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“Inasmuch as the learner is in untruth but is that by his own act . . . he might seem to be free, for to be on 
one‟s own certainly is freedom. And yet he is indeed unfree and bound and excluded, because to be free 
from the truth is indeed to be excluded, and to be excluded by oneself is indeed to be bound.” 
Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 
“The demand for absolute freedom raises the dilemma of self-dependence in its acutest form. And the 
renewed saliency of irrational and destructive cravings makes us question the very idea of autonomy[.]” 
Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society 
“Does one‟s integrity ever lie in what he is not able to do? I think that usually it does, for free will does 
not mean one will, but many wills conflicting in one man. Freedom cannot be conceived simply. It is a 
mystery and one which a novel, even a comic novel, can only be asked to deepen.” 
Flannery O‟Connor, Mystery and Manners 
“The autonomous self. The self sees itself as a sovereign and individual consciousness, liberated by 
education from the traditional bonds of religion, by democracy from the strictures of class, by technology 
from the drudgery of poverty, and by self-knowledge from the tyranny of the unconscious – and therefore 
free to pursue its own destiny without God.” 
Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos 
“Jack Kerouac‟s On the Road came out in 1957 and . . . I resented its apparent instruction to cut loose; 
Rabbit, Run was meant to be a realistic demonstration of what happens when a young American family 
man goes on the road – the people left behind get hurt.” 
John Updike, Introduction to Rabbit Angstrom: A Tetralogy 
“[Y]ou were called to freedom, brothers. Only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, 
but through love serve one another. For the whole law is fulfilled in one word: „You shall love your 
neighbor as yourself.‟ But if you bite and devour one another, watch out that you are not consumed by 
one another.” 
Saint Paul of Tarsus, The Letter of Paul to the Galatians 
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Introduction 
Freedom, following the path laid for her since Immanuel Kant‟s notion of autonomy, has 
come to be designated a meaning that would have been alien to our pre-Enlightenment forebears. 
Stripped by this designation of her inherent responsibilities, freedom has come to be constituted 
by self-reliance and, in extreme cases, unmitigated devotion to one‟s impulses. She is now 
married to a kind of relativistic self-authenticity which is self-derived from person to person, 
and, thus, ultimately vacuous and potentially nihilistic. Freedom‟s value – perhaps precisely 
because it is now considered a mere value – is tenuously subjective, lacking the contextual 
foundations necessary for virtue, restraint, and concrete meaning.  
However, due to the collapse of virtue, restraint, and meaning, relations between self and 
other have also collapsed under the weight of this vagrant notion of freedom. Hence, the 
forthcoming discussion will be primarily concerned with taking up the argument that alienation 
is the necessary corollary of autonomous notions of freedom in modern society. Further, this 
alienation is the primary source of the 20
th
 C. modern American‟s malaise – his uneasiness. 
While many Americans, for various reasons, avoided the brute fact of alienation, some mid-
twentieth century novelists perceived and depicted the disintegration of intimacy all too clearly. 
Three novels in particular – Flannery O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood, Walker Percy‟s The 
Moviegoer, and John Updike‟s Rabbit, Run – deal with modern, alienated individuals and the 
loss of intimacy within their relationships, a loss related to the sociological institutions of church, 
marriage, and family. These three institutions are of course inextricably connected as 
sociological themes, but it is appropriate to cast each novel as addressing one theme in particular: 
O‟Connor‟s novel deals significantly with alienation and God; Percy‟s novel, alienation and 
intercourse; Updike‟s novel, alienation and the nuclear family. In each novel, the protagonist 
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takes a basic form of communion that requires intimate commitment to something outside of the 
self – God, a spouse, a family – and inverts each of these forms of communion so as to be 
committed solely to the self. Hazel Motes does not just reject God, but he starts his own 
evangelistic self-religion; Jack “Binx” Bolling does not just make sexual advances outside of the 
marital institution, but he uses women he barely knows as a means to alleviate his alienation; 
Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom does not just abandon his family, but he attempts, on his own esthetic 
terms, to recreate a sense of family with a prostitute.  
While various critics have commented on the Kierkegaardian alienation that thematically 
infuses each of the three novels, little work has been done to contextually situate the themes as 
illustrating fundamental problems with modern conceptions of freedom and human agency in 
America. Hence, this work is split into two main parts, each composed of three chapters. The 
first part offers a narrative, by no means intended to be comprehensive, that situates the three 
novels within a historical-cultural context, and, ultimately, allows the novels themselves to 
situate human identity within a sense of narrative. In light of Kierkegaard‟s varied but 
undeniable influence on O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike, the first chapter situates the Danish 
philosopher in relation to autonomous notions of agency which have degenerated since 
Immanuel Kant‟s. In the second chapter, the automobile will be considered as a distinctly 
American cultural artifact which concretizes the sense of self-direction that autonomous freedom 
affords the individual. And, before turning to Part Two, chapter 3 will conclude with a socio-
linguistic discussion of how the self is situated within a communal sense of narrative, and how 
this implicitly and explicitly relates to novelistic structure. Involved most prominently in this 
discussion will be Charles Taylor, James Davison Hunter, Walker Percy, and Mikhail Bakhtin. 
Finally, if freedom conceived as radical self-sufficiency is tantamount to the corrosion of 
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communal relationships which are necessary for one‟s identity, then it follows that something is 
fundamentally amiss with the modern, autonomous agent‟s interactions with his fellows. If, as 
stated above, the fundamental relational commitments that partly constitute one‟s identity and 
that necessarily involve a mutual giving and receiving of one with the other have been inverted, 
then an apt metaphor for this egocentric inversion is onanism. That is, perhaps the autonomous 
agent‟s manipulation of the other – whether God or fellow human beings – for the sole purposes 
of his own personal fulfillment has rendered both self and other wasteful, devoid of worth due to 
the loss of a more fruitful intercourse. 
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Part 1, Chapter 1 
Kantian Autonomy and Kierkegaardian Despair: The Rise of Radical Notions of Freedom and 
the Christian Existentialist Critique of their Validity 
 
Introduction 
 It is well known that Walker Percy and John Updike were notably influenced by Søren 
Kierkegaard. What is less widely considered is that Flannery O‟Connor was also influenced by 
SK, albeit to a lesser extent. O‟Connor was less directly influenced by SK than she was more 
considerably influenced by the popularity of existential thought in general during the mid-
twentieth century.
1
 Part of the influence and allure of existential thought during the American 
post-war period was the feeling that despite expanding individual freedoms, many Americans 
still felt a keen sense of dissatisfaction with their existence. Hence, a consideration of SK‟s 
relation to these three authors is best considered against the backdrop of the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century philosophy that both provided the intellectual milieu for the Danish 
philosopher‟s thought and provides compelling insight for our distinctly American situation. 
Samuel Loncar has effectively shown how the dialectic of freedom and alienation in SK‟s 
existential thought is founded upon a history that can be traced back to Kant and German 
Idealism.
2
 I take the concomitant rise of freedom and alienation from Kant to SK to be a story of 
                                                          
1
 See “Early Work and Wise Blood” in Frederick Asals‟ Flannery O’Connor: The Imagination of 
Extremity for a treatment of the philosophical climate that O‟Connor inhabited: “Existentialism 
was both in the air and in print. From late in the World War II on into the 1950s the influential 
literary journals . . . to which Flannery O‟Connor herself would be contributing by the late 1940s 
and early 1950s – poured forth a stream of translations, interpretations, and reviews which 
delivered to their audiences word of this newest mode of thought.” Frederick Asals, Flannery 
O’Connor: The Imagination of Extremity (Athens: U of Georgia P, 1982), 29. 
2
 Samuel Loncar, 2008. “From German Idealism to Existentialism.” Unpublished Paper. Samuel 
Loncar has provided me with some helpful directions in this analysis; this project has especially 
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particular relevance for modern America and the three novels with which we are here concerned. 
Hence, before recounting this story, it will be helpful for our purposes to establish that 
O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike perceived despair or malaise as symptoms of a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of freedom. 
 
The Relevance of Freedom, Alienation, and Selfhood for O’Connor, Percy, and Updike 
 O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike – though Updike, along with SK, comes from a Protestant 
perspective as opposed to the former two‟s Thomist perspective – seemed to recognize a 
profound aberration within dominant conceptions of freedom in American culture.
3
 Unwittingly, 
O‟Connor aligns herself with SK when, in her introduction to the second edition of Wise Blood 
in 1962, she conceives of freedom as a paradoxical mystery: “Does one‟s integrity ever lie in 
what he is not able to do? I think that usually it does, for free will does not mean one will, but 
many wills conflicting in one man. Freedom cannot be conceived simply. It is a mystery and one 
which a novel, even a comic novel, can only be asked to deepen.”4 Walker Percy‟s recognition of 
the problems that derive from autonomous notions of freedom – and the direct influence of SK 
on this recognition – is noteworthy in his satirical self-help book Lost in the Cosmos. There he 
rather humorously wonders why “the autonomous self feels so alone in the cosmos” that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
benefitted from his pointing out the dialectic of freedom and alienation in SK‟s thought, from his 
work on SK‟s critique of autonomous human agency in The Sickness unto Death, and from his 
pointing me in the direction of more recent work on human agency – particularly Charles 
Taylor‟s. Both Samuel and Dr. Craig Hinkson have deepened my reading of SK, and provided a 
nuanced entryway into SK and his prophetic influence on the modern world we inhabit. In 
tracing the story of the German Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment below, both Samuel‟s 
and Dr. Hinkson‟s works are cited. 
3
 That is, general conceptions of these authors as involved in a battle of good versus evil or even 
Christianity versus secularity, while partially true, are over-reductive of the nuance that 
compelled their thought and literature. 
4
 Flannery O‟Connor, Mystery and Manners, ed. Sally and Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, 1969), 115. 
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government and primatologists are directing a mass effort to teach chimpanzees and other apes to 
learn human language.
5
 Later, Percy states the fact in “Kierkegaardian terms,” saying that the 
self is “informed,” and that despite deluded objections to the contrary, “[t]he fact is that, by 
virtue of its peculiar relationship to the world, to others, and to its own organism, the 
autonomous self in a modern technological society is possessed. It is possessed by the spirit of 
the erotic and the secret love of violence.”6 Lastly, even the prodigious man of letters, John 
Updike – himself, at times, seemingly a borderline voluptuary – recognized a self-stultifying 
form of freedom at work in the American Zeitgeist. Outside of Updike‟s novels, this perhaps 
manifested itself most clearly in a bit of a literary battle in 1984 between Updike and Harold 
Bloom over the merits of “Emersonianism.” Robert Bellah points out that in a piece by that name 
for The New Yorker, John Updike, despite his best efforts at finding a reason to appreciate the 
American literary/philosophical icon, found Ralph Waldo Emerson‟s love-affair with self-
sufficiency as “too coldly self-absorbed to be very helpful to us today.”7 To which Bloom, in 
praise for Emerson, took a somewhat veiled, but nonetheless clear, shot at Updike in an essay 
titled “Mr. America,” proclaiming that “the only God in which Americans can any longer 
believe, [is] the god of the self.”8 These essays and anecdotes allude to an expanding notion of 
freedom that always threatens the modern with an existence qualified by nothingness because it 
moves in the direction of rendering void any binding content for a stable identity. Indeed, if 
Emerson‟s Self-Reliance – a work undoubtedly influenced by the Kantian and Romantic 
traditions – might be considered in many ways a defining text for American identity, then it 
                                                          
5
 Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983), 168.  
6
 Ibid., 178. 
7
 Robert Bellah, “Individualism and Commitment in American Life,” 
www.robertbellah.com/lectures.html (20 February 1986). 
8
 Ibid.  
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behooves us to return to the German intellectual scene beginning with Kant and leading up to the 
prophetic SK – so as to gain a fuller picture of what inspired O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike over 
against what has inspired a problematic, American notion of radically autonomous freedom. 
 
Kantian Freedom and its Varied Responses during the German Enlightenment 
 Any discussion of freedom conceived as radically independent self-sufficiency and self-
direction – at least in terms of its being a modern, philosophical, and publically-codified norm, 
must begin with Immanuel Kant‟s notion of freedom – particularly autonomous agency.9 That 
the discussion must begin with Kant is not without due recognition to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. As 
many contemporary philosophers, including Charles Taylor, have pointed out, the concept of 
self-determining freedom originates with Rousseau.
10
 However, as it relates to freedom, 
selfhood, morality, and God, autonomy was most foundationally articulated by Kant. Terry 
Pinkard notes that Kant‟s notion of enlightenment entails the human agent‟s ability to reason 
without the counsel of an exterior source.
11
 Kant‟s definition of enlightenment indicates a special 
relation that Kant accorded between reason and morality. Yet, not only that, but in answer to the 
question of what was needed to accomplish enlightenment, Kant says “all that is needed is 
                                                          
9
 Though, it must be stated initially that Kant himself, were he still living, would undoubtedly 
reject this radical notion of freedom that has been largely derived from his thought. John E. Hare 
has most prominently come to Kant‟s defense. He has argued that “Kant continued to believe and 
urged us to believe that a personal God exists, and that we should recognize our duties as God‟s 
commands. Kant has been demonized as the presiding genius of modernism[.] . . . But it falsifies 
his views to make him into this kind of symbol.” John E. Hare, God’s Call: Moral Realism, 
God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 87-8. 
10
 “Rousseau is at the origin point of a great deal of contemporary culture, of the philosophies of 
self-exploration, as well as of the creeds which make self-determining freedom the key to virtue. 
He is the starting point of a transformation in modern culture towards a deeper inwardness and a 
radical autonomy.” Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989), 362-3. 
Additionally, Cartesian self-consciousness is another important “origin point” for autonomous 
notions of freedom. 
11
 Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860 (New York: Cambridge UP, 2002), 19.  
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freedom.”12 For Kant, freedom must, necessarily, have a moral dimension because he believes 
humans are moral agents. However, he also asserts that morality is not normative based on an 
exterior source, but is instead “dictated by the very nature of reason itself.”13 Hence, according to 
Kant‟s model, to act freely is to act morally because to do so is to act in accordance with true 
human nature – and it would be irrational to do otherwise. Taylor notes that the impact of Kant‟s 
model cannot be overstated: “This is a more radical definition of freedom, which rebels against 
nature as what is merely given, and demands that we find freedom in a life whose normative 
shape is somehow generated by rational activity. This idea has been a powerful, it is not 
overstated to say revolutionary, force in modern civilization.”14 Indeed, this rational/moral 
approach to human agency proves essential to Kant‟s notion of autonomy. 
 Because Kant conceived of humans, in accordance with their true nature, as 
rational/moral agents, this had far-reaching implications for his view of freedom. For an agent to 
act freely, he must not only rationally consider the moral laws that will govern his actions, but 
must actually conceive of the laws that govern his actions as self-imposed. While this idea of 
moral self-government could be, and has been, taken to relativistic extremes, Kant had no such 
intention. As Pinkard notes, Kant recognized that one could make pleasure his maxim and 
motivation for action; however, in contrast to moral duty, this conception of freedom is 
conditional on an exterior motivation: “Moral duty, however, as unconditionally binding on us, 
requires us to rise above even such things as the pursuit of pleasure[.] . . . It requires, that is, not 
just freedom but autonomy, self-determination, giving the practical law to oneself instead of 
                                                          
12
 Ibid., 20. 
13
 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 363. 
14
 Ibid., 364. 
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having any element of it imposed on oneself from outside oneself[.]”15 Thus, autonomous agency 
builds on the notion that an agent‟s freedom is exhibited by his ability to be a moral law unto 
himself – to have the free will not only to devise maxims of conduct, but to “institute the 
supreme practical law by which those maxims are to be evaluated.”16 Further, the distinction in 
Kant‟s conception of freedom between free choice and free will has significant implications for a 
democratic society. A civil authority cannot determine whether an individual is acting out of the 
Kantian notion of free will, because we do not have pure access to one another‟s motivations – 
whether they are based on moral duty or on the pursuit of personal advantage.
17
 Thus, a free 
society would have to be based on the harmonization of free choices. Yet, in the hindsight of 
inhabiting such a society, it seems most evident that the problem of personal motivation (the 
sources of Kantian “free will”) has proven to be a keen problem with which Kant and all post-
Kantians have had to come to grips. 
 If autonomous agency involves rational/moral self-government that is not coerced by 
exterior imposition, then Kant had to supply an anthropological basis for obligation and 
motivation. According to Kant, one of the, if not the, major motivations was the dignity inherent 
in being a rational agent. Taylor asserts Kant‟s view concisely: “Everything else in nature . . . 
conforms to laws blindly. Only rational creatures conform to laws that they themselves 
formulate. This is something incomparably higher. That is why rationality imposes obligations 
on us. Because we have the status which is incomparably higher than anything else in nature, we 
                                                          
15
 Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860, 52. 
16
 Ibid., 55. 
17
 This, obviously, has major implications for our own society, and for the problems attendant to 
the conception of American freedom that O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike recognized. This, we 
will return to below. 
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have the obligation to live up to it.”18 According to Kant, the agent‟s rational nature is an end in 
itself. Yet, this account of motivation seems to ignore the overwhelming prevalence of 
immorality in “educated” societies. Michelle Kosch rightly notes that, for Kantians, “morality is 
freedom” and, thus, “the idea of freely chosen immorality is unintelligible.”19 Nevertheless, with 
freedom, morality, and motivation wholly internalized based on the dignity of rational agency, 
the status of established religion as necessary for one‟s life became a significant battleground 
that Kant had to engage in. 
 It is at this point appropriate to acknowledge that what Kant essentially asserted was that 
morality was not dependent upon established, revealed religion. While Kant remained a Christian 
along deistic lines, his conception of Christianity is, according to Taylor, “radically 
anthropocentric,” and the source of the transformation of the agent‟s will is not God, but “the 
demands of rational agency itself which lie within.”20 Put simply, if morality gives rise to 
religion and not religion to morality, then what place does established religion have in people‟s 
lives? Kant‟s final answer, according to Pinkard, seems to be that morality demands a final end: 
“[R]eligion in its true, rational sense boiled down to . . . „the recognition of all duties as divine 
commands,‟ and the authority of moral duty itself rests on its having been instituted by the 
agents in the „kingdom of ends,‟ not from its being commanded by a God standing outside of 
human reason.”21 It should be noted that it was deeply important to Kant that his conception of 
autonomy be considered compatible with Christianity. He went so far as to say that Christianity 
was “the only example of such a „moral religion,‟” and reinterpreted the story of Jesus‟ death and 
                                                          
18
 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 365. 
19
 Michelle Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard New York: Oxford 
U P, 2006), 2. 
20
 Ibid., 366. 
21
 Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860, 62. 
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transfiguration as meaning that “‟there exists absolutely no salvation for man apart from the most 
inward incorporation of genuinely ethical principles into his disposition[.]‟”22 Pinkard points out 
that for Kant, “Morality, autonomously doing duty for duty‟s sake, simply is all there is, 
rationally, to the idea of religious salvation.”23 Kant‟s conception of autonomy would, by itself, 
be sufficient to consider over against SK‟s construal of human agency; however, Kant‟s 
influence created both allies and adversaries among the Romantics and German Idealists – many 
of whom would prove to be compelling influences on SK.  
 One of the profoundest influences on SK‟s life and work was the German thinker Johann 
Georg Hamann. The pietistic leader of the Sturm und Drang
24
 movement is necessary to consider 
here for two primary reasons: the philosophical/religious battle he undertook against Kant over 
the supremacy of rationality, and the significant role he played in reviving and defending the 
spirit of Luther “when the Aufklärung threatened to destroy it.”25 Of course the two influences 
are no doubt related: Luther was seminal in asserting “the frailty of reason” and that “faith 
transcends the criticism and demonstration of reason.”26 Beiser argues that Hamann is the natural 
competitor to Kant‟s conception of disembodied, autonomous reason because he claims that 
reason is not able to “determine its principles independent of other faculties,” but must be 
conceived within “a context of social and cultural forces.”27 To question the status of reason as 
                                                          
22
 Ibid., 65. 
23
 Ibid., 65. 
24
 Translated “Storm and Stress,” the Sturm und Drang, over against the Aufklärung (see below), 
was a movement that emphasized the individual‟s subjectivity and emotional self-expression as a 
necessary reaction to the constraints of enlightenment rationalism. 
25
 Aufklärung was the term that came to signify the enlightenment movement of the 18
th
 C. The 
term was generally accepted as early as Kant‟s essay “Answering the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?” Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to 
Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993), 17. 
26
 Ibid., 17. 
27
 Ibid., 17-8. 
Olson 17 
 
an end in itself is to throw into question Kant‟s notion of autonomy. Underlying Hamann‟s 
assertion that the faculty of reason must be contextualized is his critique of the post-Cartesian 
assumption that self-consciousness is the primary province of self-illumination. Instead, Hamann 
considers self-awareness “problematic, mysterious, and obscure” and asserts that self-knowledge 
is acquired by knowing our position in “nature, history, and society, for our identity depends 
upon our relations to everything else.”28 At this point, we can begin to see what was at stake in 
the battle between Kant and Hamann. While both philosophers affirm the necessity of self-
knowledge, they fundamentally differ in how man is to acquire this knowledge and, thus, supply 
life with significance: for Kant it is reason, while for Hamann it is faith. It would be Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte who would push Kantian autonomy to its extremes and function as somewhat of 
a bridge between Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
29
 
 Fichte carries on the Kantian mantel of autonomy and sets out to assert it with a new 
level of force. He, like Kant, maintains two concepts of freedom: the freedom of will and the 
freedom of choice. One of the most important assertions in Fichte‟s account of freedom is that it 
must exclude both necessity and chance. In other words, Beiser notes, freedom entails that “there 
must be some reason for our actions . . . but it cannot be a cause that compels us to act so that we 
cannot do otherwise.”30 The Fichtean model of freedom is summarized in the term “self-
determination” which necessitates that the agent is only fully free when there are “no external 
causes to make us what we are.”31 Fichte did come to concede that the agent‟s identity 
                                                          
28
 Ibid., 21. 
29
 It is generally accepted that German Idealism – a movement which asserted that all of reality 
was the product of mind, and which includes Fichte and Hegel as its seminal proponents – 
flowed from the philosophy of Kant. 
30
 Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801 (Cambridge: Harvard 
U P, 2008), 274. 
31
 Ibid., 277. 
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inescapably involves wholly exterior factors such as environment and heredity; while the agent 
may have the ability to create purposes and live unto them, he cannot have any control over his 
properties or characteristics which are dependent upon nature.
32
 As a result, Fichte resolves to 
conceive of freedom as one‟s rational striving to bring nature incrementally under one‟s control. 
Beiser elucidates the anguish Fichte felt over the seeming impossibility of self-determining 
freedom: 
Over no issue was Fichte more uncertain and troubled at this time than the 
question of the reality of freedom itself. . . . Rather than saying man is free, it is 
better just to say that he strives and hopes to be free. Then in plain blunt language 
Fichte writes: „The proposition that „man is free‟ is not true[.]‟ . . . He eventually 
resolves this tension by developing the thesis that, although we are not free in the 
sense of having absolute independence, we still must strive to attain this goal. It is 
indeed only in the striving after freedom that we prove that we are free after all. 
Ideal freedom requires complete independence, not only from, but over the causes 
of nature; it consists in having causality over everything that is not ourselves. 
Although we cannot achieve such complete independence, we can still strive to 
approach it.
33
 
Ultimately, Fichte falls back on the appeal to conscience and moral duty. When a person fails 
morally, his conscience appeals to him that he could have chosen otherwise, and, thus, he has the 
duty to believe in the reality of his freedom.  
Fichte‟s musings on freedom led him to adopt an “intersubjective” model of society in 
which people make claims for personal rights and place limits on their own freedom toward 
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respecting and recognizing the rights of others. Here, like Kant, Fichte operates on the good-faith 
assumption that others will operate with the Kantian free will (inner freedom) to respect one 
another‟s sphere of free choices (outer freedom).34 It is this Kantian/Fichtean model of 
autonomous moral agency giving rise to an intersubjective normative social order that would 
provide the foundation for the Hegelian Sittlichkeit – the ethical system composed with the goal 
of reconciling subjectivity and the general social good. Yet, Hegel would come to situate the 
freedom of the people within the rational-idealistic evolution of Geist – or world-history. 
However, before turning to a brief consideration of Hegel and freedom, we must first consider 
Friedrich Schlegel‟s and Johann Ludwig Tieck‟s romantic irony – particularly their rejection of  
finitude and unbridled affirmation of infinite possibility. 
With regard to the human‟s free agency, Schlegel and Fichte radicalized freedom in terms 
of infinite possibility by transposing the Fichtean metaphysical principle for subjectivity onto the 
finite subject. In consideration of this move and its implications, SK himself is the most evident 
and helpful critic.
35
 In his dissertation, The Concept of Irony, SK comments that the early Fichte 
“infinitely liberated thought” by making the “producing I” the same as the “produced I” – 
forming a singular, abstract identity.
36
 SK criticizes this “infinity of thought,” saying that 
Fichte‟s infinity is “an infinity in which there is no finitude, an infinity without any content.”37 
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SK relates these metaphysical conceptions of freedom in the early Fichte to Schlegel and Tieck 
by noting that the latter two used this metaphysical conception as a basis for the agent‟s 
operating in the world. 
38
 The essential difficulty with this move, though, is that “the empirical 
and finite I was confused with the eternal I[.]”39 As we will note further below, the Romantics 
conceived of irony as, unlike Hegelian irony, unbridled because it is not situated in the service of 
world spirit. That is, “[i]t was not an element of the given actuality that must be negated and 
superseded by a new element, but it was all of historical actuality that it negated in order to make 
room for a self-created actuality.”40 This romantic notion of irony “now functioned as that for 
which nothing was established, as that which was finished with everything, and also as that 
which had the absolute power to do everything.”41 Schlegel‟s and Tieck‟s affirmation of infinite 
possibility and degradation of finitude is manifested in their literary writings. SK notes that while 
in Lucinde Schlegel “didacticizes” and “turns directly against actuality,” in Tieck‟s novellas, he 
maintains indulgence “in a poetic abandon” and maintains this “in its indifference toward 
actuality.”42 Yet, whether the militancy of Schlegel or indifference of Tieck, the result is the 
same: the inherent boundaries of finitude are abandoned in favor of the perceived advantages of 
infinite, abstract possibility. SK fully aligns himself with Hegel in negation of these fanciful 
assertions, commenting that “Hegel‟s hostile behavior toward it is entirely in order.”43 Though in 
their rejection of the infinite abstractedness of romantic irony SK and Hegel would no doubt 
agree, they part ways, however, with regard to how the agent‟s freedom is situated. 
 It is common for philosophers to draw a line of connection from Kant to Hegel, and one 
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appropriate way of doing so is to say that Hegel sought to provide the model – or, system – by 
which the autonomous self would not have a situationless freedom disconnected from nature, but 
which would also avoid negating the idea of the subjective agent‟s rational will. SK would of 
course come to reject much of Hegel‟s system, but he would certainly – as we will see – agree 
with Hegel that freedom must be situated, for otherwise it leads to nihilistic vacuity. Regarding 
the significance of Hegel‟s relation to Kant, Taylor notes, “Hegel laid bare the emptiness of the 
free self and the pure rational will, in his critique of Kant‟s morality and the politics of absolute 
freedom. And he hoped to overcome this emptiness, to give man a situation, without abandoning 
the notion of rational will. This was to be done by showing man to be the vehicle of a cosmic 
reason, which generated its articulations of itself.”44 In sum, Hegel‟s move was to situate self-
determination – leading one‟s own life – within the historical outworking of what he called 
“cosmic spirit.” Pinkard notes that this historical outworking forms the basis of Hegel‟s 
Phenomenology of Spirit: “Hegel intended the book to satisfy the needs of contemporary 
(European) humanity: it was to provide an education, a Bildung, a formation for its readership so 
that they could come to grasp who they had become (namely, a people individually and 
collectively „called‟ to be free), why they had become those people, and why that has been 
necessary[.]”45 That is, Hegel asserted that the total outworking of all of history to this point was 
toward the evolution of self-determining freedom. This was modern man‟s call. It is no 
coincidence that Hegel‟s assertion seems religious, for Hegel conceived of God as evidently 
unfolding himself in nature. For Hegel, there is a sense in which history – of which man is a part 
– is God‟s evolving. At the very least, God is wholly within reach of man‟s rational reflection. 
Thus, at bottom, Hegel articulated a religion of immanence.  
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The ultimate immanent nature of Hegel‟s philosophy has proven to be as equally unstable 
for human agency as the underlying motivation supporting Kant‟s notion of autonomous agency. 
Taylor notes that all it took was for Hegel‟s notion of total self-creation – which was attributable 
to cosmic spirit – to be “transposed on to man to push the conception of freedom as self-
dependence to its ultimate dilemma. He thus played an important part in the intensification of the 
conflict around the modern notion of freedom.”46 If Hegel can be credited for throwing into 
question the whole project of self-determining freedom set apart from a background situation – 
or, an external horizon of significance – SK can be credited for doing the same. However, as we 
will see, SK‟s project will avoid abandoning the necessity of both God‟s transcendence and the 
individual human agent being situated before this transcendent Creator. Thus, as Craig Hinkson 
notes, while SK “rejects the romantics‟ excessive emphasis upon the infinity of the human spirit 
as experienced in imagination and irony, he also rejects Hegel‟s unimaginative, unironic 
boundness to finitude. The task of the individual is to reconcile both aspects of his nature.”47 
Influenced by the Romantics and German Idealists, SK emphasizes subjectivity, but also 
recognizes the necessity for the subject to actualize content for a coherent existence. 
 
Kierkegaard’s Critique of Autonomous Freedom in The Sickness unto Death 
 While Kierkegaard‟s emphasis on subjectivity must no doubt be understood against the 
background of late eighteenth and nineteenth-century thought regarding human agency, he is not 
an ally to autonomous notions of freedom, but instead provides a point of departure from them. 
In one telling journal entry in 1850, SK notes,  
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Kant was of the opinion that man is his own law (autonomy) – that is, he binds 
himself under the law which he himself gives himself. Actually, in a profounder 
sense, this is how lawlessness or experimentation are established. . . . If I am 
bound by nothing higher than myself and I am to bind myself, where would I get 
the rigorousness as A, the binder, which I do not have as B, who is supposed to be 
bound, when A and B are the same self.
48
  
In his own witty way, SK echoes the problem of sufficient motivation for Kantian autonomy. 
Pinkard comments that “for [SK], the modern world has promised freedom but, instead had 
delivered a deadening conformity, and, even worse, a kind of puffed up rhetoric about itself that 
seemed far removed from its tawdry reality.”49 This “tawdry reality” – which SK believed all of 
the modern, rhetorical systems
50
 regarding freedom and the ethical life had failed to sufficiently 
address or improve – is, in a sense, the foundation for his existential thought.  
As alluded to above, Hamann proves to be a significant influence on SK‟s conception of 
human agency, for he is most responsible for arousing SK‟s interest in both Socrates and Luther. 
Hinkson notes that SK was indebted to Socrates, as mediated by Hamann, for his existential 
thought, and that Hamann‟s Socrates was distinctly Christian; Hamann sought to release Socrates 
from the clutches of the Aufklärer by accusing them of ignoring Socrates‟ claim to be the 
recipient of divine revelations, and his recognition that genuine self-understanding lay beyond 
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man‟s ken.51 That is, they both, in common with Luther, maintained a profound mistrust of 
human nature and its ability to rationally comprehend itself. But Luther, too, needed to be freed 
from the Aufklärer’s clutches. The typical misappropriation of Luther that characterized 
Hamann‟s and SK‟s contemporaries‟ thought was that he was the champion – the liberator – of 
autonomous reason.
52
 Ironically, of course, Luther‟s ideas are completely at odds with the 
Enlightenment‟s humanistic optimism. Rather, as Hinkson rightly notes, “Against a common foe 
– reason and its pretensions – Luther, Hamann, and Kierkegaard appealed to the deep fallenness 
of human nature and its utter inability to establish a point of contact with God, on the one hand, 
and to the transcendence of God and the incomprehensibility of his wondrous, saving acts, on the 
other.”53 Indeed, for SK, human nature is so deeply corrupted by sin that there is an absolute 
divide between God and man; further, if there is to be any reconciliation between God and man, 
this divide necessitates a revelation that is both authoritative and paradoxical.  
If SK is right that man is inhibited by his sin to such an extent that he cannot encounter 
God via his natural capabilities, then God‟s self-revelation will necessarily appear offensive to 
reason. Here, I would argue that Hinkson‟s elucidation of SK‟s and Luther‟s “theology of the 
cross” is exceedingly significant for understanding Kierkegaard, autonomous freedom, and 
human agency: 
[B]ecause God‟s absolute unlikeness cannot even in principle become manifest 
except by a paradoxical assumption of likeness (likeness with an unsettling 
dissonance about it), Kierkegaard is led to posit Luther‟s Christological sense of 
                                                          
51
 Craig Hinkson, “Kierkegaard, Socrates, and the Maieutic Art.” Papers of the Nineteenth 
Century Theology Group XXXII (2001): 10, 13-4. 
52Craig Hinkson, “Will the Real Martin Luther Please Stand Up! Kierkegaard‟s View of Luther 
versus the Evolving Perceptions of the Tradition,” International Kierkegaard Commentary: ‘For 
Self-Examination’ and ‘Judge for Yourself!’ (Macon, GA: Mercer U P, 2002), 62-3. 
53
 Ibid., 74. 
Olson 25 
 
hiddeneness, as well. The lowly servant of all, Jesus of Nazareth, is the 
omnipotent, Lord God of all. Kierkegaard‟s “God incognito” and Luther‟s “God 
hidden in sufferings” are equivalent expressions of the necessity of indirect 
communication where revelation is concerned: if God is to manifest himself at all 
to sinful humans, such manifestation will necessarily entail an act of 
condescension that simultaneously conceals him, preserving intact the essential 
secrecy of Godhead. The paradoxical character of revelation is necessarily 
scandalous to reason.
54
  
I would argue that God‟s manifestation in Christ as a paradoxical “incognito” is relevant toward 
our consideration of what constitutes free human agency. On my reading of SK and the relevant 
scholarship, there are two primary respects in which the human agent must come to understand 
his freedom as paradoxically expressed in submission or service: (1) the created human agent 
must come to understand freedom in terms of accepting the necessary aspects of his situation that 
are beyond his control as designated by a Creator
55
 and, therefore, (2) freedom‟s possibility is 
materially qualified by the object of his choosing – i.e., in the profoundest (and most narrowed) 
sense, the acceptance or rejection of those revealed designations.
56
 Here, it is important to 
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ascertain that although SK‟s conception of the self is qualified by necessity, it is not, as Samuel 
Loncar notes, “a complete repudiation of self-determining freedom. For while our nature is, in 
one sense, given, we have the freedom and responsibility to become a certain type of self that we 
are not simply in virtue of existing.”57  Though published after Either/Or, The Sickness unto 
Death provides the most insight into SK‟s conception of human agency and, thus, will provide 
an excellent initial backdrop against which to consider the esthetic and ethical depictions of 
human agency found in E/O. 
 In SUD, SK offers his clearest elucidation of the human agent: he is constituted by a 
synthetic relation, which is itself an established relation beyond the agent‟s control. SK, via Anti-
Climacus, asserts that man is “a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the 
eternal, of freedom, and necessity, in short a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two.”58 
This synthesis becomes a self when the relation “relates itself to itself” – i.e., becomes self-
conscious; however, this self “must either have established itself or have been established by 
another.”59 SK contends that the human self is this derived relation. Loncar comments that SK‟s 
theory of the self is similar to Fichte‟s except in this particularly important point of its derived 
constitution: “This is Kierkegaard‟s major modification of Fichte‟s theory, the first principle of 
which is the self‟s positing of itself. Fichte‟s idealism has to explain how all experience of 
necessity . . . and otherness are compatible with the idea that everything that is posited within the 
self. By contrast, for Kierkegaard the self does not posit itself but is rather posited by another.”60 
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Based on the self‟s being a derived relation, the rest of SUD expounds upon two primary ways in 
which the human agent can be in despair: not to will to be oneself and to will to be oneself in the 
wrong way. In other words, despair is not the result of one‟s lack of free agency, but results from 
the misunderstanding of the nature of his free agency. The two primary expressions of despair – 
not to will to be oneself or to will to be oneself in the wrong way – can manifest themselves in 
multiple ways. As Kosch puts it, “Despair in the most general sense will turn out to be the 
unwillingness to accept human agency with all of its particular conditions. There are many ways 
to do this, and each will be accompanied by a corresponding distortion – a failure of fit.”61 
Loncar expands on Kosch‟s elucidation of despair as unwilling submission by showing how SK 
anticipates Charles Taylor‟s notion of man as being partially constituted by self-interpretation; 
that is, despair is not merely the result of faulty self-conceptions or poor choices, but is a state of 
existence.”62 The synthetic relations of human agency – infinite and finite, temporal and eternal, 
freedom and necessity – must be in balanced tension and the agent can only achieve this balance 
by grounding his existence in – or, perhaps more correctly, relating his self to – the One who 
established the relation (i.e. God). Thus, to not will to be oneself is to be materially qualified by 
nothing; it is, in despair, to relate oneself to nothing and, thus, to hollow out in nothingness. 
Conversely, to despairingly will to be oneself is to choose to ground oneself in something other 
than God. Kosch makes two helpful points regarding SK‟s conception of human agency: first, it 
is constituted by the interrelation between freedom and constraint and, secondly, that it is, except 
the point of the agent relating himself to the power that posited him, similar to popular 
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nineteenth-century conceptions of human agency like Fichte‟s.63 The typical models of freedom 
as self-starting, or, self-positing, are examples of an agent despairingly willing to be himself. 
And this form of despair – more precisely, the despair of the self which “becomes lost in 
possibility”64 – is the form of despair we are primarily interested in here in our consideration of 
modern notions of freedom. Interestingly, SK, via Anti-Climacus, describes despair as an 
“impotent self-consuming that cannot do what it wants to do.”65 This willing self-consumption 
is, ironically, one‟s self-annihilation, for he wants to “tear his self away from the power that 
established it.”66 If one‟s freedom is not qualified by “the power to obey, to submit to the 
necessity in one‟s life, to what may be called one‟s limitations”67 then one is not truly free. This 
despairing agent who is lost in possibility – who wishes to be “master of itself”; who wishes “to 
make his self into the self he wants to be”; who wishes to “begin a little earlier than do other 
men, not at and with the beginning, but „in the beginning‟”68 – is the type of agent we want to 
bear in mind as we consider the esthetic and ethical lifestyles presented pseudonymously in E/O. 
 
The Dialectic of Freedom and Alienation in Either/Or 
 SK‟s E/O is significant to consider with regard to human agency because it presents two 
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approaches to existence – the esthetic and the ethical – that provide essential examples of how an 
agent conceives of his freedom and identity; further, I take the exposition of both approaches to 
agency and their attendant problems – despite Judge William‟s closer proximity to authentic 
freedom – as characterizing the shortcomings of both Kantian autonomy and its subsequent 
aberrant forms in the post/modern age. E/O is constituted by two parts that have been edited by 
“Victor Eremita”; in part I, SK presents the esthetic view of life via “A,” who is, himself, an 
esthete, and, in part II, SK presents the ethical view of life via “Judge William.” Broadly 
speaking, the esthetic approach to agency is characterized by the agent‟s living in what SK calls 
immediacy, or, in the moment; in contrast, the ethical approach to agency is constituted by the 
agent‟s binding himself to significant ethical commitments. I would argue that both views, while 
vastly different, are qualitatively grounded in a sense of autonomy, or, by differing approaches to 
self-determination. In the end, my argument regarding the onanistic nature of autonomy that I 
find apparent in both modes of existence, will flow from my agreement with Pinkard: SK intends 
for the reader to come to realize that there is no choice between the agent‟s leading his own life 
esthetically or leading his own life ethically because of the impossibility of an agent‟s wholly 
leading his own life at all.
69
 Against this backdrop of interpretation, we will first consider the 
autonomous-esthetic approach to existence.  
 Because leading one‟s own life esthetically is constituted by immediate-desire 
fulfillment,
70
 the human agent who leads such an existence necessarily comes to maintain 
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relationships that are instrumental; and, thus, what I am going to refer to as the “autonomous-
esthetic”71 existence produces a kind of human agency characterized by one‟s manipulation of 
others for his own fulfillment with disregard for the other‟s desire-fulfillment – ultimately 
producing waste for both self and other. This selfish form of interpersonal agency – 
characterized by manipulation, fulfillment, and waste – provides the contours for my analogous 
use of onanism throughout this project.  This form of esthetic autonomy falls under the broad 
category of despairingly not willing to be oneself. Victor Eremita gives the reader the initial 
intimation that A‟s life lacks coherence because, in contrast to Judge William, “there is no 
information at all about him.”72 A‟s scattered writings come to fulfill this intimation. While at 
times assertive and lively, A also comments that one of his most intimate confidants is his 
depression: “My depression is the most faithful mistress I have known – no wonder, then, that I 
return the love.”73 The reason his depression is his most faithful mistress is evident when he 
makes some notably asocial assertions. A warns that one should “stay clear of friendship,”74 and 
“never become involved in marriage.”75 In what may be his most revealing and evidently self-
stultifying assertion regarding freedom and commitments, A provides his rationale for avoiding 
friendship and marriage: 
One must always guard against contracting a life relationship by which one can 
become many. That is why even friendship is dangerous, marriage even more so. 
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They do say that marriage partners become one, but this is very obscure and 
mysterious talk. If an individual is many, he has lost his freedom and cannot order 
his riding boots when he wishes, cannot knock about according to whim. If he has 
a wife, it is difficult; if he has a wife and perhaps children, it is formidable; if he 
has a wife and children, it is impossible.
76
 
A‟s hostility toward, and lack of, permanent relational commitments seems to cause his 
depression. Tellingly, he says, “I have, I believe, the courage to doubt everything; I have, I 
believe, the courage to fight against everything; but I do not have the courage to acknowledge 
anything, the courage to possess, to own, anything.”77 And, further, A seems to revel in the fact 
of his meaningless existence: “[T]he only thing I see is emptiness, the only thing I live on is 
emptiness, the only thing I move in is emptiness.”78 A replaces permanent commitments with 
immediate satisfactions, and takes Don Juan as his guide to the artistic-life.
79
 
A sets up “Don Juan”80 as a paradigmatic figure for his esthetic existence. He 
distinguishes between immediate seduction and reflective seduction:  
In the musical Don Juan, there would then be the extensive seducer; in the other, 
the intensive. So the latter Don Juan is not presented as possessing his object with 
one single blow – he is not the immediately qualified seducer; he is the reflective 
seducer. That which occupies us here is the subtlety, the cunning, whereby he 
knows how to steal into a girl‟s heart, the dominion he knows how to gain over it, 
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the enthralling, deliberate, progressive seduction. How many he has seduced is of 
no importance here; what occupies us is the artistry, the meticulousness, the 
profound cunning with which he seduces. . . . The musical Don Juan enjoys the 
satisfaction; the reflective Don Juan enjoys the deception, enjoys the craftiness. 
The immediate pleasure is past, and reflection on the enjoyment is enjoyed 
more.
81
 
For both the immediate and the more reflective seductive-esthete, a potential commitment in the 
form of a relationship with a woman is inverted so that the woman is objectified as a means to 
the end of personal pleasure. Whereas a commitment would be considered a constraint to the 
esthete‟s freedom, the manipulation of another person toward the fulfillment of personal desire is 
imagined as realized freedom. While the immediate esthete enjoys the act of pleasure itself, the 
more self-aware, reflective esthete enjoys his own enjoyment. Further, the craft of the seduction 
provides A with the antidote of amusement to what he classifies as life‟s chief evil: boredom.82 
In order to achieve control over his own enjoyment, the seducing esthete makes his life – indeed, 
his interactions with others – into a work of art that is subordinate to his whim as the artist. In his 
inward reflections, Johannes the Seducer
83
 attempts to fashion the circumstances of his existence 
into a situation that can be enjoyed. This esthetic re-creation lends itself to the end of self-
sufficiency, of independence. The Seducer‟s extreme goal is perhaps most concisely stated in his 
stance contra God and His human agents: “I have always tried to develop the beautiful Greek 
αὐτάρκεια (self-sufficiency), and especially to make a pastor superfluous.”84 In the place of 
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religious submission, the Seducer is intoxicated with his own power – by the thought that 
Cordelia is beholden to his power.
85
 He is essentially an asocial god using others to fulfill 
himself: “My relationship to her is like a dance that is supposed to be danced by two people but 
is danced by only one. That is, I am the other dancer, but invisible.”86 Here, again, the onanistic 
imagery is apparent, and all it takes for this debased form of agency to become normative is the 
breaking down of motivation on Kant‟s rational/moral paradigm. 
There is a sense in which the esthetic sphere – in all of its varying, actual manifestations 
– is constituted by a transposition of Kant‟s notion of autonomy from a rational/moral norm for 
agency to a desire-fulfillment norm for agency. And, if this is the case, the implications for the 
agent‟s relationships are disastrous for both the people who become manipulable objects that 
serve the end of the agent‟s self-satisfaction, and for the agent himself who, from these 
instrumental relations, produces only waste – certainly no viable content for a safe, coherent 
identity. That this distorted form of free agency is recognizable to us today is beyond dispute. In 
fact, Taylor – who has put forth contemporary work on human agency which is, some critics 
have argued, in many ways anticipated by SK
87
 – comments on this form of agency that is 
predicated on a desire-fulfillment norm: “The advantage of the view that freedom is the absence 
of external obstacles is its simplicity. It allows us to say that freedom is being able to do what 
you want, where what you want is unproblematically understood as what the agent can identify 
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as his desires.”88 Taylor decisively rebuts the notion, saying that there “seem to be cases in which 
the obstacles to freedom are internal; and if this is so, then freedom cannot simply be interpreted 
as the absence of external obstacles; and the fact that I am doing what I want, in the sense of 
following my strongest desire, is not sufficient to establish that I am free.”89 For further critique 
of the esthetic sphere, and the assertion of an identity involving permanent, relational 
commitments, we now turn to the ethical life asserted by Judge William in his critique of A in 
part II of E/O.  
 SK, via Judge William, provides an ethico-religious
90
 critique of A that highlights the 
problems attendant to the autonomous-esthete. One of the first reprimands the Judge provides in 
his letter to A is that he is “the epitome of any and every possibility[.] . . . You pursue every 
mood, every idea, good or bad, happy or sad, to its outermost limit, but in such a way that it 
happens more in abstracto than in concreto, so that this pursuit is itself more a mood, from 
which nothing more results than a knowledge of it[.]”91 As a result of the supposed freedom that 
A finds in despairingly not willing to be himself, he has, according to the Judge‟s rendering, 
made himself “impervious to any attribution of responsibility.”92 Further, the Judge identifies 
A‟s depression as representative of society at large and a defect of the age; it is a depression that 
has “robbed us of the courage to command, the courage to obey, the power to act, the confidence 
to hope[.]”93 Clearly connecting this depression to ethical/social problems, the Judge says that 
A‟s enjoyment is “egotistical,” and comments that A never gives of himself – never lets others 
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enjoy him.
94
 Indeed, in one fell swoop, the Judge comments on love as involving a freedom 
qualified by constraint: “But just as the nature of all love is a unity of freedom and necessity, so 
also here. The individual feels himself free in this necessity, feels his own individual energy in it, 
feels precisely in this the possession of everything he is.”95 According to the Judge, A‟s 
conception of freedom as infinite, abstract possibility – uninhibited by concrete, exterior 
commitments – is actually enslaving and self-contradictory because by never “finding solidity” 
in his life, he never “acquires content,”96 but instead “withers away in atrophy.”97 The primary 
example that Judge William provides for how the agent‟s ethical/social commitments define his 
identity is the marital institution according to which one‟s identity is defined by his commitment 
as a husband to his wife or as a father to his children. While the Judge‟s critique of A‟s lack of 
ethical commitments is helpful in considering that which is necessary for agency and identity 
formation, the Judge‟s admonitions for A to lead his own life ethically raise questions regarding 
the motivational source for the perseverance that is necessary for the moral agent to remain 
bound to his commitments. 
 Within the Judge‟s critique of the esthetic life are hints of Kantian autonomy that, 
ultimately, foster an onanistic disregard for the relationship between the autonomous-ethicist and 
the transcendent Creator. That is, there is a sense in which the Judge, though he in several places 
acknowledges God‟s existence, considers himself his own authority. When considering what 
shall bind him to his ethical commitments, the Judge‟s response is telling: “And if I cannot fulfill 
my duty, where is the authority to compel me? State and Church have indeed set a certain limit, 
but even though I do not go to the extreme, can I not therefore be a bad husband? Who will 
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punish me? Who will stand up for her who is the victim? . . . Answer: you yourself.”98 Similarly, 
the Judge points out that the agent who lives ethically will face difficulties, and “when the 
darkness of the storm clouds so envelops him that his neighbor cannot see him, he still has not 
perished, there is always a point to which he holds fast, and that point is – himself.”99 While the 
Judge may lead a more respectable life than A, his ethico-religious attempts at respectability are 
self-righteous manipulations of God‟s divine revelation that have as their aim self-fulfillment.100 
Here, again, we can turn to Taylor both for confirmation of E/O‟s relevance in our own day and 
for yet another critique of Kantian autonomy: “The demand for absolute freedom raises the 
dilemma of self-dependence in its acutest form. And the renewed saliency of irrational and 
destructive cravings makes us question the very idea of autonomy[.]”101 Ultimately, for SK, 
while the ethico-religious agent is in a sense closer to realizing his freedom than the esthetic 
agent, he has not yet realized the paradox that any attempt to lead one‟s own life – whether 
esthetically, ethically, or in immanent religiousness – is a form of slavery because he has not 
fully submitted to the divine call, as manifested in Christ, to relate himself to his Creator. 
 SK asserts that genuine freedom can only be realized in submission to Christ. This 
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paradoxical freedom is qualified not by reason, but by faith. Further, this faith is wholly 
dependent on God‟s revelation in Christ. But, again, as Hinkson asserts, due to the absolute 
divide between God and man, God‟s revealing of Himself is necessarily an “incognito” or, a 
“hiddenness.” God takes on the form of a servant in Christ, but also exhibits the utmost freedom. 
Pinkard supports this interpretation of SK and free agency: “One must, instead, give oneself over 
to God and accept that only by submitting one‟s life to God‟s judgment can one then have a life 
of one‟s own. The „Kantian paradox‟ is „overcome‟ only by acknowledging the Christian 
paradox that one must first give up one‟s life in order to have one‟s life.”102 SK emphasizes both 
of the Christian doctrines of man‟s freedom and that it is conditioned by God‟s grace. That man 
can be in despair is, essentially, a kind of freedom that places him above the animals. However, 
it is a negative freedom, for though the human agent is free to reject God, he would be rejecting 
the thing most needful for his freedom – Freedom itself. Though SK recognizes that the human 
agent must submit his self transparently before God in order to realize his freedom, there is also a 
sense in which the human agent comes to this crisis of the will via his choices and the realization 
that his choices prove ineffective apart from God‟s will. Hinkson notes that the progression of 
SK‟s stages “resembled a kind of funnel in which one‟s possibilities became more and more 
limited until, at last, they had been reduced, really, to but one: either Christianity . . . or 
despair.”103 Eventually, once the human agent‟s failed choices have been reduced by God, his 
choice between God and alienation from God is qualified so absolutely by the agent‟s reliance on 
God‟s grace that it is as if there is no choice.104 Yet, ultimately, while SK advocates the necessity 
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of God‟s revelation, he still remains too committed to the human agent‟s personal crisis moment 
of choice with God. While SK provides a departure from autonomous notions of freedom in 
Christian terms, he also opens a debate as to whether he advocates his own peculiar 
individualism.  
 
The Lack of Community in Kierkegaard’s Thought 
 Though SK offers a compelling critique of Kantian autonomy on the basis of the human 
agent‟s need for revelation, his thought seems ultimately bereft of the realization that the Kantian 
move which transposes the telos of authority from God‟s revelation to human reason also has 
profound implications for the human agent‟s relationship with other people. We noted above that 
although SK‟s ethical pseudonym, Judge William, provides a sharp and needed critique of A‟s 
lack of commitments, he also, until his acquired intimation in the conclusion of E/O, remains 
committed to God on the basis of his own authority as an ethical agent. Further, in SK‟s thought, 
there is still a tendency for the human agent, due to his powers of choice and passionate 
subjectivity in relation to God, to retain a problematic independence from other human agents. 
That is, it seems that in Kierkegaard‟s thought the human agent is conceived of as relational, but 
his relational activity is excessively a matter between his interior self and God, and his 
interdependence with the Body of Christ – the Church – is ultimately deemphasized. 
 It is common knowledge that SK is often accused of asserting a form of individualism. 
His writings concerning human agency, while eminently extensive and laudable, seem to lack a 
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theology of the church. Several excuses can, and have been, inserted on behalf of the Danish 
philosopher. A few arguments, in particular, seem most fashionable: that SK was too concerned 
with the authenticity of the individual Christian in the face of “Christendom” or the Hegelian 
system that he saw so many problems with; that he himself avoided significant relationships 
because of the fear instilled in him by his father that he was going to die at an early age; or, that 
SK, due in large part to the “Corsair Affair,” became a bit of an embittered recluse. Further, 
some critics – notably C. Stephen Evans – take a more positive view SK‟s view of community 
and are quick to note that the attribution of sociality is often implicated in his construal of human 
agency. However, I agree with Hinkson (and the relevant scholarship attendant to his argument) 
that SK‟s apparent individualism is perhaps most attributable to a particular line of thought in his 
theology: a preoccupied, overemphasis of suffering in his Christology and, in a related sense, his 
overemphasis of subjectivity. In a sense this point seems to unify the typical assertions 
mentioned above, while also validating the claim that SK is ultimately individualistic. Hinkson 
argues convincingly that upon consideration of SK‟s Christology, “[I]n the end, the Christian 
who would imitate Christ assumes suffering not out of concern for his neighbor‟s well-being, but 
out of the priority (and hence, merit) that the suffering enjoys in its own right. And the facts, 
indeed, bear this supposition out.”105 Hinkson ultimately pinpoints this overemphasis of suffering 
as the result of SK‟s de-emphasis of the resurrection: “[T]he problem is that on SK‟s 
presentation the believer‟s contemporaneous imitation of Christ the model is unqualified by the 
Christ the redeemer’s enabling presence.”106 Perhaps most notably, Hinkson points out that the 
glorified, risen Christ is foundational for a theology of the church, and, thus, SK‟s over-emphasis 
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of the contemporaneous imitation of Christ‟s modeled suffering fosters individualism:  
[T]he absence of any relationship to [the risen Christ] should entail the absence of 
any relationship to his body. Conversely, the Christ with whom Kierkegaard 
seems best acquainted is Christ the model. The only possible relationship with 
him is imitation through suffering. But as Kierkegaard makes clear, concentration 
on „the collective‟ is inimical to the category of imitation, which relates to the 
individual. Isolation is the element in which discipleship breathes, and suffering is 
the instrument by which people are individualized and driven into isolation. . . . 
The net result of SK‟s extreme emphasis upon imitation in suffering is a strong 
doctrine of the individual, but not of the church.
107
 
Thus, what remains irreconcilable in SK‟s thought is a situation in which a free agent can be an 
authentically Christian individual within an interdependent church body. That is, it seems 
unlikely to imagine SK conceiving of a Christian as becoming more like Christ through the 
manifestation of his church body as opposed to the individualistic imitation of His sufferings. 
Finally, and certainly most strikingly in light of this discussion, Hinkson comments that 
for all Kierkegaard‟s talk about the „equilibrium‟ of the erotic and the ethical or 
about a dynamic „synthesis‟ between soul and body, eternity and temporality, 
finitude and infinity, there are hints that what is intended is the revocation, not the 
sublation, of the countermoment. One may cite, for example, Judge William‟s 
assertions at the end of Either/Or II that „every person is an exception‟ and that 
such exceptionality can lead to one‟s becoming „an extraordinary human being in 
a nobler sense‟ since what is lost by way of extensiveness can be won „in 
                                                          
107
 Ibid., 244-6. 
Olson 41 
 
intensive inwardness.‟ The hidden agenda as early as Either/Or II, seems to be 
that of not realizing the universal, but rather, achieving an „intensive inwardness‟ 
in isolation from the others.
108
 
In addition to his peculiar preoccupation with Christological suffering, SK also overemphasizes 
subjectivity – the exceptional nature of the individual person – to the extent that he comes to 
denigrate the finitude of the world, or, we might say, creation itself. Here, SK certainly parts 
ways with Luther and the implications fully support the view that SK held a disregard for 
authentic community life – in and outside of the church. 
 
Conclusion 
 SK has provided us with both a profound critique of autonomous notions of freedom and 
a point of departure where he has still asserted a form of individualism. My analysis in Part 2 of 
Wise Blood, The Moviegoer, and Rabbit, Run will turn on both of these conclusions; that is, I 
believe each author offers a Kierkegaardian-worthy critique of autonomous notions of freedom, 
but, ultimately (though, to varying degrees) cannot avoid forms of individualism in their 
depictions of redemptive possibilities. Ultimately, as I will argue more extensively in chapter 
three, what these authors‟ visions are lacking is the notion that the greatest signals of 
transcendence (to borrow Peter L. Berger‟s phrase)109 are communal acts that serve to emphasize 
and manifest the comedic reconciliation of the risen Christ. But, first, let us turn to a 
consideration of what is both an enabler and cultural artifact of the autonomous individual in 
twentieth-century America: the automobile. 
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Part 1, Chapter 2 
Autonomous Agents in the American Dream-Machine: From Romanticizing the Road‟s 
Possibility to Transcending the “Constraints” of Relational Commitments, Time, and Place 
 
Introduction 
 The automobile is undoubtedly a prominent symbol in the three mid twentieth-century 
novels addressed here: Flannery O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood, Walker Percy‟s The Moviegoer, and 
John Updike‟s Rabbit, Run. Like any serious fiction writers, these three authors incorporate 
cultural symbols into their novels as a means to commentate on the culture‟s Zeitgeist. Regarding 
the author‟s employment of symbols, both generally and the automobile specifically, O‟Connor 
is representative:  
The mind is led on by what it sees into the greater depths that the book‟s symbols 
naturally suggest. This is what is meant when critics say that a novel operates on 
several levels. The truer the symbol, the deeper it leads you, the more meaning it 
opens up. To take an example from my own book, Wise Blood, the hero‟s rat-
colored automobile is his pulpit and his coffin as well as something he thinks of 
as a means of escape. He is mistaken in thinking that it is a means of escape, of 
course, and does not really escape his predicament until the car is destroyed by 
the patrolman. The car is a kind of death-in-life symbol, as his blindness is a life-
in-death symbol.
110
 
O‟Connor notes that the automobile functions, falsely, as a means of escape – or, we might say, 
as a means toward the end of freedom, or, release. Therefore, I would argue that the automobile 
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provides the symbolic embodiment of the philosophical ideas related to freedom and autonomy 
that were discussed in chapter one – to the extent that we can aptly refer to the automobile as a 
cultural artifact. As a cultural artifact, the automobile offers a point of synthesis between the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century foundations for modern notions of freedom, the three mid 
twentieth-century novels we are here considering, and the specifically American culture that 
those authors inhabited.  
 
Radical Freedom in Modern America and the Automobile as Cultural Artifact 
 As was expressed implicitly in chapter one, it seems evident that Rousseau, Kant, and the 
Romanticism/German Idealism that flowed from their thought have been foundational for some 
of the most celebrated ideals in modern society. It is worth noting that, genealogically, America 
is not exactly a child of the German Enlightenment. That is, America‟s genealogy could not be 
traced to the idealists, but to political liberalism.
111
 Though the founding of America certainly 
involved the confluence of Christians, Deists, and humanists, America is, at bottom, a child 
birthed by the Enlightenment. Stanley Hauerwas and Ralph Wood rightly note that America was 
“founded almost entirely on an Enlightenment basis,”112 and due to an Enlightenment-influenced 
American individualism, freedom is no longer “construed as obedience to a telos radically 
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transcending ourselves and thus delivering us from bondage to mere self-interest.”113 Of course, 
despite historical and present assertions to the contrary, the influence of ideas is inseparable from 
the concrete actuality of their existence. Following James Davison Hunter‟s masterful 
articulation of culture and cultural change, the American ideal of autonomous freedom has not 
been merely an intellectual product of worldview persuasion and manipulation. Rather, it has 
taken force most prominently within cultural symbols and artifacts, within a matrix of economic 
structures, and under the influence of social institutions with varying degrees of cultural 
capital.
114
 Hence, perhaps the most appropriate approach to considering the influence of 
philosophical ideas is not just to assert that they were “in the air,” but, rather, to also make a case 
for how they were culturally actualized, or, embodied. Perhaps no other cultural artifact 
embodies autonomous notions of freedom more eminently than the automobile; one could argue 
that no other modern technology further enables and represents this sense of self-sufficient 
freedom. Yet, we cannot fully understand how the automobile had such an impact without 
understanding the American consumerist use of the American Dream. 
 The automobile is a cultural artifact representative of the American Zeitgeist, and it 
seems evident that the spirit of American culture is one of excessive freedom resulting in 
despairing alienation. Yet, to synthesize the full impact of autonomous notions of freedom and 
the automobile in American culture, we must consider that this American Zeitgeist is reflected in 
the notion of the American Dream, and by the incessant disillusionment which this Dream 
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instills in its hopeful adherents. In short, we could say that a general conception of the American 
Dream entails the individual‟s right to a life of fulfillment, but also that the individual‟s right to 
this full life is linked to his abilities. Thus, there is a sense in which the American Dream offers 
the individual fulfillment if he proves himself sufficient to the task of creating his own 
possibilities for success. Further, America‟s economic and advertising culture has (and continues 
to) widely monopolized the conception of the full life; according to this dominant conception, 
one‟s fulfillment is primarily constituted by personal prosperity and the ownership of goods. 
Thus, three problems, in particular, seem relevant when considering the freedoms enabled by the 
automobile within a culture largely defined by the American Dream: mass dislocation, 
dehumanizing commodification, and excessive consumption. By “mass dislocation,” I mean 
simply that many American families consistently uprooted themselves in search of fulfillment 
and the identity they wanted for themselves. “Dehumanizing commodification” refers to the 
practice of discordantly manipulating private, relational virtues – non-goods – into 
commercialized, impersonal utilities. Lastly, by “excessive consumption,” I point to the 
inordinate desire for fulfillment that ironically works toward the individual‟s detriment. In terms 
of excessive freedom in American culture encouraged by the American Dream, if mass 
dislocation is representative of alienation, then the American culture of commodification and 
consumption represents the onanistic, instrumental relationships between alienated interlocutors. 
Before considering the effects of the automobile on Americans‟ relationships within the social-
spheres of church, neighborhood, nuclear family, and marriage, we will first consider the 
development of the automobile as a cultural artifact in America. 
 Mid twentieth-century America experienced a boom in automobile sales that seems 
attributable to advertisers‟ ambitious attempts to romanticize the American dream-machine. Rudi 
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Volti notes that in 1950, America was “the world‟s largest producer of automobiles, accounting 
for 82 percent of world output” and could boast “twenty-six cars for every hundred people.”115 
One could argue that the increasing mobility of people was bound up with increasing 
communications. Describing the time as characterized by the mass mobility of people and ideas, 
Daniel Snowman provides some telling statistics for the mid twentieth-century:  
In 1950 there were five million American families with television sets; in 1960 
the figure was 45 million – or well over 95 per cent. In 1950 motor vehicles 
travelled nearly 460 billion miles in the United States, a figure that had reached 
nearly 720 billion by the end of the decade; in the same period the number of 
registered automobiles had shot up from 40.3 million to 61.5 million. The federal 
and state governments undertook colossal road-building projects during this 
period (but gave hardly a thought to the great social and aesthetic problems that 
they were helping to engender and magnify). This was preeminently the era of the 
motel, of the drive-in movie, the decade in which Kerouac wrote On the Road and 
Nabokov Lolita, and in which one American family in five moved each year. It 
was a decade of huge impersonal new suburbs and of ugly, blighted, old cities.
116
 
A boom in television access during the period entailed an increase in both mass communications 
and the advertisement of goods this afforded. Additionally, increased automobile ownership 
enabled more people to pursue the American conception of the full life – to acquire commodified 
goods with a new voracity – in the most desirable location toward achieving this goal. However, 
essential in understanding what has been problematic in this paradigm of individual fulfillment is 
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that the pursuit of a fulfilling life in these terms has been bound up with the individual‟s attempt 
to realize his identity.  
Travel has often been romanticized as the opening up of possibilities for the individual. 
Ronald Primeau notes that travel has been seen as “a way to discover one‟s real self in a release 
from everyday constraints.”117 The automobile, however, had its own distinct romanticized 
vision of travel in American culture. Primeau continues, “The American car has always been 
more than just transportation: it is status, success, dreams, adventure, mystery, and sex[.]”118 
Further, he credits Kerouac‟s On the Road (1957) with culturally codifying the automobile as 
symbolic of romanticized possibility.
119
 What is most curious about this romanticized notion of 
freedom that the automobile purportedly affords is that the proponents of these transient travels 
attempt to rebut criticisms of their potentially individualistic nature. Primeau notes that defenders 
of the road traveler often make assertions such as, “Though the highway quester often drives 
alone, the trip sooner or later involves a community of fellow travelers with similar goals.”120 
Though drivers find in the automobile the opportunity to “renounce home and move from town 
to town,” they can still “experience closeness and community” with potential passengers such as 
hitchhikers, so that they “are free to develop relationships that are free from the restraints of 
everyday obligations.”121 For these defenders to simultaneously assert a sense of community 
alongside avoiding any obligations is, essentially, to make a group of anonymous individuals 
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indistinguishable from a community of committed, interconnected individuals. But, perhaps such 
erroneous assertions can be attributed to the common American attitude of abdication – the call 
to dissuade criticism of the American way. 
It seems that the American culture of abdication and alienation in the twentieth century is 
attributable to the pursuit of, and vast praise for, self-reliance; that is, not only is alienation the 
result of devaluing interpersonal reliance, but the high cultural regard for self-reliance as a norm 
for human agency discourages assertions of its shortcomings. Miller and Novak confirm that “the 
spread of alienation through American culture was widely ignored. Perhaps the chief factor 
discouraging its recognition was the consensus fantasy about American culture. It was not a 
healthy, American act to talk about chaotic concepts like alienation. It was an admission that 
things were not the simple, pretty picture the fifties imagined.”122 To question the American 
Dream was to throw into question the validity of one‟s fantasized possibilities. The authors go on 
to note that to even “write at all about human alienation in America was to rouse mainstream 
ire.”123 It seems obvious that this mainstream ire was so prevalent because so much was at stake; 
the individual identities within the collective group hung in the balance. And to question the 
American Dream as a paradigm for identity formation was to obviate these individuals‟ ability – 
their worth – to achieve their own success and fulfillment. Ironically, if there was widespread 
unity among Americans toward anything, it was toward ensuring that man would never have to 
rely on his neighbor. Thus, even the occasional call for Americans to “band together,” has 
typically been in response to potential threats to the culture of desire-fulfillment autonomy – not 
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a call toward undermining its validity. Hence, this avoidance from acknowledging something 
was amiss in America‟s cultural structure only perpetuated alienation. 
This American culture of self-reliance in pursuit of the full life has inspired a culture of 
alienation. Philip Slater comments on the increasingly private nature of mid twentieth-century 
American culture:  
We seek a private house, a private means of transportation, a private garden, a 
private laundry, self-service stores, and do-it-yourself skills of every kind. An 
enormous technology seems to have set itself the task of making it unnecessary 
for one human being ever to ask anything of another in the course of going about 
his daily business. Even within the family Americans are unique in their feeling 
that each member should have a separate room, and even a separate telephone, 
television, and car, when economically possible. We seek more and more privacy, 
and feel more and more alienated and lonely when we get it.
124
 
Slater‟s description describes well the total pursuit of privacy and self-reliance. Yet, it seems that 
increasing privacy cast fellow human beings in a new light: “We less and less often meet our 
fellow man to share and exchange, and more and more often encounter him as an impediment or 
a nuisance: making the highway crowded when we are rushing somewhere.”125 In response to 
these relational impediments, increasing mobility afforded an ideal solution: elusion. Slater 
comments that in prospect of difficult situations, people “tended to chuck the whole thing and 
flee to a new environment. Escaping, evading, and avoiding are responses which lie at the base 
of much that is peculiarly American – the suburb, the automobile, the self-service store, and so 
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on.”126 While the suburb and the automobile did provide a preferable alternative to the 
dehumanizing, claustrophobic atmosphere of the city, the automobile has also been the essential 
means in modern America for one to escape potential inhibitions to autonomy; that the goals of 
our technologies have been oriented toward this end has been exceedingly problematic for the 
relationships necessary for selfhood.
127
 Noting the effects of this American notion of freedom, 
Slater asserts, “One of the major goals of technology in America is to „free‟ us from the necessity 
of relating to, submitting to, depending upon, or controlling other people. Unfortunately, the 
more we have succeeded in doing this the more we have felt disconnected, bored, lonely, 
unprotected, unnecessary, and unsafe.”128 The essential contention is this: the disintegration of 
community life – under the guise of individual “freedom” that seeks individual fulfillment – 
ironically results in the disintegration of the individual. Because the automobile is the essential 
cultural embodiment of this irony, the rest of this chapter will be devoted to exploring the 
connections between the automobile and the dissolution of four communal bodies: the church, 
the neighborhood, the nuclear family, and marriage. 
 
The Automobile, Alienation, and the Church 
 In the mid-twentieth century, one particular factor motivating a glossy view of American 
culture was a peculiar syncretism between many religious establishments and the multifarious 
institutions that pushed the American Dream. The President of the mid-twentieth century, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, was instrumental in establishing this American/religious syncretism in 
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new ways. Miller and Novak note that Eisenhower once began a crusade by opining, 
“Recognition of the Supreme Being is the first, the most basic, expression of Americanism. 
Without God, there could be no American form of government, nor an American way of life.”129 
In 1954, Eisenhower influenced the addition of “Under God” to America‟s pledge of allegiance, 
and two years later he also influenced the adoption of “In God We Trust” as an American motto. 
However, Gary Cross shows how neither party to this syncretistic civil religion could avoid the 
temptation of self-interest; he notes that while the founding fathers understood the necessity of 
self-control for the success of the country, they still  
came close to accepting the notion that the individual could be defined by rational 
choice in fulfilling personal desires. Complementing this was an evangelical 
tradition that emphasized personal religious experience over doctrine or ritual. . . . 
[T]his sentiment easily slid into the dream of self-transforming spending. The 
end-all of life was personal satisfaction. Americans found it easy to identify 
society with the market where individual desires were fulfilled and where people 
related to each other through exchanging and displaying their goods.
130
 
Inherent in Cross‟ description is a transition that occurred in many churches from preaching rigid 
doctrinal truths to entering the fray of desire-fulfillment, forming an unholy amalgamation 
between the faithful and the American Dream. However, this transition meant that the church 
was entering the fray of competition and consumption where a rooted church community would 
have to compete with the possibilities offered by mobility – or, what many Americans were 
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treating as the highway of “sacred space.”131 
 When it came to the business of desire-fulfillment, the church seems, to some extent, to 
have been unable to compete with the forms of immediate fulfillment afforded by the 
automobile. People were finding better ways to spend their Sunday afternoons. In research done 
by Robert and Helen Lynd, one female respondent commented that her husband “don‟t like to go 
to church Sunday night. We‟ve been away from church this summer more‟n ever since we got 
our car,” while another woman said, “In the summer we‟d rather get out in the car, because 
we‟ve only the one free day during the week.”132 The problem seems to have been a common 
one, for the same study found one pastor of a “business class church” drawing lines in the sand 
over absentee church members: “I do not need to lecture you people who are here, but the people 
who call themselves Christian who are today motoring and playing golf, who will not see the 
inside of a church today, they are traitors to the kingdom of God.”133 In what could be seen as a 
hopeful response (though certainly an odd one) to these absentee “motorists,” several “drive-in 
churches” began to appear. Miller and Novak describe these motorist congregations: “Even 
drive-in churches appeared, modeled on the success of drive-in movies. One Presbyterian drive-
in in Venice, Florida, offered to carry the communion grape juice to those cars whose passengers 
were unable to walk to the communion table.”134 Another interesting popular-culture synthesis 
between evangelist and automobile occurred when Billy Graham‟s publicist – in response to the 
simple use of understated advertisements for the famous traveling evangelist – used a telling 
analogy: “When you see an advertisement for a Cadillac, it just says Cadillac and shows you a 
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picture. Billy is like a Cadillac. We don‟t have to explain.”135 Presumably, the traveling 
preacher‟s image was self-sufficient enough to draw hoards of people. Whatever the motivations 
or implications of “drive-in churches” or America‟s most prominent preacher being compared to 
a Cadillac, the overall impact of the automobile on community life, as Snowman notes, was 
undisputed: the automobile, considered within the context of the American Dream, was 
responsible for “reduced church attendance” and broken families.136 While the automobile had 
some transformative effects on the church‟s community life, its increasing popularity also had 
some destructive implications for traditional neighborhood life. 
 
The Automobile, Alienation, and the Neighborhood 
 Widespread dependence upon the automobile resulted in transient neighborhoods and 
reflected a new paradigm for identity formation within these fragmented communities. The 
automobile, of course, is substantially responsible for the formation of suburban neighborhoods. 
However, despite the convenience these neighborhoods may have afforded them, suburbanites 
retained a particular desire for belonging due to the nature of their communities. Miller and 
Novak comment that “[o]ne of the main reasons for the frantic „belongingness‟ in suburbia was 
the rootlessness most people felt. These were transient communities. Not only was everyone a 
newcomer, but few expected to remain in one place long since corporate policy prescribed 
frequent transfers of personnel[.]”137 Suburban neighborhoods were inhabited by people who had 
not laid down roots long enough to establish worthwhile commitments to one another. And it 
should be noted that what was partly underlying this transience was the instrumental relationship 
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between the triumvirate of corporation/business, dream-pursuing worker, and the dream-
pursuing consumers who were dependent upon the relationship between the former two. 
However, not only did the automobile enable these fragmented suburban neighborhoods, it also 
had a disintegrating effect on both city and country life. Miller and Novak assert that the 
automobile was “the single greatest factor in subverting the virtues of both city and 
countryside[.] . . . Cars had made suburban escape possible, but at a very heavy price. . . .  
General Motors triumphed over common sense and the result was smog, creeping bumper-to-
bumper traffic, decaying cities, divided by freeways, despoiled landscapes, time payments, and 
often early death.”138 Thus, whether the suburbs, the city, or the country side, neighborhood life 
in America was largely decaying, and in decline. Slater, who was certainly no adherent to the 
American culture of abdication, puts the situation rather bluntly: 
The automobile . . . did more than anything else to destroy community life in 
America. It segmented the various parts of the community and scattered them 
about so that they became unfamiliar with one another. It isolated travelers and 
decoordinated the movement of people from one place to another. It isolated and 
shrank living units to the point where the skills involved in informal cooperation 
among large groups of people atrophied and were lost. As the community became 
a less and less satisfying and pleasurable place to be, people more and more took 
to their automobiles as an escape from it. This in turn crowded the roads more 
which generated more road-building which destroyed more communities, and so 
on.
139
 
Such widespread dependence upon the automobile not only had a decaying effect on 
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neighborhoods and communities at large, but also reflected a paradigm shift in identity formation 
that resulted in new ways for individuals to interact with one another within their neighborly 
communities. 
 More motorists necessitated changes in neighborhoods that resulted in new ways of 
people relating to one another that are telling with regard to the nature of an overly 
individualistic identity in American culture. The notion of the individual‟s “belonging” has most 
traditionally been defined by his relational commitments; however, transient, disconnected 
neighborhoods introduced new forms of identity and ways of belonging. Robert and Helen Lynd 
note that neighbors no longer “spend long summer evenings and Sunday afternoons on the porch 
or in the side yard since the advent of the automobiles and the movies. These factors tend to 
make a decorative yard less urgent; the make of one‟s car is rivaling the looks of one‟s place as 
an evidence of one‟s „belonging.‟”140 Car garages make both front porches and neighborly 
interaction less likely; and the individual no longer finds identity in these neighborly 
relationships, but instead feels at home in the competition inherent in the culture of consumption 
and commodification which is manifested in the individual displaying his new car for his 
neighbors to see. In this sense, the competitor becomes an instrumental relationship toward the 
individual‟s fulfillment. In an observation that is at once humorous and frightening, Slater notes 
that these instrumental relationships are, in a sense, governed by machines that perpetuate 
instrumentality: “[T]here is no way for large numbers of people to coexist without governing and 
being governed by each other, unless they establish machines to do it; at which point they risk 
losing sight and understanding of interconnectedness itself – a process well advanced in our 
culture today. There is something wildly comic about cars stopping and starting in response to a 
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traffic light, for example, but most Americans have lost the capacity to experience it.”141 
Naturally, the result of this situation has been to gather up the people incapable of independence 
and group them together; this, in the end – or, perhaps more precisely, as an end toward the 
culture of autonomous desire-fulfillment – seems like the most instrumental thing to do. 
Disintegrating churches and decaying neighborhoods denote that new levels of pressure were 
heaped upon the nuclear family toward its own self-sustainment. Yet, as we will see, neither the 
nuclear family nor the marital relationship could withstand the undermining effects of the 
automobile within an American society situated toward the pursuit of autonomous fulfillment, 
and predominately characterized by instrumental relationships toward that end. 
 
The Automobile, Alienation, and the Nuclear Family 
 In the middle of the twentieth century, the nuclear family also started to experience the 
disintegration of its communal life due to the freedom enabled by the automobile. Arguably 
since, and as a result of, the Reformation, one unique characteristic of modern society is the 
autonomous nuclear family; yet, it was also typically the norm for this autonomous nuclear 
family – even if self-directing – to be interconnected with a community greater than itself, 
providing a background for both sustainment and self-understanding. Yet, with this background 
fading, an expanding pressure was placed on the nuclear family to be wholly self-sustaining and 
self-defining. Beth Bailey notes that many social scientists have pointed out that, in the twentieth 
century, the nuclear family is no longer “surrounded by the protection of the kinship group, the 
church, the school and the neighborhood. . . . It seemed clear to [them] that the American family 
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had been undermined.”142 Certainly, much of this undermining effect can be attributed to 
sociological changes that accompanied technological change in the twentieth century. Miller and 
Novak note that technological changes leading up to the fifties created sweeping changes in 
societal views of marriage, domesticity, family life, and home life – changes which resulted in 
the spread of instability, anxiety, and uncertainty.
143
 Of course, these technological changes 
enabled increased mobility for families – so much so for families during the fifties that Cross 
describes American families treating homes “like cars, objects to be traded in.”144 Again, 
families no doubt connected this mobility with the romanticized possibility enabled by travel. 
Robert and Helen Lynd note that advertisers, banking on the American Dream, sold this sense of 
self re-creation with vigor to families: “Meanwhile, advertisements pound away at Middletown 
people with the tempting advice to spend money for automobiles for the sake of their homes and 
families: „Hit the trail to better times!‟ says one such advertisement.”145 The chance for a better 
life at the end of mobility was not just sold to families, but it was sold to them for the sake of 
their families – posing the potential move firmly as an ethical situation. The social life of the 
family was, to some extent, centered on the family automobile. Yet, the automobile did not just 
lead to autonomous families increasingly evading the rootedness of community life; it also led to 
increasing autonomy among the individual members of the nuclear family – particularly its 
teenagers.  
 When the American nuclear family, pursuing romanticized possibility with new abandon, 
allowed itself to be tossed to and fro by consumer society, it was only a matter of time until the 
                                                          
142
 Beth L. Bailey, From Front Porch to Back Seat: Courtship in Twentieth-Century America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 1988), 120. 
143
 Miller and Novak, The Fifties: The Way We Really Were, 148. 
144
 Cross, An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America, 91. 
145
 Robert and Helen Lynd, Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture, 256. 
Olson 58 
 
individual members of that nuclear family would pursue their own self-fulfilling goals – even if 
in defiance, or to the detriment, of the family as a whole. Cross rightly notes that the “privacy 
and the freedom of the car culture complemented the consumerist nest of the home, but it also 
threatened to make the family house merely a launching pad for individual networking.”146 This 
individual networking seems evident in at least two particular ways. A pair of critics note that the 
automobile “is making noticeable inroads upon the traditional prestige of the family‟s meal 
times” and “has done much to render obsolete the leisurely Sunday noon dinner of a generation 
ago at which extra leaves had to be put in the table for the company of relatives and friends[.]”147 
Traditional times devoted to the giving and sharing of food, conversation, and intimacy in 
general no longer retained the same importance it once held for the nuclear family. Increasing the 
devaluation of meal times was the absence of relatives who were lost in frequent moves. Cross 
notes that this increased mobility “compounded the loss of daily contact with and advice from 
relatives about child rearing and marriage.”148 The convergence of these two losses – relatives in 
the extended family and the wisdom they often bestow, and the intimacy-building at meal times 
– no doubt played a negative role in the development of the children who were the future of 
American society. And often the children themselves were the ones absent from the dinner table. 
Robert and Helen Lynd comment on the influence of the automobile and the freedom it gave to 
children in the nuclear family: 
The extensive use of this new tool by the young has enormously extended their 
mobility and the range of alternatives before them; joining a crowd motoring over 
to dance in a town twenty miles away may be a matter of moment‟s decision, with 
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no one‟s permission asked. Furthermore, among the high school set, ownership of 
a car by one‟s family has become an important criterion of social fitness: a boy 
almost never takes a girl to a dance except in a car; there are persistent rumors of 
the buying of a car by local families to help their children‟s social standing in 
high school.
149
 
The automobile seems to allow teenagers to inhabit a culture of their own – wholly separate from 
their families. Further, the paradigm for identity formation that involves the fulfillment of 
displaying new goods to one‟s peers seems to have been not only true for parents with their 
neighbors, but also to have been reproduced in their children. Young adults gained identity 
affirmation from their peers on the basis of automobile ownership. Cross comments that as early 
as the twenties, “young Americans bought [automobiles] and won freedom from their families. 
Seldom had anything like this ever happened in the history of the family. Prosperity and 
permissive parenting encouraged a youth consumer culture that seemed to open the floodgates of 
sexuality and carefree spending.”150 Here, we can begin to gain a full picture of an American 
setting against which people, young adults included, are governed by a debased notion of 
autonomy that is fueled by the American Dream of self-sufficiency in hasty pursuit of self-
fulfillment. However, a collapsing community life involved the slow decay of responsibility. 
Freedom – not qualified by social/ethical commitments, but from them – had debilitating effects 
on intimate relationships between men and women inside and outside of the context of marital 
union. 
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The Automobile, Alienation, and Marriage/Sexuality 
 In an exceedingly consumerist American culture, the automobile came to be identified 
with sexuality, and had the dehumanizing effect of perpetuating the commodification of women. 
Thus, instrumentality no longer solely characterized relationships between consumer and 
business, but increasingly characterized our more intimate relationships. Yet, this consumerist 
mentality did not just involve commodifying people, but it also involved sexualizing sexless 
objects, with the latter trend perpetuating the former. As usual, Slater provides both an adept 
analysis of the last century‟s trends and a prescient warning of their ends: 
The fundamental mechanism for generating sexual scarcity is to attach sexual 
interest to inaccessible, nonexistent, or irrelevant objects; and for this purpose 
man‟s capacity to symbolize is perfectly designed. Today this basic technique has 
become the dominant one. By the time an American boy or girl reaches maturity 
he or she has so much symbolic baggage attached to the sexual impulse that the 
mere mutual stimulation of two human bodies seems almost meaningless. 
Through the mass media everything sexless has been sexualized: automobiles, 
cigarettes, detergents, clothing.
151
 
Sexualizing a sexless object – like the automobile – had two effects: (1) It devalued the worth of 
sexual beings by objectifying them and, therefore, (2) it also devalued the worth of sexuality in 
general by making it an object of utility. Bailey describes one simile that was used which seems 
to reflect this trend: “‟He takes her out . . . like he takes out his new car, but more impersonally, 
because the car is his for good but the girl is his only for the evening.‟ In fact, the equation of 
women and cars was common in mid-century American culture. Both were property, both 
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expensive . . . and both could be judged on performance.”152 Further, the equation of women and 
automobiles was not merely women in general, but also wives in particular. In a 1951 Time 
magazine piece, two males described the relationship between men and women before and after 
marriage in terms of being like an automobile: “Before the property is yours, I don‟t see why 
anybody can‟t use it. . . . After marriage some guy taking my wife would be like taking my car 
and putting on a few extra miles. It might improve through use, but I like to drive my own.”153 
Despite any semblance of ethical responsibility implied by the statement, the nature of the 
particular simile was an incongruence that went unnoticed in the article.  
One devastating effect attendant to the objectification of women and the collapse of 
larger communities is the undermining of intimacy between couples. Robert and Helen Lynd 
point out that the loss of a “community of interests, together with the ideas each sex entertains 
regarding the other, appears in many families in a lack of frankness between husband and wife, 
far-reaching in its emotional outcome.”154 An example characterized by mutual objectification 
and a lack of intimacy between parents set the standard for their motoring teenagers, who were in 
the process of creating their own community separate from family life. It is no wonder that, 
against this background situation, “intimacy” slowly degenerated toward being synonymous with 
sexuality.  
 With increased automobile ownership came new freedom for young adults, creating a 
new paradigm for courtship in America. Bailey notes that “[y]oung men and women went out 
into the world together, enjoying a new kind of companionship and the intimacy of a new kind of 
freedom from adult supervision,” and Bailey goes on to concede that the “automobile certainly 
                                                          
152
 Bailey, From Front Porch to Back Seat: Courtship in Twentieth-Century America, 69-70. 
153
 Ibid., 70. 
154
 Robert and Helen Lynd, Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture, 120. 
Olson 62 
 
contributed to the rise of dating as a national practice.”155 Yet, this new kind of “intimacy” 
resulting from new freedoms could – in many cases, it seems – scarcely be identified as authentic 
intimacy. The new paradigm for courtship – “dating” – was characterized by social distance and 
anonymity. Bailey explains, “In twentieth-century America, courtship became more and more a 
private act conducted in the public world. This intimate business, as it evolved into „dating,‟ 
increasingly took place in public places removed, by distance and by anonymity, from the 
sheltering and controlling contexts of home and local community.”156 Hence, the prevailing norm 
for “intimate relationships” was constituted by distance from the communities that traditionally 
helped foster identity and responsibility, and by entrance into a public community constituted by 
anonymity. However, not only did this emerging form of courtship signal a shift from 
community ties to public anonymity, it also – because of the consumerist nature of the public 
sphere – “privileged competition” and “valued consumption.” Here, again, it would not take 
much for the nature of this dating scene – constituted by competition and consumption – to have 
an undermining effect on the intimacy between the two persons. The woman was a good to be 
consumed at the cost of a night motoring about in the town; the man‟s value was determined by 
what material fulfillment he could purchase, and the woman‟s value was determined by the 
sexual fulfillment she could provide. Roaming freely from the family, the dating relationship, 
with its instrumental fulfillments, was both autonomous and inter-manipulative. As 
Mademoiselle and the New York Times Magazine can attest, the car came to function as a make-
shift bed:  
A short story in Mademoiselle describes „college girl cars with boxes of tissues 
and clean seat covers that were parked in the lot behind the dormitories‟ where the 
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student couple made love. But many colleges and universities had regulations 
against students having cars. In 1963, students at a Midwestern university 
launched a campaign against this restriction. One male student told the New York 
Times Magazine that the issue wasn‟t transportation but privacy: „We wouldn‟t 
care if the cars had no wheels, just so long as they had doors.‟157 
Intimacy came less to be defined by the knowledge one could learn about another person – 
particularly the knowledge gained from the familiarity with one‟s family and home life. Instead, 
the kind of “intimacy” fostered was the knowledge of one‟s wallet and one‟s body. And this 
intimacy occurred in the anonymous public sphere where two persons were freer to project a 
created public personality to one another, even if it was disparate from the private person. An 
“esthete” could not have found a more favorable companion or culture to his onanistic 
manipulations than the automobile within modern America. 
 
Conclusion 
 The automobile – particularly within the context of the mid-twentieth century – was a 
cultural artifact in American culture because it both enabled and represented expanding 
American freedoms, while also fostering widespread possibility for alienation. Yet, what has 
hopefully been evident in this culturual/contextual consideration of the automobile is that neither 
the freedoms granted by the automobile nor the freedoms granted by the American constitution 
should be vilified; rather, the human agents who were afforded these freedoms lost sight of the 
necessarily interpersonal nature of their own identities, and, thus, increasingly submitted to a 
culture of self-indulgence. However, declining relational commitments have fostered declining 
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intimacy and moral responsibility between people. And this onanistic, self-reliant search for 
fulfillment has ironically contributed to the eroding alienation of the individual. Here, again, it 
seems evident that the radical individualism underlying Kantian autonomy must be called into 
question, for the form of autonomy advocated and exhibited in American life has been 
increasingly immoral or amoral – and, this,  in spite of flourishing education. Yet, despite the 
problems which have accompanied mid twentieth-century American culture, and have seemingly 
only progressed to our present day, a growing body of literature has arisen in the last half-
century that has called into question our individualistic culture and the philosophy it was largely 
founded upon. This body of socio-philosophical literature is, broadly speaking, characterized by 
a communitarian approach to identity – and this is where we turn to in the third and final chapter 
of part one. 
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Part 1, Chapter 3 
A Novel Science for Late Moderns: Situating the Self in Communal Narrative 
 
Introduction 
  In the last half-century, a body of literature has arisen that I am going to loosely refer to 
as “communitarian.” In using the term, which has both social and political connotations, I am 
referring to critics who have both recognized the ultimately individualistic nature of American 
culture, and have sought, in various ways, the reaffirmation of man‟s communal nature. On these 
terms, the literary works we are concerned with here – O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood, Percy‟s The 
Moviegoer, and Updike‟s Rabbit, Run – indirectly affirm the need for communal commitments 
in their depictions of autonomous, alienated protagonists. Yet, I would argue that these 
depictions ultimately lack any positive affirmation of life together. Percy, who assembled an 
impressive body of literature devoted to semiotic theory, was no doubt in search of 
community;
158
 thus, his non-fiction, more exclusively than O‟Connor‟s or Updike‟s, will be 
considered in this chapter. Regarding Percy‟s sense that moderns lacked a genuine sense of 
community, John Desmond notes, “With increasing insistence and directness, Percy‟s novels 
record this search for community. Both sides of the issue – alienation and separateness, hope and 
the possibility for communication – reflect the spirit of Percy‟s obsession . . . with community 
throughout his career as a writer.”159 Indeed, Percy‟s assertions regarding the mysterious nature 
of language provide important critiques of autonomous agency – as does The Moviegoer, along 
                                                          
158
 The most complete and sophisticated consideration of Walker Percy and community is found 
in John F. Desmond‟s aptly titled Walker Percy’s Search for Community. Desmond‟s work 
points to the need to consider Percy‟s non-fiction work in this chapter. 
159
 John F. Desmond, Walker Percy’s Search for Community (Athens: The U of Georgia P, 
2004), 3.  
Olson 66 
 
with the other two novels we are concerned with here, in their depictions. As will be explored 
below, novelistic depictions are helpful because the alienated self must be situated within a 
narrative, but meaningful narratives are necessarily communal; while all three authors‟ Christian 
commitments – and the inherently narratival nature of novel writing in general – allow 
O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike to indirectly depict the need for community life, the content of 
their novels ultimately lacks any faithful, positive affirmations of authentic community – and this 
lack of affirmation leaves the depictions of redemption in their novels ultimately wanting. 
 
The Self’s Situation in Narrative 
 Rather than considering the self as autonomous – or, self-directing and self-governing on 
the basis either of reason or desire-fulfillment – it is helpful to consider modern man‟s identity as 
needing situated within the context of narrative structure. Among the three primary authors, 
Percy, due to his distinctive search for community, seems to recognize intuitively the importance 
of narrative when he says that what interested him was not “the physiological and pathological 
processes within man‟s body, but the problem of man himself, the nature and destiny of man; 
specifically and more immediately, the predicament of man in a modern technological 
society.”160 Understanding man as in pursuit of a destiny or encountering predicament is 
certainly elemental of narrative structure. Perhaps no recent thinker has better articulated the 
need to understand one‟s identity as situated within narrative than Charles Taylor.  
Taylor has provided worthwhile commentary regarding man‟s imperative to understand 
his life as in pursuit of meaning – or, of making sense of things. Further, the self must be situated 
within an overall understanding of life that articulates what is of worth. In Sources of the Self: 
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The Making of the Modern Identity, Taylor argues that man necessarily understands his life as a 
pursuit of meaningfulness, which necessarily requires dialogical interaction: “[A] framework is 
that in virtue of which we make sense of our lives spiritually. Not to have a framework is to fall 
into a life which is spiritually senseless. The quest is thus always a quest for sense. But the 
invocation of meaning also comes from our awareness of how much the search involves 
articulation. . . . Finding a sense to life depends on framing meaningful expressions.”161 Life 
demands that some semblance of coherence is available, for the recognition that one‟s life lacks 
orderliness is conceived against the implicit understanding that coherence is attainable. However, 
a framework for understanding what is meaningful necessarily involves differentiation between 
what is good and what is not. Therefore, Taylor rightly notes that “doing without frameworks is 
utterly impossible for us[.] . . . [T]he horizons within which we live our lives and which make 
sense of them have to include these strong qualitative discriminations,” and to avoid recognizing 
that a strongly qualitative framework is constitutive of human agency “would be tantamount to 
stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human 
personhood.”162 That is, the human agent articulates that which is of worth, and this necessarily 
involves taking on particular commitments to the exclusion of others on the basis of 
differentiated value. A powerful company owner divorces his wife because she complains that he 
is not home enough; he values his work to such an extent that he is willing to allow his marriage 
to dissolve. The shape of his life is defined by his commitments to work, business successes, and 
the pride attendant to the achievements of the work-a-day world. We can begin to see that Taylor 
is articulating a sense of identity which is understood analogically in spatial terms:  
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Who am I? But this can‟t necessarily be answered by giving name and genealogy. 
What does answer this question for us is an understanding of what is of critical 
importance to us. To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My 
identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the 
frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is 
good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other 
words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.
163
 
Taylor‟s description of identity as understood against a horizon of significance is helpful toward 
understanding what we mean when we say that one has an identity crisis, or when some critics 
have asserted that an essential feature of modernity is widespread disorientation. Taylor goes on 
to say that this disorientation is expressed by people in terms of “not knowing who they are, but 
which can also be seen as a radical uncertainty of where they stand.”164 Thus, disorientation is 
the result of not merely a predicament encountered, but, rather, an incoherent sense of situation – 
or narrative – altogether by which the predicament can make sense. And without this coherence, 
the individual experiences an inability to process and transcend predicaments. 
 Thus far, following Taylor, we have come to see identity as necessarily involving a 
coherent sense of orientation to that which is of worth; because orientation fundamentally 
involves understanding what has gone before, what is happening, and what is to come, we could 
say that one achieves a sense of identity within a narrative understanding of his life. Taylor 
summarizes the point:  
The issue of our condition can never be exhausted for us by what we are, because 
we are always also changing and becoming. . . . I have been arguing that in order 
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to make minimal sense of our lives, in order to have an identity, we need an 
orientation to the good, which means some sense of qualitative discrimination, of 
the incomparably higher. Now we see this sense of the good has to be woven into 
my understanding of my life as an unfolding story. But this is to state another 
basic condition of making sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a 
narrative.
165
 
Identity involves a continuous state of becoming, because one‟s identity is based on one‟s 
commitments and the outcomes of those commitments. Further, not only do these commitments 
entail moral articulations – qualitative discriminations of what is good or bad or worthwhile – 
but the effectiveness of these commitments in the past, and the projection of our choices‟ 
outcomes into the future, can only be understood within a sense of story. Returning to the 
example above, the businessman who has chosen his job over his wife may remember the 
hastiness in which he married her, or he may project a future that involves company expansion 
and a date with his secretary. His narrative sense of the past and the future, based on his 
commitments, fundamentally shapes his decision to end the marriage. That is, regardless of the 
merit of his choices and whether or not he realizes it, the businessman is living a narrative that is 
shaped by actions which involve his qualitative discriminations. With narrative, we have 
understood the formal shape of identity, and now we want to retrieve a qualitative sense of 
identity, or, what is involved in character – that quality of being which both inhabits narrative 
and infuses it with qualitative action. 
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The Loss of Character 
 Before considering James Davison Hunter‟s more elaborate elucidation of the nature of 
character, it will be helpful to consider whether the modern, autonomous self coheres with 
narrative and character – or, with the sense of story that long predates modern selfhood. The 
modern‟s sense of freedom is constituted by contractural rights and the notion that others must 
respect his personality. Taylor notes that “[t]o talk of universal, natural, or human rights is to 
connect respect for human life and integrity with the notion of autonomy. . . . And for us 
respecting personality involves as a crucial feature respecting the person‟s moral autonomy.”166 
Taylor continues, saying, “[T]his expands to the demand that we give people the freedom to 
develop their personality in their own way, however repugnant to ourselves and even to our 
moral sense.”167 But, what precisely is personality, and how does it differ from character? Hunter 
considers “personality” the modern version of the self – a replacement of “character” that first 
came on the scene in the late eighteenth century, but came into prominence in the early twentieth 
century: “The concept of personality reflected a self no longer defined by austerity but by 
emancipation for the purposes of expression, fulfillment, and gratification.”168 Hence we might 
say that the modern psychologized self is characterized by excessive freedom for the purposes of 
personal fulfillment and gratification; however, the irony is that this characterization actually 
undercuts character much in the same way that onanistic relief undercuts fulfilling intimacy. 
Commenting on the nature of the modern Self (Hunter capitalizes “Self” – presumably intending 
to implicate its divinization in modern times), Hunter says, “The implications are simultaneously 
liberating and disturbing. There is unprecedented individual freedom that few would be willing 
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to relinquish. But there is also a license that disparages self-restraint and responsibility toward 
others. This ambivalence is an inescapable feature of our time.”169 The constituents of one‟s 
identity which Taylor noted – that man is partly constituted by his commitments and 
relationships to others – are here undermined by a codified modern identity that gives excessive 
license to rights that emphasize emancipation. That is, it seems that this modern self – the 
personality – is fundamentally constituted in such a way that severely stultifies itself because it 
devalues significant commitments which entail responsibility. Here, we are again confronted 
with the problems associated with an understanding of human agency which grants the self moral 
legislation. 
 There is a sense in which we understand character to be forged by the outside 
circumstances that we encounter. Tellingly, Hunter attributes the death of character to the 
rejection of externally imposed norms of conduct in favor of internally chosen values: “[T]he 
demise of character begins with the destruction of creeds, the convictions, and the „god-terms‟ 
that made those creeds sacred to us and inviolable within us. This destruction occurs 
simultaneously with the rise of „values.‟ Values are truths that have been deprived of their 
commanding character. They are substitutes for revelation, imperatives that have dissolved into a 
range of possibilities.”170 Hunter‟s description brings to mind the story presented in chapter one 
involving the battle between Kant and Hamann at the end of the seventeenth century. When 
character is disconnected from the commanding imperative inherent in authoritative revelation, it 
dissolves into transient values that involve the self‟s choices, which typically serve only to 
comport with the personality‟s day-to-day whim. Kant, as we saw, has been most criticized for 
the lack of sufficient moral motivation in his conception of autonomy; yet, on Hunter‟s terms, 
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character is essentially implausible apart from the revelation that Hamann firmly advocated. 
While Kant by no means advocated autonomy based on unfettered desire, many critics have 
drawn a bit of a historical line from Kant to Nietzche, and Hunter seems to affirm the plausibility 
of this line when he defines nihilism as unfettered autonomous desire: 
I define nihilism as autonomous desire and unfettered will legitimated by the 
ideology and practice of choice. I don‟t want to be misunderstood here. The 
power of self-determination is, of course, our reigning definition of freedom, and 
such freedom can indeed be liberating. For many, and not least the powerless and 
disadvantaged and oppressed minorities, such freedoms are rare and cherished, 
and one can only hope that they will expand. The problem, then, is not with the 
freedom of will as such, but rather its autonomy from any higher value.
171
 
If the modern‟s conception of freedom and selfhood ultimately flattens out into nothingness, then 
clearly we have lost a sense of character that needs to be retrieved – a retrieval that begins with 
understanding what it means, more precisely, to act with character. 
 In our culture‟s present situation, the most basic element of character in need of recovery 
is a collective understanding of freedom that defines what one is rightfully unable to do. Hunter 
asserts that “[t]o have a renewal of character is to have a renewal of a creedal order that 
constrains, limits, binds, obligates, and compels,” but, instead, “[w]e want character . . . without 
unyielding conviction; we want strong morality but without the emotional burden of guilt or 
shame; we want virtue but without particular moral justifications that invariably offend; we want 
good without having to name evil; we want decency without the authority to insist upon it.”172 
Hunter‟s assertion is reminiscent of Flannery O‟Connor‟s comment in the introduction to the 
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second edition of Wise Blood that was mentioned in the beginning of chapter one, but bears 
repeating: “Does one‟s integrity ever lie in what he is not able to do?”173 It is helpful to consider 
the term integrity extricated from its typically platitudinous iterations; at its root, integrity 
involves a sense of unified wholeness. Thus, we could say that, according to O‟Connor and 
Hunter, a sense of restriction is necessary toward being fully human. Of course, this more 
extensive understanding of the inextricability of freedom and justice necessitates that character 
be confirmed outside of the self; it requires an authority other than the self because it now seems 
evident that the self is incapable of restricting itself authoritatively. Hunter alludes to this when 
he says that character is constituted by sociality.
174
 Yet, it seems evident that moderns would 
cringe at the idea of a “command theory” of identity175 – which is an understandable recoil given 
the corrupting nature of power. 
Thus far, we have emphasized the commanding nature of character which is necessary for 
a full sense of human identity. A common and understandable objection to a “command” is that 
its coercive nature can often assert itself without proper explication of its necessity. Yet, if these 
commands – authoritative on the basis of revelation – are understood as essential to a fulfilling 
and holistic identity, then it behooves us to not just propose particular qualities of character that 
carry commanding weight, but to better articulate the basis of their authority in relation to 
humanity‟s well being. Hunter notes that “morality includes the explanations that give these 
codes coherence and authority for the individual and the community. It is in this way that culture 
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becomes authoritative. Morality demands, requires, expects of people, but in a way that seems 
natural and logical to them.”176 Following Hunter, the form of character – commitments to an 
exterior moral code that is binding and authoritative – necessarily requires us to be explicit about 
the content of character; that is, it requires us to articulate what we are committed to with regard 
to goodness, and to provide more definitive definitions of freedom and justice that cause the two 
to cohere in a more fulfilling and reconciliatory way. Hunter provides a lengthy summation of 
what is involved in character that is worth quoting in full, because it brings the retrieval of 
character full circle in relation to Taylor‟s situation of identity within narrative: 
Implicit in the word „character‟ is a story. It is a story about living for a purpose 
that is greater than the self. Though this purpose resides deeply within, its origins 
are outside the self and so it beckons one forward, channeling one‟s passions to 
mostly quiet acts of devotion, heroism, sacrifice, and achievement. These 
purposes, and the narrative in which they are embedded, translate character into 
destiny. In so doing they also establish the horizons of the moral imagination – 
the expanse of the good that can be envisioned. The moral excellencies of 
character, then, are not the end toward which one strives but rather a means. At 
the same time, the moral disciplines within which one is habitualized are 
enactments of the purposes to which one is called, embodiments of the vision to 
which one is committed. The vision itself is imbued with a quality of sacredness. 
The standards by which one lives and the purposes to which one aspires have a 
coherence and an inviolability about them and they beckon ever forward . . . but 
never alone. The story implicit within the word „character‟ is one that is shared, it 
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is never just for the isolated individual. The narrative integrates the self within 
communal purposes binding dissimilar others to common ends. Character outside 
of a lived community, the entanglements of complex social relationships, and 
their shared story, is impossible.
177
 
To be a self is to be involved with – bound and committed to – others. And, as it turns out, the 
submission of one‟s self to this communal story, is not, in the grand scheme of the narrative, 
restricting of the self‟s freedom, but provides boundaries for the imagination that actually infuse 
it with a new, more refined expanse of possibilities. If, however, this story or narrative which the 
self is communally situated in relies on sense or meaning, then it is a story that must involve a 
robust theory of language that moves beyond behaviorism, and allows for grammars that allow 
faithful reconciliation between self and other. 
 
The Nature of Language as it Relates to Freedom and Alienation 
 Many of the themes we have been considering thus far – community, narrative, story, 
sense, meaning – center around that which is most mysterious about man because it most eludes 
naturalistic explanations: language. Undoubtedly, if we are to consider a communal 
understanding of free human agency, then this consideration requires that we address the nature 
of language as it relates to the aforementioned themes. Of course, our primary concern remains 
the two polarities of alienation and community, and their relation to the human agent‟s freedom 
and authenticity. Taylor provides a substantive starting point when he elucidates the incoherence 
of authenticity constituted by individually created meanings:  
Briefly, we can say that authenticity (A) involves (i) creation and construction as 
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well as discovery, (ii) originality, and frequently (iii) opposition to the rules of 
society and even potentially to what we recognize as morality. But it is also true, 
as we saw, that it (B) requires (i) openness to horizons of significance (for 
otherwise the creation loses the background that can save it from insignificance) 
and (ii) a self-definition in dialogue. That these demands may be in tension has to 
be allowed. But what must be wrong is a simple privileging of one over the other, 
of (A), say, at the expense of (B), or vice versa. This is what the trendy doctrines 
of „deconstruction‟ involve today. They stress (A.i), the constructive, creative 
nature of our expressive languages, while altogether forgetting (B.i). And they 
capture the extremer forms of (A.iii), the amoralism of creativity, while forgetting 
(B.ii), its dialogical setting, which binds us to others. There is something 
incoherent about this.
178
 
Thus, there is a sense in which language mirrors activity in terms of the modern‟s emphasis on 
unfettered creativity and possibility. In short, language has been widely considered, wittingly or 
not, more autonomously designative than communally expressive. On the autonomous-
designative model, the definitions of freedom, character, and identity can be individually 
projected. Taylor identifies Augustine as providing one of the earliest articulations of an 
expressive theory of meaning, according to which God is an expressivist and “the world is a 
meaningful order, or a text. This kind of view of the world is dominant right up to the 
seventeenth century, when it was pulverized in the scientific revolution.”179 Flowing from this 
theistically expressive ontology has been what Taylor refers to as “semiological ontologies.”180 
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On this view, broadly speaking, the world of things embodies ideas that posit a sense of being in 
the world; or, we might say that the earth has a particular significance about it that shapes our 
cognizance and, thus, our languages. But, here, contra the designative view of language, the 
expressive view recognizes that the cosmos shape us.  
 Over against the expressive view of language is the more recent and fashionable 
designative view of language that developed in the seventeenth century. Taylor tellingly 
describes this designative view: “Language for the theory of these centuries is an instrument of 
control in the assemblage of ideas which is thought or mental discourse. It is an instrument of 
control in gaining knowledge of the world as objective process. And so it must be perfectly 
transparent; it cannot itself be the locus of mystery[.]”181 Based on what we have considered thus 
far, it comes as no surprise that aggression toward the expressive view derives from the modern‟s 
grab for radically independent freedom. On the designative view, to take on the expressive 
theory of language is “to lose control, to slip into a kind of slavery; where it is no longer I who 
make my lexicon, by definitional fiat, but rather it takes shape independently and doing this 
shapes my thought. It is an alienation of my freedom as well as the great source of illusion; and 
that is why the mean of this age combated this cosmos of meaningful order with such 
determination.”182 It should be noted that, on first glance, the designative view may seem more 
practically acceptable. Yet, we must take into account the holistic nature of language and how 
new terms come into common usage. Taylor notes that though “[m]en are constantly shaping 
language,” their linguistic creativities are always situated; they are “never quite autonomous, 
quite uncontrolled by the rest of language. They can only be introduced and make sense because 
they already have a place within the web, which must at any moment be taken as given over by 
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far the greater part of its extent.”183 Hence, with language – as with any creative possibility – the 
human agent is creative within an inescapably given normativity. To live toward eschewing this 
given normativity is to decay toward nothingness. As we noted earlier, Walker Percy was 
moving toward a significant affirmation of community; most essential to this pursuit was his 
interest in semiology. 
 
Percy’s Semiological Search for Meaning 
 Supplementing Percy‟s search for authentic community and his critique of alienation is 
his exploration of language – particularly his proposed triadic theory of communication, which 
involved sign theory and the nature of naming. In the modern age, Percy considered language 
essentially the last remaining anthropological mystery: “Only language and other symbolic 
behavior (art, music) seems to remain as the sole remaining indisputably unique attribute of man. 
If language can be shown to be within the capability of apes, dolphins, and humpback whales, 
the dethronement of man will be complete.”184 Percy‟s theory-laden emphasis on language – 
largely following Charles Sanders Peirce‟s work – hinges on his triadic theory of language and 
meaning. He comments that “[t]riadic behavior is that event in which sign A is understood by 
organism B, not as a signal to flee or approach, but as „meaning‟ or referring to another 
perceived segment of the environment.”185 Not only is there something more to human 
communication than mere mechanistic response – or, behaviorism – but Percy further comments 
that “all such triadic behavior is social in origin. A signal received by an organism is like other 
signals or stimuli from its environment. But a sign requires a sign-giver. Thus, every triad of 
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sign-reception requires another triad of sign-utterance. Whether the sign is a word, a painting, or 
a symphony . . . a sign transaction requires a sign-utterer and a sign-receiver.”186 While language 
signifies a unique, socially-embedded understanding and exchange of meaning, it also, on 
Percy‟s understanding, implicates the self‟s metaphysical homelessness.  
The human self embodies a kind of freedom that is wholly unique in the world. Percy 
comments that “[a]s soon as the self becomes self-conscious – that is, aware of its own unique 
unformulability in its world of signs – from that moment forward, it cannot escape the 
predicament of its placement in the world.”187 Here, Percy describes the possibilities uniquely 
attendant to human agency; that is, the self – because it achieves consciousness, or, self-
awareness – eludes behavioristic descriptors. Yet, the paradox is that the self still “must be 
placed in a world. It cannot not be placed. If it chooses by default not to be placed, then its 
placement is that of not choosing to be placed.”188 One essential element of Percy‟s sign theory 
and of the self‟s need to be placed in the world is the process involved in naming. We have been 
saying that the self‟s resistance of any sort of submission, or, self-giving, is actually a negation 
of the self because it requires content that is always given from the outside. Thus, it is telling that 
Percy considers naming an affirmation: “Naming or symbolization may be defined as the 
affirmation of the thing as being what it is under the auspices of the symbol. When the child 
understands that by the word „ball‟ his father means the round thing, his understanding is of the 
nature of a yes-saying. . . . But an affirmation requires two persons, the namer and the hearer.”189 
Language involves interpersonally agreed upon symbols that signify mutual affirmation of 
meaning. However, the self – the “namer and hearer” – seems to elude the category of things, yet 
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still feels the need to be placed, or authoritatively named.  
Following Kierkegaard, Percy defines the human categories of affirmation in terms of 
authentic-inauthentic. He says, “[A]s soon as an individual becomes a name-giver or a hearer of 
a name, he no longer coincides with what he is biologically. Henceforth, he must exist either 
authentically or inauthentically. . . . A person may flourish biologically while, at the same time, 
living a desperately alienated and anonymous life.”190 Percy goes on to say that “whether I write 
or read a line of great poetry, form or understand a scientific hypothesis, I thereby exist 
authentically as a namer or a hearer, as an „I‟ or a „thou‟ – and in either case as a co-celebrant of 
what is.”191 Other people are necessary collaborators – “co-celebrants” – of existence, and, 
further, we require names to resist the void of anonymity. Of course, the problem for humanity is 
that the cosmos which he is situated in has been deemed largely disenchanted – and, thus, 
indifferent to man‟s place in its midst. Man‟s existence is inescapably derivative; however, who 
or what can authoritatively name him in terms of his ultimate place in the grand narrative? 
Essential to understanding Percy‟s reconciliation between word and world – and between self 
and other – is his commitment to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. However, before 
considering this commitment, we would do well to consider Percy‟s advocacy for a new science 
– novel writing – which he considered an equally appropriate – even authoritative – form of 
knowledge; further, we want to consider how a Bakhtinian literary analysis allows us to 
recognize the structures of alienation and community that are inherent in novelistic worlds.  
 
Diagnosing Alienation: Percy, Bakhtin, and the Novel 
Percy considered novel writing a science which was essential in its ability to provide 
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diagnostic analysis of man‟s problems. For Percy, the novelist is, in a sense, a detached 
empiricist-physician providing analysis of man‟s plight by describing it in narrative form. Taking 
Anton Chekhov as his literary exemplar, Percy believed the twentieth century was ripe for 
novelistic diagnosis because  
[t]o the degree that a society has been overtaken by a sense of malaise rather than 
exuberance, by fragmentation rather than wholeness, the vocation of the artist, 
whether novelist, poet, playwright, filmmaker, can perhaps be said to come that 
much closer to that of the diagnostician rather than the artist‟s celebration of life 
in a triumphant age. Something is indeed wrong, and one of the tasks of the 
serious novelist is, if not to isolate the bacillus under the microscope, at least to 
give the sickness a name, to render the unspeakable speakable.
192
 
Percy‟s novels are literary attempts to expose the related problems of alienation, malaise, and 
despair which he saw to be particularly prevalent in American culture. For Percy, as we have 
seen, these novelistic diagnoses gain credence because of the nature of naming that is necessarily 
attendant to literature. Because the novel‟s structure of action and character mimics the nature of 
narrative and character that are necessary for understanding human agency, it is uniquely and 
inherently set up to expose life‟s incongruities. And because narratives are necessarily 
communal, novelistic structure also exposes alienation. Toward this end, Mikhail Bakhtin‟s 
novelistic themes – particularly his affirmation of heteroglossia and critique of monologism – 
can enrich our task. 
 O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike all produced novels that could be deepened by Bakhtinian 
analysis, because their novels evince competing socio-ideologies – including those differing 
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between author and character. Michael Kobre and Robert H. Brinkmeyer have each provided 
calculated criticism, in Bakhtinian categories, of Walker Percy‟s and Flannery O‟Connor‟s 
novels, respectively.
193
 Bakhtin comments that at any given moment in the midst of 
heteroglossia, “language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the 
word . . . but also . . . into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, 
„professional‟ and „generic‟ languages, languages of generations and so forth.”194 These layers of 
language work toward illustrating that “language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the 
borderline between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone else‟s. It 
becomes „one‟s own‟ only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, 
when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention.”195 
And, continuing with Bakhtin‟s terms, the novel can be defined as “a diversity of social speech 
types . . . and a diversity of individual voices, artistically organized.”196 In short, Bakhtinian 
analysis allows the critic to consider a few compelling issues regarding language, alienation, and 
sociality: the inward monologisms that characters keep free from interpersonal transparency; the 
conversations that form and alter characters‟ ideological direction and identity formulation; and 
the course these languages take in the novel also reveals, to some extent, authorial ideology. Of 
course, the self is not merely an amalgamation of voices. As Kobre has effectively expressed, the 
individual must selectively appropriate the linguistic socio-ideologies he receives in his 
interactions,
197
 but these conversations are essential for Percy as the “source and guarantor of our 
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identities.”198 When the self is transparent in interaction, the possibility opens up whereby “one‟s 
inauthentic self is exposed or one‟s real self is validated „in the discovering look of another.‟”199 
In the direct literary analysis we will examine in Part 2, Bakhtinian analysis will prove helpful to 
not only elucidating onanistic, alienating violations of interpersonal intimacy within the 
structures of language, but also to exposing individualistic remnants in the underlying authorial 
voice which ultimately inhibit faithful, authentic depictions of community. But before 
considering the prominent absence in these novels of what Hunter has recently termed “faithful 
presence,” it will be helpful to consider how Percy‟s understanding of the Incarnation, the 
Eucharist, and its implications may expose a point of departure where he still remains 
individualistic in his believing and aesthetic tendencies. 
 
Percy’s Incarnational and Eucharistic Basis for a Meaningful Narrative 
 As a Christian with specifically Catholic commitments, Percy placed a particularly realist 
emphasis on the Incarnation and the Eucharist in an attempt to bridge the divide between 
observable and spiritual realities. Toward the end of his life, he took it as his task not just to 
restore Christianity to academic respectability, but to firmly establish it as a body of knowledge 
that could be apprehended with absolute certainty. Here, again, it is necessary to turn to 
Desmond, for no Percy critic has more concisely and adequately synthesized the totality of 
Percy‟s interests on the basis of the Incarnation and the Eucharist: 
The Eucharist is the essential sign of mystical community made real in human 
history. Belief in the Incarnation and in the real presence of God-in-Christ in the 
Eucharist, with all its reticular implications, was the core belief that informed his 
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theology, his philosophy, his theories of language and of fiction writing (the 
community of art), and his own practice as a novelist. Belief in the divine Word 
made flesh, for Percy, is the central truth of community. Percy‟s theological 
vision of community was interwoven throughout his thought and writing with his 
belief in philosophical realism. . . . [H]e felt it crucial to believe in a „realistic‟ 
philosophy and theology that could lead to absolute certainty, such as the 
certainty that the Eucharist was not a symbol but a reality, and that God was 
genuinely present as a person in the consecrated bread and wine.
200
 
Percy‟s affirmation of the Incarnation is agreeable on a couple of levels. First, he commits 
himself to a particular content that provides a meaningful narrative and articulation of character. 
God affirms his creative order and human beings by entering time and space, taking on human 
flesh, and living among the human race for the purposes of reconciliation between Himself and 
human kind. However, what seems evident in these descriptions is that they are primarily 
concerned with personal actions rather than things. The tendency among Catholic considerations 
of the Eucharist is to identity the real presence of Christ and his signified actions as locally 
present in the things of bread and wine. This articulation, which certainly has material – and 
therefore modern-scientific – implications, seemingly provides the basis for Percy‟s concern with 
absolute certainty. In the rest of this chapter, I want to expand, in a few ways, on John D. Sykes‟s 
specific critique of Percy‟s grounds for community life, and its proponents like Desmond. Sykes 
comments, “My point, in opposition to Desmond‟s presentation of Percy, is that the tension 
between faith and reason was bound to be relaxed in favor of reason so long as Percy used Peirce 
to establish „no less than an anthropological basis for the creation of a revitalized organon of 
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truth.‟ The goal itself was problematic.”201 Percy may have adequately pointed out the necessity 
of faith, but his aspirations of making that necessity rational in any demonstrable sense, though 
understandable, may have been a goal that proved problematic in its immodesty. Any attempt to 
eliminate the distinctions between modern science and individual faith – or, in a different way, 
objectivity and subjectivity – is bound to fail because self-conscious, self-evaluative actions 
transcend the categories of modern-scientific objectivity. The “real presence” of historically-
remembered or presently-encountered personal actions – of embodied personal expressions – 
always necessarily requires faith in a way that resists the scientistic sense of observable reality. 
Following Sykes‟s critique of community life in Percy‟s and O‟Connor‟s work, I want to spend 
the rest of this chapter developing the point that signals Christ‟s “real presence” within the 
immanent frame manifest in the faithful, communal actions of Christ‟s body – His people; and 
the emphasis on Christ‟s action toward people generally, and through his people specifically, is, 
perhaps, the proper emphasis for sacraments like the Eucharist, which will allow for fulfilling 
transcendence
202
 through interpersonal intimacy with God and man.  
 
The Absence of Faithful Community Life 
 Though O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike have offered glimpses of redemption in their 
novels, their narratives often prove slightly dissatisfying in that they ultimately lack any 
depictions of community life. Or, we might say that their narratives lack a communally minded 
faithful presence
203
 because their authors seemingly avoid inserting their own character into the 
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narratives. In his chapter “Southern Strangers and the Sacramental Community,” Sykes voices a 
fine critique of the lack of depictions of community life in O‟Connor‟s and Percy‟s work. He 
comments that O‟Connor‟s work “is so firmly fixed on the drama of the individual soul that she 
offers no positive vision of life together to counter her scathing satire of consumer society,”204 
and that Percy‟s affection for the detached observer, and too strong a commitment to 
Kierkegaard indicates that his “understanding of the self, despite qualifications, remains 
atomistic.”205 Additionally, Sykes rightly asserts that “one looks in vain in the fiction of 
O‟Connor and Percy for examples of a realized community” and that “[i]ntense scrutiny of the 
fact of alienation may show the need for communion, but it does not supply the lack.”206 One 
could provide different analyses as to why there is a lack of community life depicted by authors 
who, not only have professed Christian commitments, but felt they were providing significantly 
redemptive narratives. Certainly, one factor is that O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike wanted to avoid 
“church fiction.” Or, they wanted to avoid overly didactic, and, thus, ultimately unrealistic 
narratives. One could argue, however, that this concern reveals a significant indictment of the 
American church. Ralph Wood and Stanley Hauerwas have convincingly argued that American 
churches have made it nearly impossible for authors to offer convincing depictions of the 
institutional church because “the church has become virtually invisible in America. It has so 
fully identified itself with the American project that our artists have had little cause to heed any 
unique and distinctively Christian witness in the churches.”207 Hauerwas‟s and Wood‟s reading 
of the exclusion of the church from the American literary tradition certainly comports with the 
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analysis put forth in chapter two that American individualism was largely characteristic of the 
American church‟s community life. While the authors go on to commend O‟Connor for her 
“sacramental fiction” because it is “not didactic,”208 they also submit that “O‟Connor remained 
unable to depict a faithful community wherein such drastic divine grace might be socially 
embodied and ethically sustained.”209 My contention is that the former praise of O‟Connor‟s 
sacramental avoidance of didacticism is not unrelated to the latter criticism of her novels‟ lack of 
communal depictions. Though “preachy” novels are certainly something to be avoided, and 
O‟Connor intimates that “the real heart of the story” lies in “action,”210 I would argue that 
O‟Connor‟s excessive revulsion to “didacticism” and mis-emphasis on the sacraments as being 
predominantly about the things of creation are excessive in a way that betrays an understanding 
of art as an intentioned action of the artist, and ultimately undermines any potential visions of 
redemption through interpersonal human agents as opposed to transfigured things.
211
 
 Flannery O‟Connor‟s and Walker Percy‟s commitment to, and particular understanding 
of, “sacramental reality” ultimately sets them at odds with a view of art that is based on action, 
and narrows the redemptive possibilities of their work. Sykes comments that for Percy, like 
O‟Connor, “[T]he sacraments take on a life-and-death importance. For ultimately, it is only 
through them that the basic spiritual needs of the self can be met. The sacraments restore us to 
the world by affirming the connection between the spiritual and physical. . . . [T]he sacraments 
reconcile us to God, satisfying our need for transcendence.”212 This view of the sacraments leads 
in two problematic directions whereby (1) the sacraments are a mystical form of self-
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transcendence, and (2) God‟s restorative purposes are predominantly through the things of 
Creation rather than the active beings of creation. Additionally, Hauerwas and Wood offer a 
telling, extensive comment on the sacramental view of literature that O‟Connor espoused: “Just 
as baptism resembles nothing so much as drowning and eucharist appears as a kind of 
cannibalism – while both events are the very means of life temporal and everlasting – so will 
Christian fiction be characterized by a necessary alterity, since the central Christian premise is 
that the world made and redeemed by God is constantly interrupted and transfigured by 
revelation.”213 These particular commitments to a sacramental vision of the world cause both 
O‟Connor and Percy to be too detached from their work in such a way that they can only counter 
individualistic tendencies by, in their own particular ways, depicting worlds which are 
sacramentally infused with a kind of Christian otherness, and, thus, are ultimately uninhabitable 
for Christ-less characters. Yet, it seems evident that this position forces the authors into a corner 
wherein the Christian otherness of reality never becomes affirmingly familiar via the faithful 
presence of interpersonal human agency.  
In his work Art in Action, Wolterstorff offers a compelling case that the modern‟s 
philosophical understanding of art must be overhauled. His fundamental argument is that “works 
of art are objects and instruments of action. They are all inextricably embedded in the fabric of 
human intention. They are objects and instruments of action whereby we carry out our intentions 
with respect to the world, our fellows, ourselves, and our gods.”214 Hence, faithful authorial 
action need not necessarily be equated with didacticism. The epigraph to Wolterstorff‟s work 
from J. R. Lucas‟s Freedom and Grace appears telling for our considerations here: “If we, as 
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theists, believe that the universe is fundamentally personal in character, it follows that our 
ultimate understanding will not be in terms of things, which occupy space and may or may not 
possess certain properties, but of persons, who characteristically do things. Action, not 
substance, will be our most important category of thought. It is a truth too long neglected by 
philosophers.”215 That is, though we might say that God gives the individual grace via things 
such as food, it would be a mistake to avoid His exceeding manifestation of Himself via the meal 
graciously cultivated by one person for another or a host of others. That things are created by 
God is not primarily an affirmation of things as mere ends in themselves, but, rather, as 
instruments for personally purposive ends, which make those things enjoyable ends. However, 
Hauerwas and Wood are right to assert that imaginative depictions of community life are made 
difficult in an American context in which the church community has largely receded from 
fruitful action. So, to conclude, I want to briefly unpack Hunter‟s concept of “faithful presence” 
– to which I have been alluding – and assert that this socially-embedded, active faith might offer 
a paradigm-shift for more fulfilling narratives, and, thus, more fulfilling identities. 
 If the self is primarily rooted in community and situated in narrative, then the possibility 
of transcendence – or, the possibility to overcome life‟s pressures – is necessarily rooted in an 
active, inter-personal community which is characterized by reconciliation. Berger has used the 
phrase “signals of transcendence” to describe particular instances in the immanent frame which 
seem to indicate the possibility to overcome the difficulties attendant to being a human agent in 
the world; and he asserts, for instance, that one of these signals of transcendence is laughter.
216
 
Signals of transcendence, like laughter, momentarily create an alternate reality where the 
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violences and burdens of the immanent frame seem powerless. Berger asserts that the contention 
for believers is that the redeeming signals within these moments “are not temporary at all, but 
rather . . . point to that other world that has always been the object of religious attitude.”217 My 
contention is that these “signals of transcendence” are primarily, if not always, socially 
embedded. Laughter, to continue with Berger‟s example, is almost always shared with others; of 
course, we can conceive of an individual laughing to himself, but his laughter is the result of a 
conscious reflection that was socially formed. Berger‟s accomplished disciple, James Davison 
Hunter, with his concept of “faithful presence,” has asserted a compelling communal narrative 
wherein these signals of transcendence make a totally redeemed reality on the other side of death 
significantly more plausible.  
 Hunter‟s notion of faithful presence calls for human agents to be communally minded, 
character-driven, and actively seeking the well-being of others. It is particular in its moral 
judgments in such a way that justice is not undermined, but also avoids coercive rhetoric or 
action that would undermine its reconciliatory character. Hunter comments that the particular 
vision of this community of faithfully-present individuals “is the vision of shalom. It is a vision 
of order and harmony, fruitfulness, and abundance, wholeness, beauty, joy, and well-being. For 
the Christian, this was God‟s intention in creation and it is his promise for the new heaven and 
the new earth.”218 Hunter, like O‟Connor and Percy, grounds his vision in the Incarnation, but 
with a compellingly different emphasis: “In the most momentous event in history, God became 
incarnate in Christ not only to model shalom (by forgiving the sinner, feeding the hungry, 
healing the sick and infirm, raising the dead, losing the outsider, and caring for all in need) but, 
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as St. Paul writes, to be „our shalom.‟”219 That is, not only was God, incarnated in Christ, a 
model of shalom in his particular interactions while on earth, but His life signified reconciliatory 
actions toward all of humanity. For the Christian, God not only dwelt among men – submitting 
himself to take on flesh – but fearlessly submitted himself to the vile hatred of the cross to 
reconcile the human race to Himself. Yet, what is crucial for us within this particular narrative, 
in terms of freedom, is that Christ submitted himself to the cross as a sacrifice for others, 
knowing he would rise again. That is, if one believes that the momentary signals of 
transcendence in this life point to a reality after death which will be eternally and fully 
constituted by the character of these transcendent moments, then surely this believer has grounds 
for a truly radical freedom that undermines neither his identity nor the relationships which 
constitute him. On these terms, the human agent neither retreats from this life as if it were devoid 
of goodness, nor excessively embraces it as if this life were all that he had to lose. Operating on 
this paradigm shift of freedom, Hunter says, “Christians are to live toward the well-being of 
others, not just to those within the community of faith, but to all.”220 Of course, this vision of 
shalom, rooted in the particularity of the Incarnation and the ultimate triumph of resurrection, 
necessarily entails meaningful commitments that are rooted in faith. 
 According to Hunter‟s vision, we have reconciliation between word and world and 
between self and other on the basis of faith rather than certainty; however, this reconciliation is 
particularly rooted in faith in such a way that the immanent commitments it entails are certainly 
good for all. This “communal narrative”221 entails making familiar to all people the language and 
grammar of its story: “Words such as covenant, grace, gift, sin, mercy, forgiveness, love, hope, 
                                                          
219
 Ibid., 229. 
220
 Ibid., 229-30. 
221
 Ibid., 237. 
Olson 92 
 
blessing, the flesh, glory, creation, resurrection, sacrament, and the like must be learned anew in 
part by understanding the significance of the language and narrative of faith within the context of 
the social, political, and cultural realities of one‟s time.”222 This narrative is imbued with faith – 
not abstractedly – but particularly in two ways. The first has yet to be pointed out explicitly, but 
serves, and requires, the second in a way that bears reiterating: (1) Significant community life is 
necessary for human agents, but these interactions are necessarily rooted in faith – faith that the 
other also seeks my well-being, and faith that what the other says has established, shared 
meaning between us. And (2), understanding that other human agents will not always act 
faithfully, we place faith in an authoritative, personal Creator who has promised that this life is 
not all there is, but that the goodness, truth, and beauty that we can see through a glass darkly, 
will be inaugurated after death for all of eternity. And, thus, faith in God supports the fulfillment 
of faith in others, while also helping us cope with the destruction faith in others can entail.  
The Christian commitments of the primary thinkers we have been concerned with – 
O‟Connor, Percy, Updike, Kierkegaard, et. al. – have necessarily driven us to reconsider 
modernity‟s commitments to autonomous reason and/or desire. While some secularists may balk 
at the religious bent of this study – or the importance of faith in human agency – they would do 
well to thoughtfully consider sociologists like Peter L. Berger, who asserts that modern society 
has “threatened the plausibility of religious theodicies, but it has not removed the experiences 
that call for them. Human beings continue to be stricken by sickness and death; they continue to 
experience social injustice and deprivation. The various secular creeds and ideologies that have 
arisen in the modern era have been singularly unsuccessful in providing satisfactory 
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theodicies.”223 Further, modernity “has not fundamentally changed the finitude, fragility, and 
mortality of the human condition. What it has accomplished is to seriously weaken those 
definitions of reality that previously made that human condition easier to bear.”224 Fundamental 
to autonomous notions of freedom and human agency is the individualistic inwardness of desire 
and reason, but this inwardness is coupled with the failure to recognize that desires and reason 
are socially shaped. The human agent appropriates, but he does so within the context of a host of 
physical, social, and metaphysical contingencies, and these contingencies necessitate the faith 
that among these givens, truth can be grasped. 
 
Conclusion 
 The self seems constituted by its need for community, and its need to be situated within a 
narrative understanding of this life. And this communal narrative necessarily calls for moral 
commitments, and, thus, discriminations. It calls for faithful action with one another, ever 
seeking reconciliation, while also understanding that not every human agent will act toward this 
end. Thus, it also calls for faithful articulation of that which should be excluded from our 
communities for one another‟s well being. As we turn to part two and its literary analysis of 
O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood, Percy‟s The Moviegoer, and Updike‟s Rabbit, Run, we are in a good 
position to consider these three novels with the understanding that these authors‟ narratives offer 
worthy Kierkegaardian critique of autonomous freedom, but ultimately lack socially-embedded 
possibilities for redemption. That is, continuing with our metaphor for the faulty understanding 
of human agency, O‟Connor, Percy, and Updike offer compellingly critical depictions of 
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onanistic tendencies, but without depicting significantly fruitful intercourse. 
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Part 2, Chapter 4 
The Ascetic Bondage of Manipulating the Essential Self: Hazel Motes as Autonomous Modern 
and Revelation as Violence in Wise Blood 
 
Introduction 
 Perhaps the most contentious debate in the relatively brief history of Flannery O‟Connor 
criticism has been – and, no doubt, will continue to be – over the intermingling of violence with 
revelation in her fiction. I want to offer that it might be helpful to return to her first major work 
and novel – Wise Blood. Critics have often noted that O‟Connor‟s first novel is somewhat 
anomalous when compared to her later work. In consideration of O‟Connor‟s affinities with 
Søren Kierkegaard,
225
 I will argue that Wise Blood provides a foundational precedent for how 
O‟Connor‟s later intentionally distorted depictions of revelation are motivated by a 
fundamentally orthodox view of the limits of man‟s freedom and knowledge. That is, Wise Blood 
reminds us that for the autonomous modern, revelation will often be perceived as an intrusion 
from “the other” – a form of violence against one‟s modern, egoistic sensibilities; further, 
because O‟Connor‟s sacramental approach to revelation often involved strange transfigurations 
that de-familiarized God as other,  her protagonists‟ redemptive moments ultimately prove 
individualistic and devoid of intimacy.
226
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 This chapter will explore particular themes that have been visited by various other O‟Connor 
scholars, but, to my knowledge, not in such a way that seeks to reconcile four particularly 
prevalent themes in a pointed fashion: autonomy, revelation, violence, and the lack of 
community life in her works. Ralph Wood and Farrell O‟Gorman have most extensively 
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Kierkegaardian Themes and the Precedent for Violence in Wise Blood 
If Wise Blood sets a thematic precedent for the intermingling of violence with revelation 
in O‟Connor‟s later work, then it is helpful to first elucidate how two relative anomalies, which 
are unique to O‟Connor‟s first novel, specifically provide the contours for such a precedent to be 
perceived. Here, I want to follow two helpful points that Frederick Asals makes in his oft-
referenced work Flannery O’Connor: The Imagination of Extremity. He notes the existential 
thought which was prevalent during the mid-twentieth century and influential for Wise Blood: 
“Existentialism was both in the air and in print. From late in World War II on into the 1950s the 
influential literary journals . . . to which Flannery O‟Connor herself would be contributing by the 
late 1940s and early 1950s – poured forth a stream of translations, interpretations, and reviews 
which delivered to their audience word of this newest mode of thought.”227 Further, Asals 
comments that Kierkegaard may have been most distinctly influential during the period, and that 
Kierkegaardian catch phrases would be familiar to readers of Wise Blood.
228
 Hence, tracing 
affinities between O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood and Kierkegaardian thought seems an apt endeavor – 
particularly considering that in addition to the existential language which populates Wise Blood, 
they both maintained orthodox Christian commitments. The second point of uniqueness for Wise 
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have offered compelling considerations regarding the use of violence in O‟Connor‟s fiction. The 
aim of this chapter is to offer that, upon considering O‟Connor‟s affinities with Kierkegaard, an 
existential dialectic of freedom and alienation helps to bind these themes into a modestly 
cohesive explanation that helpfully furthers the continuing debate among O‟Connor critics, while 
also offering some charitable reconciliation. 
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Blood that Asals points out is that “in Wise Blood Hazel Motes‟s moment of recognition comes 
from staring at the sky,”229 and, unlike much of her later works, “matter [remains] impenetrable 
and no revelation [comes]. To the protagonists of [O‟Connor‟s] later work, however, the 
terrifying awakenings to the dimension embodied in [the landscape] prove ultimately 
irresistible.”230 That is, revelation in Wise Blood, unlike much of O‟Connor‟s later work, is not 
manifested in a violent, exterior intrusion upon the protagonist from the outside created order.
231
  
Essentially, the two points from Asals‟s criticism regarding Wise Blood that I want to consider in 
relation to one another is the novel‟s affinity with Kierkegaardian thought, and its employment 
of more traditional forms of revelation. That is, because O‟Connor – like Kierkegaard – 
recognizes the essential necessity for revelation, she also recognizes, like Kierkegaard, how 
averse the autonomous modern is to accepting revelation. And Wise Blood, unlike much of 
O‟Connor‟s later work, seems to most clearly present the autonomous modern‟s perception of 
and reaction to a more conventional revelation, and, thus, provides a helpful precedent for 
O‟Connor‟s later more literal distortions. These two points featured in Wise Blood – O‟Connor‟s 
Kierkegaardian view of revelation and autonomy, and the relative absence of violent forms of 
revelation – I take as helpful in the continuing scholarly debate over whether O‟Connor‟s  artistic 
distortions of revelation are motivated by considerations of orthodoxy. 
 Regarding connections between O‟Connor and Kierkegaard, there is one particular 
critical precedent which I take as foundational for my comparisons. In his 1972 offering The 
Christian Humanism of Flannery O’Connor, David Eggenschwiler argues that O‟Connor was a 
                                                          
229
 Ibid., 60. 
230
 Ibid., 69. 
231
 Here, I would also note that by referring to intrusive “violence” in her later work, I do not 
mean merely physical violence, but also forms of emotional violence. Hence, something like a 
strange, timely stroke in “Everything that Rises Must Converge” would fit the assertion. 
Olson 98 
 
humanist because she was concerned with what it meant to be authentically human. In one 
relevant comment, Eggenschwiler says, “[I]t would be a basic distortion not to realize that in her 
work to be estranged from God is necessarily to be estranged from one‟s essential self, which 
involves a form of psychological imbalance[.]”232 Eggenschwiler goes on to say that O‟Connor‟s 
concern with “the whole horse” – or, with the wholeness of existence – as a Christian is 
tantamount to Kierkegaard‟s concern with construing the nature of human agency as a synthesis 
of necessity and possibility.
233
 Finally, Eggenschwiler anticipates my argument when he says,  
“[Kierkegaard] claims that within man‟s dialectical self . . . possibility is limited 
by necessity[.] If man has an essential self, he cannot live freely in opposition to 
it; if he could, „freedom‟ would mean only freedom of choice, unlimited 
possibility. . . . [O‟Connor] forms her characters convincingly out of an awareness 
of man‟s dialectical nature and out of the belief that the truly free act does not 
violate man‟s essential self[.]234 
Thus, we might say that O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood is “existential” because O‟Connor is primarily 
concerned with authenticity. Following Eggenschwiler‟s argument, I want to offer a fuller 
reading of Kierkegaard‟s work concerning free human agency in relation to Wise Blood, and 
consider how the dialectic of freedom and alienation is essential to understanding both 
O‟Connor‟s art, and the common dissatisfaction with her depictions of redemption. 
 The most compelling affinity between O‟Connor and Kierkegaard is their view that 
human agency – contrary to the culturally-codified modern belief – is not autonomous, but, 
rather, is fundamentally constituted by a kind of givenness which necessitates revelation for 
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authentic freedom. Here it is helpful to recapitulate some of the conclusions in chapter one 
regarding Kierkegaard, free human agency, and revelation. Since the influential thought of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, autonomous notions of freedom have devolved in the 
modern age from freedom as constituted by one‟s self-determined moral/rational agency to 
freedom as constituted by one‟s ability to act according to unfettered desire – desires fed in 
America by a consumerist culture of choice. It is helpful to recall from chapter one 
Kierkegaard‟s journal entry regarding Kantian autonomy: 
Kant was of the opinion that man is his own law (autonomy) – that is, he binds 
himself under the law which he himself gives himself. Actually, in a profounder 
sense, this is how lawlessness or experimentation are established. . . . If I am 
bound by nothing higher than myself and I am to bind myself, where would I get 
the rigorousness as A, the binder, which I do not have as B, who is supposed to be 
bound, when A and B are the same self.
235
 
Kierkegaard‟s critique of Kant is clear and even prophetic: if the human agent is expected to 
produce morality via his own rational capabilities, then moral social norms are sure to degenerate 
into relativistic lawlessness, for there is no sure foundation for value. As Kosch puts it, for 
Kantians, “the idea of freely chosen immorality is unintelligible.”236 To act immorally on this 
model is to act irrationally, and the enthroning of education in modern America seems to speak 
to the primacy of this idea. Instead of freedom being constituted by radically self-determining 
agency, Kierkegaard understood the human agent to be a synthetic relation – a synthetic relation 
which is itself an established relation. In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard – via the 
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pseudonym Anti-Climacus – asserts that man is “a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the 
temporal and the eternal, of freedom, and necessity” and that this synthetic self “must either have 
established itself or have been established by another.”237 Essentially, Kierkegaard is saying that 
the human agent is not self-posited, but is a derived relation from a transcendent Creator God. 
Further, if man is fundamentally constituted by both freedom and necessity, then it follows that a 
necessary aspect of realizing freedom is to understand what being a human agent necessarily 
requires – or, to understand and submit to the facticity of one‟s existence. As Michelle Kosch 
puts it, “Despair in the most general sense will turn out to be the unwillingness to accept human 
agency with all of its particular conditions.”238 Despair, according to Kierkegaard, predominantly 
results not from exterior hindrances to one‟s free human agency, but from one‟s 
misunderstanding of the nature of human agency. Thus, Kierkegaard understood that to live 
freely necessarily entails understanding what it means to be human, and this fundamentally 
requires revelation from the Creator from whom the creature derives.  
 Though O‟Connor may not have used the term “autonomy” or provided such a 
philosophical or anthropological elucidation of man‟s need to be informed, she certainly has 
similar concerns in mind in her authorship of Wise Blood. Perhaps the most evident support of 
O‟Connor‟s unwitting alignment with a Kierkegaardian elucidation of free human agency is 
found in her introduction to the second edition of Wise Blood in 1962 where she says, “Does 
one‟s integrity ever lie in what he is not able to do? I think that usually it does, for free will does 
not mean one will, but many wills conflicting in one man. Freedom cannot be conceived simply. 
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It is a mystery and one which a novel, even a comic novel, can only be asked to deepen.”239 In 
our consideration of O‟Connor‟s affinities with Kierkegaard, it is compelling that the 
introduction to Wise Blood’s second edition includes an extensive remark on freedom, and that 
this remark alludes to one‟s not being able to do something as being integrally human. Of course, 
we have no doubt, based on her Christian commitments, that O‟Connor would agree with 
Kierkegaard that man‟s freedom is qualified by his need to submit to who God created him to be. 
Indeed, elsewhere, O‟Connor comments that “[t]he Catholic novelist believes that you destroy 
your freedom by sin; the modern reader believes, I think, that you gain it in that way.”240 Yet, 
O‟Connor‟s introduction to the second edition of her first novel is helpful toward pointing out 
that the subject of freedom was on her mind when writing Wise Blood. Essential to the first 
novel‟s narrative, and, indeed, O‟Connor‟s later work, is her understanding that modern man‟s 
alleged freedom from the God who is revealed in the historical Christ of the Gospels is the 
utmost form of slavery. Kierkegaard would term the condition of freely choosing unfreedom as 
despair. And it seems O‟Connor would agree: “At its best our age is an age of searchers and 
discoverers, and at its worst, an age that has domesticated despair and learned to live with it 
happily.”241  
 Part of what I endeavored to point out in Part One, via recent work in philosophy, is that 
the existential corollary to autonomous notions of freedom is alienation, and the theme of 
alienation seems even more obvious than freedom in Wise Blood. To transpose the telos of one‟s 
existence from outside oneself to within oneself – or, to avoid acknowledging one‟s reliance on 
exterior agentic sources for the development of one‟s identity – is to obviate significant, 
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committed relationships to other people. To renounce the givenness of one‟s existence and 
identity is to preclude the givers – be they God or fellow men. The most telling existential term 
in this regard in Wise Blood is the idea of home, functioning both as an earthly, familial place of 
familiarity and as a metaphysical term signifying the nature of one‟s place in the cosmos.242 
After returning home from war, Haze discovers that his family is absent. Further, on the initial 
train ride that opens the novel, Mrs. Hitchcock incessantly asks Haze, “Are you going home?” 
To which Haze snaps “No, I ain‟t.” He goes on to say that he is going to Taulkinham and that he 
“[d]on‟t know nobody there.”243  Later, the narrator describes a time at war camp when Haze 
made some friends who “were not actually friends but he had to live with them.”244 When Haze‟s 
non-friends inform him of the notion that he has no soul, the narrator tells us that Haze “had all 
the time he could want to study his soul in and assure himself that it was not there. When he was 
thoroughly convinced, he saw that this was something that he had always known. The misery he 
had was a longing for home; it had nothing to do with Jesus.”245 When Haze returns from his 
time of service, he discovers that his longing for home will not be satisfied in any literal sense. 
His childhood house is empty, deserted, and rotting. Of course, a sense of home does not just 
mean one‟s literal house or even simply one‟s literal family, but it also entails one‟s 
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understanding of his place in the cosmos, or his situation in the narrative of his life.
246
 Indeed, 
man‟s orientation in this life is most fundamentally constituted by what, or whom, he is 
committed to. To be a creature of God, a Christ-like one, a husband, a father, a son, a teacher, or 
a novelist is part of what it means to have a place in the cosmos – or, to feel at home. Perhaps 
most telling regarding the importance of this theme is the original plan O‟Connor had for Wise 
Blood. Sarah Gordon notes this plan: “The principle . . . character, an illiterate Tennessean, has 
lost his home through the breakdown of a country community. Home, in this instance, stands not 
only for the place and family, but also for some absolute belief which would give him sanctuary 
in the modern world.”247 Thus, it is compelling to note that Haze does not just reject Jesus and 
lack significant relationships, but alongside these self-imposed alienations, he ironically 
understands his misery as a longing for home. The irony is profoundly Kierkegaardian in its 
dialectic: in his freedom, Haze chooses unfreedom. 
 In addition to the existential themes in the novel, the other anomalous aspect of Wise 
Blood among O‟Connor‟s works is that, ultimately, its revelations are not excessively distorted, 
violent, or embellished, but, instead, are more literal and traditional. Indeed, one could argue that 
Hazel Motes‟s most significant revelation comes very traditionally from his fundamentalist, 
traveling preacher of a grandfather. Haze recalls from his childhood a memory of his grandfather 
pointing at him in front of a crowd of people saying, “[E]ven for that boy there, for that mean 
sinful unthinking boy standing there with his dirty hands clenching and unclenching at his sides, 
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Jesus would die ten million deaths before He would let him lose his soul[.]”248 While some 
critics have dismissed the idea of O‟Connor‟s aligning herself with her fundamentalist street 
preachers due to the harshness of their tone, Ralph Wood and other critics have rightly noted 
O‟Connor‟s sympathetic admiration for the fundamentalist, backwoods Protestants due to their 
commitment to the authority of the Scriptures and the reality of Christ‟s deity.249 Hence, for 
O‟Connor, though the voice of the fundamentalist street preacher is harsh and manipulative, the 
message preached is an authentic communication of revealed truth. And this authoritative, 
revelatory voice is precisely what Haze ultimately seems to recoil against throughout the rest of 
the novel – or, as Wood terms it, Haze is “properly scandalized”250 by the early revelation. It is 
because of this early revelation that, in Wise Blood, it is Haze – not the South – which is Christ-
haunted. That the revelatory message is a haunting violence to Haze throughout the novel is 
directly tied to his stance as a free-from-God modern. 
 
Hazel Motes as Autonomous Modern 
 That Haze is a literary exemplar of the autonomous modern seems apparent in a few 
striking ways. First, the narrator clues us in to the idea that Haze represents the autonomous 
modern when he notes that “[h]e had a strong confidence in his power to resist evil, it was 
something he had inherited, like his face, from his grandfather.”251 Here, we are reminded of the 
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self-governing moral agent who is free in the Kantian sense – man is naturally moral. Haze‟s 
arrival to Taulkinham finds him boisterously preaching about the Church of Truth Without 
Christ. His church is one that does not believe in the existence of God, sin, or the Incarnation. It 
is a church constituted by Haze alone as “member and preacher” where “the blind don‟t see and 
the lame don‟t walk and what‟s dead stays that way.”252  Haze himself is the autonomous arbiter 
of what is true, and his sense of truth is based is based on his autonomous rationality. However, 
not only is Haze‟s message radically autonomous and modern, so, too, is his pulpit. 
 The pulpit which O‟Connor gives Haze is perhaps the most significant American cultural 
artifact symbolizing autonomous notions of freedom: the automobile. Regarding Haze‟s Essex as 
a symbol, O‟Connor says, “[T]he hero‟s rat-colored automobile is his pulpit and his coffin as 
well as something he thinks of as a means of escape. He is mistaken in thinking that it is a means 
of escape, of course, and does not really escape his predicament until the car is destroyed by the 
patrolman.”253 O‟Connor notes that the automobile functions, falsely, as a means of escape – or, 
we might say, as a means toward the end of freedom. In short, the automobile is man‟s transient 
dream-machine, enabling him to transcend the supposed constraints of time, place, and people, 
and, thus, allowing him more self-reliance. Wood directly connects our explorations in chapters 
one and two above: “[the automobile] fulfills our fantasies of individualist autonomy, enabling 
us to strike out for the proverbial territories whenever the limits of social existence press in upon 
us. As Motes‟s only sacred space, the car serves as both pulpit and residence, enabling him to 
incarnate his message in a life of perpetual isolation and vagabondage.”254 That the automobile 
represents radical self-reliance for Haze is nowhere more evident than when he famously says, 
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“Nobody with a good car needs to be justified.”255 With his Essex, apparently, Haze is in control 
of both his existence and the ethical worth of his actions. Of course, toward the end of the novel, 
Haze‟s “moment of recognition staring at the sky” is prompted by the patrolman destroying his 
Essex; it is the closest O‟Connor comes in Wise Blood to a violently distorted revelation. 
To further point out O‟Connor‟s affinities to Kierkegaardian themes, Haze‟s actions seem 
to embody the esthetic lifestyle described in Kierkegaard‟s Either/or. The basest manifestation of 
Kierkegaard‟s esthete is the human agent whose freedom is constituted by his living according to 
unfettered personal whim, and this unchecked obedience to desire most often manifests itself in 
sexual promiscuity. Haze initially alludes to his devotion to unrestrained freedom when he says 
to Mrs. Hitchcock on the train, “I‟m going to do some things I never have done before.”256 The 
precise nature of these previously restricted “things” becomes apparent when Haze discovers the 
phone number of a prostitute in a bathroom stall. Soon, Haze is living the free life of 
unrestrained sexual desire – but on O‟Connor‟s humorous terms. For Haze‟s sexual liaison is 
with Leora Watts – who is described, among other things, as a big woman with greasy skin. At 
one point, Haze, in a statement similar to the one mentioned earlier regarding his automobile, 
says, “I don‟t need Jesus . . . What do I need with Jesus? I got Leora Watts.”257 Haze‟s self-
church message, the symbolism of his automobile-pulpit, and his lusty pursuit of a prostitute all 
support the notion that Haze is the unrestrained, autonomous modern – albeit a grotesquely 
debased one – who has freed himself from the perceived constraint of Christ.  
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Hazel Motes’s Perception of Revelation as Violence against his Modern Sensibilities 
Having established autonomous notions of freedom as a critical theme in Wise Blood, an 
essential point that I want to make as it relates to O‟Connor‟s later distortive use of violence is 
that Haze, as this autonomous modern, perceives literal instances of revelation and grace as acts 
of violence against his self-reliant ego. Almost immediately after we read of the revelation Haze 
received from his traveling-preacher grandfather, we discover that Haze  
saw Jesus move from tree to tree in the back of his mind, a wild ragged figure 
motioning him to turn around and come off into the dark where he was not sure of 
his footing, where he might be walking on the water and not know it and then 
suddenly know it and drown. Where he wanted to stay was in Eastrod with his 
two eyes open, and his hands always handling the familiar thing, his feet on the 
known track[.]
258
  
Here, Haze‟s reaction to Christ‟s revelatory summons is to associate it with images of wildness 
and drowning, and this is juxtaposed with his desire for the sensible and the familiar. Positively 
gracious moments are hard to come by in O‟Connor‟s fiction and, if written in, they are often 
difficult to detect. Intriguingly enough, Haze‟s gracious moment is associated with his 
automobile. When he is having persistent car troubles, Haze receives help from a man who gives 
him a tank of gas and helps him to get back on the road. As Haze is gloating that his “car‟ll get 
[him] anywhere,”259 he asks the man what he owes him – to which the man responds that he 
owes him nothing. Haze‟s recoiled response to the man‟s gracious act is telling when he spews, 
“I don‟t need no favors from him.”260 The agentic extension of grace is clearly an offense – a 
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perceived violent threat to Haze‟s self-reliance. 
The radical autonomy which characterizes Haze‟s existence necessarily calls for him to 
perceive revelation and grace as forms of violence against his freedom and sense of self. Further, 
this precedent in Wise Blood offers more literal examples of O‟Connor‟s later violent distortions 
of revelation. That O‟Connor once commented that she used distortion as a literary tool to shock 
her readers out of stagnancy has often been noted. Yet, in the same lecture at Sweet Briar 
College in 1963, O‟Connor also tellingly commented that God “has revealed himself 
specifically. [He] became man and rose from the dead. [He] confounds the senses and 
sensibilities, [He is] known early on as a stumbling block.”261 O‟Connor conceives of God‟s self-
revelation in Christ as that which disorients modern sensibilities, and, in her fiction, we might 
say that the “stumbling block” is one which literally trips her autonomous, alienated 
protagonists. 
 
A Reinforcement of Theme: Enoch Emery’s Recognition of Alienation 
The relationship between the Incarnation and the essential self in Wise Blood also seems 
evident in a way that does not involve Haze. That the existential dialectic of freedom and 
alienation is the primary theme in Wise Blood also seems evident in O‟Connor‟s depiction of the 
comedic, though sad, story of Enoch Emery. Reconciling the presence of, and events 
surrounding, Enoch has long been a confounding point for O‟Connor critics and readers, with 
some contending that it merely signals O‟Connor‟s immaturity as a novelist at the time. 
O‟Connor had little to say about Enoch in some remarks at Hollins College to introduce a 
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reading of her story: “As for Enoch, he is a moron and chiefly a comic character.”262 O‟Connor‟s 
derision is humorous, but less notable than her deeming him a “comic character.” It seems 
evident that Haze and Enoch mirror one another in a way that is chiefly important to this 
argument: they are both alienated in Taulkinham. Yet, whereas Haze‟s response to his alienation 
is ultimately ascetic, guilt-ridden despair, Enoch‟s response is to seek reconciliatory community, 
albeit failingly. 
Unlike Haze, Enoch feels the brunt of his alienation as redeemable. In one of Haze‟s and 
Enoch‟s first conversations in Taulkinham, Enoch, referring to some indifferent people, reveals 
to Haze, “You see . . . all they want to do is knock you down. I ain‟t never been to such a 
unfriendly place before.”263 Endlessly curious over Haze and alienation, Enoch asks him, “you 
know many people here?”  After Haze responds no, Enoch says, “You ain‟t gonna know none 
neither. This is one more hard place to make friends in. I been here two months and I don‟t know 
nobody. Look like all they want to do is knock you down.”264 Eventually, Enoch comes to 
recognize that Haze is just like everyone else in Taulkinham: “People ain‟t friendly here. You 
ain‟t from here but you ain‟t friendly neither.”265 Indeed, Enoch‟s accusation against Haze 
reveals both the differentiation in attitude between the two characters and Enoch‟s recognition of 
the alienating nature of Taulkinham. While much has been written regarding the significance of 
the gorilla suit in Wise Blood, it seems evident that its significance is connected to the 
Incarnation; in the animalistic world of Taulkinham which O‟Connor has created, if the 
Incarnation is not a reality, then men are ultimately animalistic, and the desire for sociality is 
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foundationally irredeemable.
266
 
 
Haze’s Inversion of Incarnation and the Evident Effects for Enoch 
One message Haze preaches is that the Incarnation is not only a fiction, but that a new 
jesus is necessary. At one point, Haze insists, “I  believe in a new kind of jesus . . . one that can‟t 
waste his blood redeeming people with it, because he‟s all man and ain‟t got any God in him. My 
church is the Church Without Christ!”267 Haze‟s message is not simply atheistic, but it is also 
directly hostile to the idea that God was embodied in Christ – and, by implication, that humans 
were not only created by God, but can also be reconciled to Him and one another. Hence, it is 
telling that the gift Haze receives from Enoch is the grotesque embodiment of the inverted 
Incarnation Haze preaches. The “new kind of jesus” is a small mummified corpse. This comedic 
“gift” of a dead jesus is symbolic of the lack of redeemable sociality and giftedness between men 
without Christ; if Jesus Christ was not God, then he remains dead, and alienated men are reduced 
to mere animals.
268
 That this seems to be the implicit message is evident in the end of Enoch‟s 
story. He gets excited to meet the man in the gorilla suit who is greeting a line of kids:  
The child in front of him finished and stepped aside and left him facing the ape, 
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who took his hand with an automatic motion. It was the first hand that had been 
extended to Enoch since he had come to the city. It was warm and soft. For a 
second he only stood there, clasping it. . . . The star leaned slightly forward and a 
change came in his eyes: an ugly pair of human ones moved closer and squinted 
at Enoch from behind the celluloid pair. „You go to hell,‟ a surly voice inside the 
ape-suit said, low but distinctly, and the hand jerked away. Enoch‟s humiliation 
was so sharp and painful that he turned around three times before he realized 
which direction he wanted to go in.
269
 
Enoch‟s desire for the simple intimacy of recognition is denied, ironically, by a man dressed up 
as a gorilla. The harsh denial causes Enoch to experience a momentarily acute form of 
disorientation. When he comes to his senses, Enoch‟s humiliation is so palpable that the seeds of 
hate have infected him: “Enoch had an urgent need to insult somebody immediately; it was the 
only thing that could give his feelings even temporary relief.”270 Eventually, Enoch calms down, 
steals the gorilla suit, and the last scene we see from Enoch is when he is dressed like an animal, 
with his arm extended to an unsuspecting couple in the park; Enoch is looking yet again for 
intimacy and recognition: “The young man turned his neck just in time to see the gorilla standing 
a few feet away, hideous and black, with its hand extended. He . . . disappeared silently into the 
woods. She, as soon as she turned her eyes, fled screaming down the highway. The gorilla stood 
as though surprised and presently its arm fell to its side.”271 Ultimately, the “new jesus” – the all-
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man – provides no reconciliation for Enoch, who, though alienated like Haze, at least recognizes 
his need for significant others.  
 
The Absence of Communal Depictions of Reconciliation in Wise Blood 
While for O‟Connor‟s Christian readers, her violent exposure of autonomous moderns 
makes for compelling literature driven by orthodox belief, I would propose that O‟Connor‟s 
focus on autonomous, alienated protagonists also helps illuminate what is often dissatisfying 
about her depictions of redemption. Though Wise Blood lacks intentional distortions of 
revelation and grace more typical of her later works, its ending is not without a violent depiction 
of one aspect of redemption. In the end of the novel, Haze performs a grotesque forms of ascetic 
penance – placing rocks in his shoes and walking for miles, blinding himself, and wrapping his 
body in barbed wire – all to pay as a form of gratitude, and, presumably, to prove his authenticity 
alongside Asa Hawkes‟s fakery. The theme of authenticity in Wise Blood should not be 
overlooked. Indeed, if one ethic drives Haze throughout the novel, it is assuredly his authenticity. 
He is annoyed by anyone who does not live and preach without hypocrisy – most notably Onnie 
Jay Holy and his modern, social message about humanity‟s good nature (“You don‟t have to 
believe nothing you don‟t understand and approve of.”272). And, in the end of the novel, Haze‟s 
self-blinding in response to the revelation that Hawkes did not actually blind himself is telling of 
his realization that authenticity comes from submitting in faith to Christ. Yet, what is also 
notable about this particular depiction of redemption is how radically alienated Haze remains 
even unto death. Indeed, toward the end of the novel, even his landlady‟s attempts to reach out to 
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him are to no avail. Tellingly, she pleads to Haze, “If we don‟t help each other, Mr. Motes, 
there‟s nobody to help us . . . the world is a empty place.”273 Ultimately, I have to agree with 
Sarah Gordon and John D. Sykes – who have both effectively pointed out the lack of significant, 
redemptive depictions of community life and charitable love in O‟Connor‟s fiction.274 Three 
particular reasons for the lack of depictions of charitable forms of reconciliation in O‟Connor‟s 
work seem especially revealing. 
 First, O‟Connor‟s novels are sacramental in the sense that grace and love are embodied 
in mysterious ways. Undoubtedly, Catholics have long viewed the sacraments – particularly the 
Eucharist and its transubstantiation – as enshrouded in mystery. For Catholics, the sacraments 
are not mere symbols, but embodied realities imparting God‟s grace. And, for Catholic novelists 
like O‟Connor (and, to a lesser extent, Walker Percy), symbolisms in the novel function not 
merely as artistic signs for the reader, but as embodied realities within her depicted world that 
strangely redeem her characters. Sykes has noted the seriousness with which O‟Connor and 
Percy viewed the sacraments: “[T]he sacraments take on a life-and-death importance. For 
ultimately, it is only through them that the basic spiritual needs of the self can be met. . . . [T]he 
sacraments reconcile us to God, satisfying our need for transcendence.”275 As mentioned above 
in chapter three, this view of the sacraments forces one in a problematic direction. For, if the 
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sacraments offer a mystical form of self-transcendence through transubstantiated things, then 
God‟s gracious and restorative purposes are predominantly through the things of Creation rather 
than the active beings of Creation. Commenting on O‟Connor‟s Eucharistic vision, Hauerwas 
and Wood note that Christian fiction will be characterized by “a necessary alterity, since the 
central Christian premise is that the world made and redeemed by God is constantly interrupted 
and transfigured by revelation.”276 These commitments to a sacramental vision of the world and 
novel writing ultimately force O‟Connor to counter individualistic tendencies by depicting 
worlds which are uninhabitable for her characters because they come up against this strange form 
of Christian otherness. Of course, what is problematic in terms of depicting redemption in this 
way is that this Christian otherness never becomes affirmingly familiar to her protagonists via 
faithful human agency. And, I would argue that this lack in O‟Connor‟s fiction is connected, in 
part, to her avoidance of didacticism. 
O‟Connor may have been excessively avoiding didacticism, or, church-fiction. She 
viewed many Christian writers as profiting off of moralistic utilitarianism. O‟Connor reflects her 
concern with avoiding preachy fiction when she says that “[Christians] are not content to stay 
within our limitations and make something that is simply a good in and by itself. Now we want 
to make something that will have some utilitarian value. Yet what is good in itself glorifies God 
because it reflects God. The artist has his hands full and does his duty if he attends to his art. He 
can safely leave evangelizing to the evangelists.”277 Yet, based on the lack of affirmative 
depictions of reconciliations in her stories, O‟Connor seems to have succumbed to a false 
either/or whereby the reconciliatory truth of the evangelist could not be realistically depicted in 
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action by the fiction-writer. Yet, in addition to the avoidance of didacticism, we could add one 
other compelling reason for the lack of positive community life in O‟Connor‟s fiction: her stance 
against liberalistic social gospels. 
O‟Connor often felt compelled to attack social gospels which obviated the eternally 
salvific nature of Christ‟s death, burial, and resurrection. A point O‟Connor makes in one of her 
letters seems to correspond to a scene in Wise Blood. In a letter to Cecil Dawkins on June 19
th
, 
1957, O‟Connor retorts, “I don‟t really think the standard of judgment, the missing link, you 
spoke of that you find in my stories emerges from any religion by Christianity, because it 
concerns specifically Christ and the Incarnation, the fact that there has been a unique 
intervention in history. It‟s not a matter in these stories of Do Unto Others. That can be found in 
any ethical culture series. It is the fact of the Word made flesh.”278 O‟Connor‟s revulsion for a 
simplistic gospel of “Do Unto Others” is also reflected in Wise Blood, when Sabbath Hawks 
receives a response in the local newspaper for a letter she wrote regarding whether she could be 
sexually promiscuous since she – a bastard – would not enter the kingdom of heaven anyway: 
“Dear Sabbath, Light necking is acceptable, but I think your real problem is one of adjustment to 
the modern world. Perhaps you ought to re-examine your religious values to see if they meet 
your needs in Life. A religious experience can be a beautiful addition to living if you put it in the 
proper presepctive and do not let it warf you. Read some books on Ethical Culture.”279 The point 
is closely related to O‟Connor‟s certain self-awareness and repugnance for the Americanist civic 
religion that Dwight D. Eisenhower was peddling. For these reasons, one wonders if O‟Connor 
could imaginatively conceive of an affirmative, communal depiction of redemptive 
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reconciliation. For O‟Connor, depictions of gospel-centered interpersonal reconciliation or 
affirmative forms of community life would appear concomitant with modern, Christ-less 
sociality. 
Yet, one wonders what O‟Connor would think of some of the Catholic sociologists that 
have arisen since her death. Various recent scholars such as Charles Taylor and Alasdair 
MacIntyre
280
 have pointed out that human agents understand their lives within the context of 
narratives, and that these narratives, if they are fulfilling, are necessarily communal; and, thus, 
they are necessarily in need of charitable forms of reconciliation.
281
 Further, Peter L. Berger 
(though, unlike Taylor and MacIntyre, a Lutheran) has used the phrase “signal of transcendence” 
to posit that certain actions point to our ability to overcome life‟s woes, and also point to a state – 
an afterlife perhaps – where these moments of redemptive overcoming might be permanent. One 
of Berger‟s examples of these transcendent signals is the redemptive act of laughter.282 What is 
striking about Berger‟s concept is that these signals of transcendence almost always, if not 
always, occur in social contexts. Indeed, the terminologies of transcendence – grace, mercy, 
forgiveness, gift, blessing – most often occur within intimate communities constituted by 
interpersonal familiarity.  
Thus, what strikes me as particularly dissatisfying about O‟Connor‟s redemptive 
depictions is the absence of interpersonal reconciliation when this is what her critique of 
autonomous, alienated moderns calls for.
283
 Or, as Sykes has put it: “Intense scrutiny of the fact 
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of alienation may show the need for communion, but it does not supply the lack.”284 To expand 
on Sykes‟s pointed critique, I would offer that, in O‟Connor‟s fiction, if God reveals himself 
violently via the scorching sun or the murderous misfit, then these redemptive depictions 
fundamentally de-familiarize God in a way that negates the implications of the risen Christ for 
the modern world. To drive this final point home (and I mean this existentially as opposed to a 
blithe cliché) and reference once more O‟Connor‟s affinity with Kierkegaardian thought, it is 
telling that Sykes notes that the prevailing image in O‟Connor‟s fiction is “[p]hysical suffering as 
imitation Christi.” Sykes‟s assertion is quite similar to Craig Hinkson‟s critique of the late 
Kierkegaard‟s thought. Hinkson comments that Kierkegaard‟s later emphasis on the 
contemporaneous model of Christ‟s suffering is problematic because “in the end, the Christian 
who would imitate Christ assumes suffering not out of concern for his neighbor‟s well-being, but 
out of the priority (and, hence, merit) that the suffering enjoys in its own right.”285 What this 
overemphasis entails is the de-emphasis of the resurrected Christ. Hinkson continues, saying, 
“[T]he problem is that on SK‟s presentation the believer‟s contemporaneous imitation of Christ 
the model is unqualified by the Christ the redeemer’s enabling presence.”286 Ultimately, the 
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image of the risen Christ is foundational for any notion of a reconciled community, for it is the 
image that entails hope. Indeed, theologically, the risen Christ manifests himself in the church 
community – which is understood to be the body of Christ. Resurrection after death – new life – 
is the image that entails the most radical of freedoms, which is the freedom in knowing that 
because this life is not all there is, one is able to lay his life down for the other and set in motion 
the perpetuation of mutual self-giving. And, paradoxically, these self-givings are precisely the 
constituents which form the contours of fulfilling identity. 
 
Conclusion 
In Wise Blood, O‟Connor provides an insightful criticism of autonomous notions of 
freedom; her depiction reveals the consequences of humans manipulating the Incarnation of God 
in Christ to their liking – of making a jesus in their own image. To deify oneself is a form of 
asceticism because it is a form of violence against one‟s essential self. Thus, what is dissatisfying 
about the conclusion to Haze‟s narrative is its equally ascetic nature. For while Haze‟s achieved 
authenticity signals the recognition of his need for faith in Christ, his ascetic form of gratitude 
lacks any Christ-like concern for fellow human beings. We have loved, and will continue to love, 
O‟Connor‟s fiction because of her compelling stories, authentic commitments, humorous wit, 
and entertaining, literary use of violence. Further, I believe that O‟Connor‟s use of violence is 
motivated by her orthodox view of revelation and its necessity over against modern autonomy. 
However, O‟Connor‟s fixation on violently revealing the limitations of the autonomous modern 
may ultimately prove dissatisfying because her antithetical approach remains, ultimately, 
unqualified by a communal affirmative. 
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Part 2, Chapter 5 
Binx‟s Search for Meaningful Intimacy: From Onanistic Internal-Monologues and Detached 
Conversations to Marriage as Speech-Act 
 
Introduction 
 Critics of Walker Percy‟s works have been primarily interested in Percy‟s devotion to 
Søren Kierkegaard, and the unique nature of human language. And rightfully so: Percy often 
spoke of the Danish philosopher‟s influence on his conversion to Christianity, and Percy‟s non-
fiction is almost solely concerned with semiotic theory. He believed language could bridge the 
gap between modern science and historical, orthodox Christianity. Undoubtedly, the former 
interest (Kierkegaard) and the latter pursuit (language) were united in one chief concern: the 
nature of the self. The two themes – which we might effectively construe thematically as 
alienation and dialogue – come together perhaps most compellingly and overtly in Percy‟s 
award-winning first novel, The Moviegoer. Kierkegaardian phraseology is obvious throughout 
the novel, and Jack “Binx” Bolling‟s ostensible search for his life‟s purpose seems tied to 
language. That is, Binx is searching for meaning – to recover the relationship between word and 
world, and, particularly, to understand the meaning of his own place within that world.  
To review, in Part One, we came upon three primary conclusions: (1) there is an essential 
self which the human agent must come to understand and submit to in order to make freedom 
and fulfillment realistic and coalescing possibilities; (2) one necessity of this essential self is that 
it needs significant commitments to other persons in order to formulate, or, realize, identity – and 
this necessarily involves conversation, devotion, and intimacy; and (3) to sustain these 
fundamentally ethical commitments, a transcendent, authoritative, and particular source is 
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required if these commitments are to be binding.  
 
Binx’s Kierkegaardian Search for Meaningful Identity 
Primarily, The Moviegoer depicts – in its Kierkegaardian terms – Binx‟s conversion from 
alienated esthete to committed ethicist; hence, my approach will take Either/Or as the novel‟s 
primary critical frame. Further, to aptly connect this Kierkegaardian approach with Percy‟s 
concern with semiotics, I will argue that Binx‟s search does not just take him from esthetic 
alienation to ethical commitment, but from onanistic internal-monologues to intimate 
conversations, and, finally, to the speech-act
287
 of marital intercourse. Stated another way, Binx 
begins to realize meaningful identity when he recognizes that his onanistic  internal-monologues 
produce solipsistic waste, while his intimate conversations signal an encounter with meaning; 
Binx‟s conversational encounter with meaning intimates its divine source, culminating in the 
fruitful intercourse of marriage. 
 Before considering Percy‟s debt to Kierkegaard as it relates to the existential dialectic of 
freedom and alienation, it is helpful to consider the connections between O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood 
and The Moviegoer in order to elucidate their thematic similarities alongside their differing 
approaches as both a connection and transition between this and the preceding chapters. Farrell 
O‟Gorman has most notably connected the two novels by identifying them together as 
apocalyptic, postwar American novels: 
O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood and Percy‟s The Moviegoer, radically different as they 
are in tone and character, are definitively postwar southern fictions both in their 
protagonists (Hazel Motes is a veteran of World War II, Binx Bolling of the 
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Korean War) and in their profound engagement with a new American culture that 
was beginning to dominate the South. Each critique of that culture – its rabid 
consumerism as communicated through pervasive advertising and embodied most 
fully in the automobile, its complacency under the sway of Hollywood and 
soothing media messengers of the public good – is presented in a setting 
characterized by an underlying apocalyptic mood.
288
 
Essentially, both O‟Connor and Percy provide unique visions of the metaphysical homelessness 
ailing Americans following World War II; further, both visions are distinctly Catholic in their 
illumination of existential problems, and both incorporate one uniquely American cultural 
artifact: the automobile.  
Yet, however similar are the thematic elements, the authors‟ stylistic approaches are of 
course far different. Percy‟s novel is a philosophical one inspired by the likes of a Sartrean novel, 
while the grotesqueries in O‟Connor‟s novels are eminently inspired by Poe-like macabre. Percy, 
given his profound interest in language, creates novels that are dialogue-driven, while O‟Connor, 
seeking to shock her sleeping readers out of the nihilistic malaise, creates novels filled with 
revelatory violences. The prevailing image in O‟Connor‟s stories is “[p]hysical suffering as 
imitation Christi,”289 while the prevailing image in Percy‟s novels is conversation. Thus, because 
Percy‟s protagonists struggle for authenticity via interpersonal intimacy, Percy‟s novels seem, in 
a way, much closer to offering an affirmation of the self‟s communal nature. As it relates to The 
Moviegoer and Wise Blood, this fundamental difference in the two authors‟ Kierkegaardian 
critique of autonomous agency seems nowhere more apparent than in their endings. As 
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O‟Gorman notes, while Wise Blood ends with a grotesque death following the rejection of a 
strange marriage between Hazel Motes and Mrs. Flood, The Moviegoer ends with a rather 
comedic marriage between its two alienated protagonists, Binx and Kate.
290
 Percy offers a 
coalescence in his fiction between a Kierkegaardian critique of autonomous, alienated 
suburbanites, and an almost sacramental view of language – and certainly of marriage. 
Therefore, our primary interest, again, will be to draw connections between Binx‟s transition 
from alienated, monological esthete to committed, conversational ethicist. But, first, it will be 
helpful to consider the relationship between Percy and Kierkegaard, and to elucidate Percy‟s debt 
to the Danish philosopher as it relates specifically to the existential dialectic of autonomous 
freedom and alienation.  
 Undoubtedly, criticism of Percy‟s novels is rife with considerations of Kierkegaard‟s 
influence in a way that is unique when compared to O‟Connor, and even John Updike. Of 
course, the critical recapitulation is necessary given the numerous interviews Percy gave in 
which he admitted his debt to Kierkegaard not only for his novel-writing, but, albeit most 
ironically, for his conversion to Catholicism. To narrow our critical field of interest as it relates 
to the relationship between Percy‟s The Moviegoer and Kierkegaardian influences, I want to 
focus on the similarities between the two thinkers in light of the two primary works from 
Kierkegaard that were examined above in chapter one: The Sickness unto Death and 
Either/Or.
291
 In response to the epigraph in The Moviegoer which is taken from SUD, many 
critics have commented on the importance of SUD for Percy‟s first novel. However, one critic – 
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Ralph Wood – has effectively and extensively synthesized SUD and E/O as a critical frame for 
The Moviegoer.
292
 Given both Percy‟s firm understanding that the self must be itself 
“transparently before God”293 in order to avoid an imbalance of the synthesis between necessity 
and possibility, and given his incorporation of the themes associated with Kierkegaard‟s three 
stages, SUD and E/O seem, ultimately, the most appropriate works to examine when considering 
Kierkegaardian themes in The Moviegoer.  
 Percy was acutely aware of the powerful critique of autonomous notions of freedom 
which Kierkegaard put forth in SUD and E/O. This fact seems most apparent in Percy‟s satirical 
self-help book Lost in the Cosmos. In a chapter humorously sub-titled, “Why it is the 
Autonomous Self becomes Possessed by the Spirit of the Erotic and the Secret Love of Violence, 
and how Unlucky it is that this should have Happened in the Nuclear Age,” Percy comments 
extensively on Kierkegaard‟s esthetic sphere, and then tellingly notes, 
Both Kierkegaard and modern semiotics give us leave to speak of the self as 
being informed – „possessed,‟ if you like, at certain historical stages of belief and 
unbelief. It becomes possible, whether one believes in God or not, soul or not, to 
agree that in an age in which the self is not informed by cosmological myths, by 
totemism, by belief in God – whether the God of Christianity, Judaism, or Islam – 
it must necessarily and by reason of its own semiotic nature be informed by 
something else.
294
 
A few points are of note in this passage which helps illuminate our concerns. Percy, via 
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Kierkegaard, recognizes that the self is essentially informed. If the human agent does not ground 
himself in God, or, relate himself to God, then he will necessarily relate himself to something or 
someone else. And Percy is inclined to conclude that Americans have been predominantly 
informed by a culture of sex and violence. In other words, because of the essential givenness of 
human agency, one is never totally self-positing or self-directing. Further, because of his 
particularly Catholic view of language, and his reading of Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, and 
Thomas Merton, Percy recognized the self‟s need for intersubjectivity – or, the intimacy of 
shared meaning between persons. Wood aptly captures the place of autonomy, alienation, and the 
need for community which thematically pervades The Moviegoer: “Binx Bolling gradually 
discovers that the ego is a vortex. A life of pure consciousness leads to the solipsistic conclusion 
that nothing but one‟s supreme selfhood is real. If there be resurrection from this solitary grave, 
it is found in a transcendent summons out of self-absorption and into community.”295 Wood 
captures Percy‟s recognition that the self‟s need for God‟s revelation also has implications for 
the self‟s need for community life,296 and he also recognizes the “gradual” move Binx undergoes 
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way of developing a scientific view of intersubjectivity and wrote a couple of articles on the 
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from alienated to committed.  
 One of the more significant Kierkegaardian moves Percy makes in The Moviegoer, as 
evidenced by the epigraph to the novel from SUD, is to depict – and to a certain extent laud – the 
human agent‟s ability to recognize that he is in despair. The epigraph reads, “[T]he specific 
character of despair is precisely this: it is unaware of being despair.” Binx‟s recognition of 
despair – even if he is ultimately unaware of its cause – is ultimately what sparks both his 
“search,” and his esthetic diversions from the psychological malaise which he feels so acutely. 
Due to Binx‟s heightened awareness of despair, another term he employs to describe what he 
takes as a cause of malaise is “everydayness.” Binx‟s use of the term is perhaps best understood 
alongside his thoughts regarding 98% of Americans believing in God and the remaining 2% 
being agnostics or atheists: “I cannot even answer this, the simplest and most basic of all 
questions: Am I, in my search, a hundred miles behind them? That is to say: Have 98% of 
Americans already found what I seek or are they so sunk in everydayness that not even the 
possibility of a search has occurred to them? On my honor, I do not know the answer.”297 
According to Binx, everydayness is a kind of stagnancy when one has ceased from the universal 
human task of becoming, and meaning is something that is taken for granted – domesticated to 
fit one‟s immediate needs. It encompasses a kind of mindless conformity to societal standards 
and obligations, without understanding what one‟s life ultimately means. However, Binx is not 
only able to recognize everydayness in others, but he is able to recognize this “enemy” in 
himself; for instance, he awakes one morning in his old place “in the grip of everydayness.”298 
What is most noteworthy about Binx‟s “search” – particularly his hyper-awareness of despair, 
everydayness, and malaise in both himself and others – is the oft detached position he takes in 
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relation to himself and the people around him. Percy seems to place an inherent value on Binx‟s 
search because he is at least aware of his despair; yet, the virtues of Binx‟s “search” might be too 
revered, for the detached observer is even less likely to become transparent with his fellows. In 
other words, one‟s detachment from inauthentic everydayness only intensifies the conditions for 
alienation and despair, for one is detached from the primary sources of authenticity. Of course, 
while Percy may affirm Binx‟s detached-observer tendencies to some extent, he is also 
illuminating what he sees as a problematic form of detachment, and this is most apparent in 
Binx‟s tendencies as a Kierkegaardian esthete. 
 
Binx as Kierkegaard’s Esthete 
 In order to more fruitfully consider the influence of Kierkegaard‟s “esthetic sphere” on 
Percy‟s first novel, it is helpful to return to some of the defining attributes of the esthete that we 
concerned ourselves with in chapter one. Kierkegaard‟s model esthete, “A,” lives within the 
category of immediacy; that is, Kierkegaard‟s esthete – to varying degrees – lives in the moment. 
He is primarily concerned with desire fulfillment – particularly through the momentary 
transcendence provided by the arts and sexual relationships. He avoids ethical commitments, and 
inhabits a general state of depression. “A” warns that one should “stay clear of friendship,”299 
and “never become involved in marriage.”300 In perhaps one of his most evidently self-stultifying 
assertions regarding freedom and ethical commitments, “A” warns that friendship and marriage 
are dangers to one‟s selfhood: “One must always guard against contracting a relationship by 
which one can become many. That is why even friendship is dangerous, marriage even more so. 
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They do say that marriage partners become one, but this is very obscure and mysterious talk. If 
an individual is many, he has lost his freedom[.]”301 “A” cannot imagine ethical commitments 
being anything but boring, unthinking conformity. Yet, his shunning of any potential 
commitments is precisely what perpetuates his despair. The last point to consider regarding our 
analysis of The Moviegoer is the distinction between immediate seduction and reflective 
seduction. Referring to Don Juan as a paradigmatic figure for the esthetic existence, “A” makes 
the distinction: 
In the musical Don Juan, there would be the extensive seducer; in the other, the 
intensive. So the latter Don Juan is not presented as possessing his object with one 
single blow – he is not the immediately qualified seducer; he is the reflective 
seducer. That which occupies us here is the subtlety, the cunning, whereby he 
knows how to steal into a girl‟s heart, the dominion he knows how to gain over it, 
the enthralling, deliberate, progressive seduction. How many he has seduced is of 
no importance here; what occupies us is the artistry, the meticulousness, the 
profound cunning with which he seduces. . . . The musical Don Juan enjoys the 
satisfaction; the reflective Don Juan enjoys the deception.
302
  
While both the immediate and the more reflective esthete avoid potential committed 
relationships with women, the more reflective esthete – the Seducer – enjoys creating the 
circumstances for seducing a woman, while the immediate esthete enjoys the pleasure. Binx, it 
seems to me, is the immediate esthete who avoids commitments, and whose primary pleasures, 
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in this particular case, are his secretaries and moviegoing.
303
 
 The most obvious way that Binx fits the description of Kierkegaard‟s esthete is the way 
that he treats his secretaries. Discussing his “evening outings and weekend trips,” Binx 
comments that he usually shares these outings with his “secretary.”304 What is notable about the 
initial statement is that his companion is an anonymity – one which “girls named Marcia, Linda, 
and now Sharon”305 fill for Binx as his role-players. The relationship might be described as an 
onanistic one for Binx because it is primarily about his personal fulfillment – his avoidance of 
everydayness – and the secretaries are merely anonymous objects for achieving this fulfillment. 
Binx provides an extensive description of the situation: 
Naturally I would like to say that I had made conquests of these splendid girls, my 
secretaries, casting them off one after the other like old gloves, but it would not be 
strictly true. They could be called love affairs, I suppose. They started off as love 
affairs anyway, fine careless raptures in which Marcia or Linda (but not yet 
Sharon) and I would go spinning along the Gulf Coast, lie embracing in a deserted 
cove of Ship Island, and hardly believe our good fortune, hardly believe that the 
world could contain such happiness.
306
 
Clearly, Binx‟s secretaries have provided him with moments of intoxicating pleasure and 
enjoyment – moments that have been transcendent in the sense of making all seem right with the 
world. Of course, at some point the transcendent highs of the evenings and weekends out with 
his secretaries must end and then the dissatisfaction when the empty everydayness of potential 
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ethical commitments sets in. However, car rides with secretaries are not the only momentarily 
transcendent pleasures in which Binx indulges; he also, as the book‟s title suggests, enjoys going 
to the movies. 
 For Binx, moviegoing is both an esthetic diversion from the boring reality of the 
workaday world, and, due to the inherently narrative nature of movies, a means of advnacing his 
search for meaning. In order to escape the mundane everydayness – the unavoidable fact of his 
seemingly meaningless existence – Binx goes to the movies. The movies and the actors who fill 
them are his bodiless companions. They are the ones to whom he is primarily committed. This is 
implicit in Binx‟s admission that “[f]or years now I have had no friends. I spend my entire time 
working, making money, going to movies, and seeking the company of women.”307 Binx has 
few, if any, significant others. When he comments about other people or the state of his culture, 
he does not generally refer to a history he has with intimate acquaintances (his own narrative); 
instead, he refers to an actor or a scene from a movie (a contrived narrative). Though John F. 
Desmond does not directly tie Binx‟s moviegoing to Kierkegaard‟s esthetic sphere, he certainly 
alludes to it when he says, “At times Binx‟s moviegoing seems the refuge of the romantic[.] . . . 
Movies and moviegoing can provide a temporary escape from the anxiety of living over the 
„abyss,‟ an „aesthetic solution‟ to the terrors of alienation.”308 Essentially, movies offer Binx yet 
another detachment from reality. Yet, again, there is also a sense in which Binx‟s state as the 
detached observer is portrayed positively in virtue of the fact that he is at least on the search. At 
one point, Binx tellingly comments,  
The movies are onto the search, but they screw it up. The search always ends in 
despair. They like to show a fellow coming to himself in a strange place – but 
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what does he do? He takes up with the local librarian, sets about proving to the 
local children what a nice fellow he is, and settles down with a vengeance. In two 
weeks time he is so sunk in everydayness that he might just as well be dead. What 
do you seek – God? you ask with a smile. I hesitate to answer, since all other 
Americans have settled the matter for themselves[.]
309
 
Hence, Percy does not merely use movies as functional diversions for his esthetic protagonist; he 
also uses movies to signify Binx‟s laudable desire to transcend everydayness. Thus, moviegoing 
– the essential motif of Percy‟s novel – represents Binx‟s recognition and avoidance of 
inauthentic conformity to the everydayness of societal norms, and also his inability to transcend 
this conformity without alienating himself from the significant relationships which he needs as 
an existing human being.
310
 Hence, while Binx is reading the signs of meaning which the movies 
provide, he is still in need of the kind of semiosis – an activity of signs producing meaning – 
which will place him in the cosmos; or, Binx needs a significant, committed community life 
which will provide authentic content for his existence. 
 
Percy’s Sacramental View of Language and the Importance of Speech-Act in The 
Moviegoer 
 Before elucidating the contrast between Binx‟s onanaistic, internal-monological 
relationships and his intimate, conversational relationships, we would do well to consider Percy‟s 
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sacramental view of language. As we saw above in chapter 3, Percy valued language and 
semiotic theory because he considered it the last essential quality uniquely distinguishing 
humanity in the modern age: “Only language and other symbolic behavior (art, music) seems to 
remain as the sole remaining indisputably unique attribute of man. If language can be shown to 
be within the capability of apes, dolphins, and humpback whales, the dethronement of man will 
be complete.”311 Percy recognized that the nature of language implied man‟s unique ability to 
rise above behaviorism in mysterious ways. Percy took this mysteriousness to be significant in 
relation to his particularly Catholic, sacramental realism. Wood, for instance, alludes to Percy‟s 
sacramental view of language and semiotics when he says that “[t]he mysterious phenomenon of 
speech is the real basis of Percy‟s natural theology. . . . [H]e seeks to show the gift of articulate 
breath is the single characteristic distinguishing our species from all others.”312 However, 
Desmond goes a step further than Wood and provides extensive commentary regarding Percy‟s 
sacramental view of language as it relates to The Moviegoer specifically, which is worth quoting 
in full, for it proposes that Percy is concerned with “real presence”:  
[U]nderlying the semiotic structure of the novel, and informing it at every turn, is 
what I will call the community of real presence. This is the reality of the presence 
of God in the „here-and-now,‟ manifested especially in Percy‟s use of sacramental 
signs. Binx is a muser who intuits this true invisible community in his heart and 
longs for it, but he is constantly distracted from it. There is a terror in this 
presence as well, since it threatens to break the closed heart open into love. The 
community of real presence is the human community into which the divine Logos 
has come, and where He is always present. . . . Binx‟s persistent fascination with 
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the mystery and wonder of the here-and-now is an indelible sign of the reality of 
that community and of the spirit guiding his search.
313
 
Ultimately, Desmond affirms the search for community which Percy depicts on the basis of his 
sacramental-semiological approach, and the search for meaning this entails for Binx. Yet, as we 
saw in chapter 3, some critics, like Sykes, counter proponents of Percy‟s realism like Desmond: 
“My point, in opposition to Desmond‟s presentation of Percy, is that the tension between faith 
and reason was bound to be relaxed in favor of reason so long as Percy used Peirce to establish 
„no less than an anthropological basis for the creation of a revitalized organon of truth.‟ The goal 
itself was problematic.”314 Sykes finds problematic Percy‟s tendency toward a “kind of 
totalism,”315 whereby Christianity is provable in an objectively rational sense on the basis of 
God‟s imparting of grace through nature. In short, Percy‟s Thomist realism is adapted to a 
sacramental theory of language and semiology. Hence, Percy‟s “sacramental community” is a 
kind of mystical intersubjectivity based on his view of the Eucharist: “Percy saw the mind/body 
question and the relation between spirit and matter, in terms of mankind‟s fall[.] . . . The 
„scandal‟ and mystery of the Eucharist is that it radically affirms the real presence of the risen 
Christ in matter (bread and wine), as the act of transubstantiation in the Mass enacts incarnation 
and resurrection of the God-man.
316
 While I agree with Sykes‟s criticism of Percy and his 
proponents like Desmond, Percy‟s search for community as embodied by a sacramental view of 
language that involves “real presence” seems especially close to the idea of a communal “faithful 
presence” presented in chapter three. The basis for Percy‟s redemptive reconciliation between 
alienated protagonist and community will be considered more extensively below. Before 
                                                          
313
 Desmond, Walker Percy’s Search for Community, 43. 
314
 Sykes, Flannery O’Connor, Walker Percy, and the Aesthetic of Revelation, 110. 
315
 Ibid., 108. 
316
 John F. Desmond, “Walker Percy‟s Eucharistic Vision,” Renascence 52.3 (Spring 2000): 220. 
Olson 133 
 
considering Binx‟s transition from alienated internal-monologue to conversational intimacy, I 
want to consider how J. L. Austin‟s theory of “speech-acts” provides a helpful elucidation of 
what is positively communal in Percy‟s linguistically-minded communal redemptions.  
 One way we could describe the tension Binx experiences in his alienation is to say that 
his detachment enables him to observe the inauthenticity in others, but that his detached stance 
forces him, according to Percy, to be a “victim of . . . Rene Descartes.”317  That is, Binx‟s 
projected reality as a Cartesian dualist is excessively constituted by his self-consciousness. 
Therefore, he must find a way to relent his stance as detached observer by concretizing himself 
in the world as part of a community, while still somehow retaining his sense of freedom and 
authenticity. A helpful way of considering Binx‟s gradual transition toward a meaningful identity 
constituted by his significant commitments – particularly considering that conversation is the 
dominant communal image in Percy‟s fiction – is to examine J. L. Austin‟s theory of speech-
acts. Austin asserts that certain sentences we utter are necessarily active, rather than merely 
descriptive: 
I propose to call it a performative sentence or a performative utterance, or, for 
short, „a performative.‟ The term „performative‟ will be used in a variety of 
cognate ways and constructions, much as the term „imperative‟ is. The name is 
derived, of course, from „perform,‟ the usual verb with the noun „action‟: it 
indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not 
normally thought of as just saying something.
318
 
As it relates to our concerns with Percy, The Moviegoer, and the communal nature of selfhood, 
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the most insightful example of a sentence which “is, or is a part of, the doing of an action” that 
Austin gives concerns the act of marriage; when the persons involved say “‟I do (sc. Take this 
woman to be my lawful wedded wife)‟ – as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony,” the 
two, by the act of their expressions, have become united in marriage.
319
 Yet, knowing that our 
words are often rendered void by the incongruities between speech and action, Austin asserts that 
in order for speech-acts to be genuinely – or, authentically – “performative” actions, they must 
be “happy.” In order for the particular speech-act to avoid unhappiness, it must be constituted by 
mutually acknowledged conventions, proper reasons and motives, and the appropriate 
circumstances for the given situation.
320
 In other words, the groom‟s practiced “I Do” the week 
before the ceremony is not felicitous in the sense of binding him to his bride, because the 
practiced expression is not a properly acknowledged and established action; and, further, the 
general sense of awkwardness that often accompanies the rehearsal ceremony can be attributed 
to the infelicity of the words rehearsed – they are ultimately rendered void. As a final example, 
if, when saying “I Do,” the groom is planning a quick divorce to cash in on prenuptial 
agreements, the speech-act is far from “happy,” for the motives are not congruent with the 
intention of the speech-act. Hence, a speech-act as serious as marriage necessarily involves the 
intimacy of both recognition and commitments, or, a knowledge that has been birthed by the 
trust of familiarity. Given the necessity to define the parameters of that which is felicitous – and 
the necessity that these definitions be mutually agreed upon and maintained – faith is implicitly 
involved in a speech-act. The speech-actor has faith that the receiver will understand and receive 
his speech-act as intended, and the receiver has the faith that the speech-actor offers a felicitous 
“performative.” Autin‟s theory of speech-acts and its application to marital commitment will 
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prove helpful as we consider the ethical change Binx undergoes toward the end of The 
Moviegoer, and why Percy‟s realistic sacramental-semiotic approach to community life is 
ultimately problematic. 
 
The Evidence of Binx’s Onanistic Alienation in his Internal Monologues 
 Much of the first half of the novel consists of Binx‟s internal-monologues – his detached, 
irony-laden self-consciousness; further, Binx‟s internal-monologues are telling when he is 
around other people because most of his relationships are onanistic, or, constituted by Binx‟s 
manipulation of other people for his own fulfillment. A helpful way to consider the nature of 
Binx‟s monological, onanistic relationships is by putting them in Bakhtinian terms. As a 
refresher of what we briefly explored in chapter 3, Bakhtin asserts that in the midst of 
heteroglossia, “language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the 
word . . . but also . . . into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, 
„professional‟ and „generic‟ languages, languages of generations and so forth.”321 Bakhtin goes 
on to suggest that these layers of language illustrate that “language, for the individual 
consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other.”322 Bakhtin‟s analysis builds 
upon the recognition that other people‟s influence is a source of one‟s identity. And, according to 
Bakhtin, the novel is a “diversity of social speech types . . . and a diversity of individual voices, 
artistically organized.”323 It seems apparent that Bakhtin‟s theories regarding language, dialogue, 
and influence in the novel center on conversation; further, the influence of ideology happens 
through the self-revealing transparency of conversation. Because Percy‟s mode of depiction 
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centers on conversation, it is helpful to consider which characters Binx is transparent with, the 
nature of those transparencies, and the lasting ideational effects of the conversations. However, 
given our concern with alienation in The Moviegoer, it is also helpful to first consider the nature 
of Binx‟s microdialogues.  
Michael Kobre, who has written the definitive Bakhtinian analysis of Percy‟s novels, 
comments that a microdialogue is “a kind of internal monologue in which the character‟s 
thoughts are saturated with the words and opinions of others.”324 Kobre goes on to argue 
extensively that Binx‟s microdialogues reveal a number of conflicting influences, including his 
Aunt Emily, his dead father, and even the consumerist culture of middle-class America which 
Binx surely encounters during his incessant moviegoing and television watching. However, what 
I want to point out, specifically, is that Binx‟s microdialogues are characterized by the tension 
between the excessively unreflective, consumptive culture which he inhabits and the constant 
detached-observer outlook of a moviegoer‟s view of the world. This consumptive consciousness 
coupled with its alienated stance reveal Binx‟s onanistic tendency to manipulate interactions with 
others – particularly women – for his personal satisfaction. Yet, these onanistic interactions, 
because of Binx‟s alienated detachment, produce only waste. This waste results from Binx‟s 
tendency to reduce people to objects of manipulation and, in the process, eliminate the possibility 
for a life of authenticity which results from significant, intimate relationships. The primary 
example of how Binx‟s internal-monologues reveal an onanistic inversion of interpersonal 
intimacy is his interactions with his latest secretary, Sharon Kincaid. Binx‟s first extended 
description of her is telling in its lusty licentiousness: 
Her name is Sharon Kincaid and she comes from Eufala, Alabama. Although she 
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has been working for me two weeks, I have not asked her for a date nor spoken of 
anything other than business. Yet the fact is that for two weeks I have thought of 
little else. She seems quite indifferent so far; and she is not really beautiful. She is 
a good-sized girl, at least five feet six and a hundred and thirty-five points – as big 
as a majorette[.] . . . Yet she has the most fearful soap-clean good looks. Her 
bottom is so beautiful that once as she crossed the room to the cooler I felt my 
eyes smart with tears of gratitude.
325
 
Binx‟s external interactions with Sharon have been solely businesslike, yet his thoughts have 
been consumed with her as a potential source of pleasure. Later, when Binx and Sharon are 
working together in a small space, his internal-monologue continues: “[S]he is close enough to 
touch. Today she wears a sleeveless dress of yellow cotton; her arms come out of the armholes as 
tenderly as a little girl‟s. . . . Her back is turned to me, but obliquely[.] . . . As she types, the little 
kidney-shaped cushion presses against the small of her back in a nice balance of thrusts. I am in 
love with Sharon Kincaid. She knows nothing of this, I think.”326 What is telling about Binx‟s 
hidden thoughts about Sharon is that, to this point, he has not only cut himself off from the 
possibility of knowing her or being known by her in any significant way, but the onanistic 
content of his internal descriptions implies that he is not likely to make his thoughts transparent. 
That is, because Binx seeks Sharon as a potentially pleasurable form of consumptive diversion, 
his hidden, onanistic motives reinforce his distance from her.  
Once Binx has spent significant time flirting with Sharon – while also avoiding revealing 
much about his self, including his despair or his search – he spends a day with her when some of 
his fantasies are revealed and fulfilled. Binx and Sharon share a few kisses on the beach and he 
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reveals to her, “I just want to tell you what‟s on my mind. . . . You. You and your sweet lips. 
Sweetheart, before God I can‟t think about anything in the world but putting my arms around 
you and kissing your sweet lips. . . . I can‟t get you out of my mind. Not since you walked into 
my office in that yellow dress. I‟m crazy about you[.]”327 Binx is feeling good about the 
afternoon with Sharon, but the inadequacy of it all still looms over him as his microdialogues 
continue in their onanistic tenor: “We pull into a bay and have a drink under the stars. It is not a 
bad thing to settle for the Little Way, not the big search for the big happiness but the sad little 
happiness of drinks and kisses, a good little car and a warm deep thigh.”328 Sharon is mangled to 
a thigh – a piece of flesh that Binx hopes will patch the leaking hole of his despairing existence. 
Yet, the transparent conversation he is about to have with his half-brother Lonnie will reveal to 
Binx the utter inauthenticity of both his relationship with Sharon and his detached identity.  
 
Jack’s Sacramental Conversation with Lonnie 
When Binx and Sharon visit his mother‟s family, Binx spends some time with his half-
brother Lonnie – a devout, 14 year old Catholic – who has an intriguing effect on Binx. Before 
considering Lonnie‟s identity and his relationship with Binx, it is interesting to note that, in this 
particular scene in the novel, Binx is referred to – with unique regularity – by his actual first 
name, “Jack.” The anomaly is perhaps a subtle signal that a shift in identity toward authenticity 
is about to occur. Binx comments lovingly of Lonnie, who has been stricken to a wheelchair:  
[Lonnie] is my favorite, to tell the truth. Like me, he is a moviegoer. He will go 
see anything. But we are good friends because he knows I do not feel sorry for 
him. For one thing, he has the gift of believing that he can offer his sufferings in 
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reparation for men‟s indifference to the pierced heart of Jesus Christ. For another 
thing, I would not mind so much trading places with him. His life is serene 
business.
329
 
This initial internal-monologue is significant for a few reasons. Jack‟s tone has changed 
significantly.
330
 His description of Lonnie is not laced with scornful, detached irony; rather, it is 
filled with direct, authentic admiration and respect. Jack is clearly filled with admiration because, 
unlike his Aunt Emily‟s southern, ethical class system,331 Lonnie‟s code of ethics is sacrificial; 
Lonnie is both “the least of these” physically, and offers his weakness as a sacrifice for the 
spiritually-weakest of these. Not only is Jack‟s detached, objective-manipulative tone silenced in 
the presence of Lonnie, but he hints at a desire to be like his half-brother – who is clearly 
intended to be a kind of sacrament of the mystical Body of Christ. That is, Lonnie is one of the 
sacramental “real presences” that Desmond refers to. The authentic conversation Lonnie has with 
Jack, which is characterized by a genuine give-and-take, has a profound sacramental-
semiological influence on Percy‟s protagonist. Further, we are reminded of the other religious 
voice Jack has within the microdialogue of his consciousness when he speaks of Lonnie‟s 
handicap and his mother: “Sometimes when she mentions God, it strikes me that my mother uses 
him as but one of the devices that come to hand in an outrageous man‟s world, to be put to work 
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like all the rest in the one enterprise she has any use for: the canny management of the shocks of 
life.”332 Though his mother‟s use of God as a crutch is uniquely tied to the suffering her family 
has experienced, she is still – according to Jack – not unlike the 98% of Americans who have 
settled the matter of belief in God for various Eisenhowerian reasons.
333
 This voice of disdain for 
inauthentic religious belief is in stark contrast to Lonnie‟s authentic belief in the face of literal 
physical suffering. Yet, it is not only authenticity that is thus brought to the fore via Lonnie‟s 
sacramental character, but also the other essential theme: intimacy.  
When Jack, Lonnie, and Sharon decide to go see Fort Dobbs at the local movie theater, 
Jack‟s struggle for intimacy and identity is clearly signified by the contrast between his 
relationship to Lonnie and his relationship to Sharon: 
A good night: Lonnie happy (he looks around at me with the liveliest sense of the 
secret between us; the secret is that Sharon is not and never will be onto the little 
touches we see in the movie and, in the seeing, know that the other sees – as when 
Clint Walker tells the sadle tramp in the softest easiest old Virginian voice: 
„Mister, I don‟t believe I‟d do that if I was you‟ – Lonnie is beside himself, 
doesn‟t know whether to watch Clint Walker or me), this ghost of a theater, a 
warm Southern night, the Western Desert and this fine big sweet piece, Sharon.
334
 
Jack‟s interactions with Lonnie during the movie exemplify the intersubjectivity that is available 
when humans are intimate with one another. The depth of knowledge and deep commitment Jack 
and Lonnie have between and for one another resembles a kind of spiritual intimacy, which Jack, 
though he may not realize it yet, longs for. Further, the scene clearly contrasts the difference in 
                                                          
332
 Percy, The Moviegoer, 142. 
333
 President Dwight D. Eisenhower is famous for saying that it doesn‟t matter what God 
Americans believe in, so long as they believe in one – a necessity for the good of the country. 
334
 Ibid., 143-4. 
Olson 141 
 
relationship between Lonnie and Jack – characterized by conversation and intimacy – and the 
relationship between Sharon and Binx – characterized, predominantly, by monologue, 
manipulation, and distance. Just before Jack and Sharon are leaving, Lonnie intimates to Jack, “I 
am still offering my communion for you.”335 Desmond describes Jack‟s relationship to Lonnie as 
a kind of semiosis whereby “Lonnie is a living sign of the reality of the Word in the world, 
linked to the Eucharist, the sacrament of community.”336 Desmond continues, “Lonnie‟s offering 
of his suffering in reparation for men‟s indifference to Jesus‟ suffering reveals the youth‟s belief 
in the reality of the mystical community and the communion of saints. His expiatory action – a 
real semiotic event – emulates the action of Christ in His sacrifice and spiritual gift giving. Near 
the end of the novel, when Lonnie dies, Binx will also affirm this community and the belief in 
the resurrection of the body.”337 Desmond‟s conclusion is, again, appealing, and we will consider 
his affirmation of Percy‟s sacramental community more fully below. Yet, while “Jack” may long 
for the relationship he has with Lonnie, “Binx” still considers Sharon a “big sweet piece.” And, 
on the ride home, Binx‟s MG – normally immune – “becomes infested with malaise.”338 He is as 
conflicted as ever following his “real” encounter with Lonnie – acutely aware of his identity 
crisis, and, therefore, suffering all the more. 
 
Binx’s and Kate’s Failed Mutual Search for Intimacy 
 In addition to Lonnie, the other character whom critics are quick to point to as one whom 
Binx authentically interacts with is his cousin-by-marriage, Kate Cutrer. Indeed, Binx seems to 
have a particularly genuine concern for Kate‟s well being; further, they both constitute a kind of 
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ironic community of alienated individuals. Desmond notes that Binx and Kate are “[b]oth 
maimed and self-isolated creatures, yet both are searchers. As Kate is drawn to Binx, so also is 
he drawn to her as the one who knows him best, one with whom he can share his deepest 
longings.”339 They recognize in one another their own psychological disorder; yet, while Binx 
detaches himself from others in such a way that his malady is hidden, Kate wears her malaise 
transparently for all to see, nearly committing suicide at one point. Because Kate is a kind of 
double of Binx‟s character, and given her utter transparency in contrast to Binx‟s hiddenness, she 
reveals what I take to be precisely the source of Binx‟s despair: autonomous freedom. In one 
revealing conversation with Binx, Kate is excited over a discovery made with her therapist, 
Merle: “I had discovered that a person does not have to be this or be that or be anything, not even 
oneself. One is free.”340 Kate‟s transparency reveals a vacuous freedom which amounts to 
nothingness, for, as we discovered in chapter one, a self must essentially become something, or, 
take on content via relational commitments. To avoid these relational commitments out of a 
misunderstanding of freedom is to allow the self to disintegrate into nothingness. And Kate‟s 
transparent proclamation also reveals Binx‟s problem: to concreteize his existence in the real 
world seems to him inextricable from the blind societal conformity he sees around him – most 
particularly in his Aunt Emily. In a final effort to solve their mutual search and alleviate their 
mutual despair, Binx and Kate attempt to consummate their alienated community of two in a 
kind of inverted marriage. 
 Kate travels with Binx to Chicago, and, after some seductive overtures, Kate comes on to 
him in hopes that these two alienated individuals – who at least share the intimacy of 
understanding one another‟s predicament – might transcend their mutual malaise in one fell 
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sexual swoop. In one often-quoted passage toward the end of the novel, Binx confesses the 
catastrophic results: 
We did very badly and almost did not do at all. Flesh poor flesh failed us. The 
burden was too great and flesh poor flesh, neither hallowed by sacrament nor 
despised by spirit (for despising is not the worst fate to overtake the flesh), but 
until this moment seen through and canceled, rendered null by the cold and fishy 
eye of the malaise – flesh poor flesh now at this moment summoned all at once to 
be all and everything, end all and be all, the last and only hope – quails and fails. 
The truth is I was frightened half to death by her bold . . . carrying on. I reckon I 
am used to my blushing little Lindas from Gentilly. Kate too was scared. We 
shook like leaves. . . . Christians talk about the horror of sin, but they have 
overlooked something. They keep talking as if everyone were a great sinner, when 
the truth is that nowadays one is hardly up to it. There is very little sin in the 
depths of the malaise. The highest moment of a malaisian‟s life can be that 
moment when he manages to sin like a proper human.
341
 
The passage, as various critics have noted, is certainly intended to mark a turning point in the 
novel for Binx‟s search. His search for objective meaning has failed him yet again – this time in 
his and Kate‟s botched attempt at sexual intimacy. Kobre points out a significant change in 
Binx‟s microdialogue in the passage: “Of course what strikes us first in this passage is the 
presence of a new voice within his microdialogue, for Binx – the skeptic, the searcher – now 
speaks in a religious voice. There is a penitential sound to his refrain „flesh poor flesh,‟ and the 
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long second sentence, with its liturgical rhythms, reads like a prayer.”342 Kobre concludes that 
the change indicates an indirect communication by which Binx discovers meaning via a failed 
bond.
343
 Desmond essentially identifies this failed bond as Percy‟s illustration of the Cartesian 
dissociation of spirit-in-flesh – the spirit-in-flesh which is ultimately a reality signaled by the 
Incarnation and the Eucharist.
344
 And Desmond, in a move similar to Kobre‟s assertion that Binx 
has an indirect recognition of meaning by recognizing a failed bond, refers to Binx‟s and Kate‟s 
trip to Chicago as a “beneficent catastrophe that eventually brings him to a decisive point in his 
search.”345 What is significant about these common critical approaches to this climactic scene in 
The Moviegoer is the implication that Binx undergoes a significantly positive change via a 
negative moment. The problem, however, is that although the idea of a positive change via a 
negative moment may seem profoundly Christological, one is left to wonder who between Binx 
or Kate is the Christ-figure. Yet, returning to Austin‟s terms, the inverted marriage between Binx 
and Kate is not “happy,” because there is no commitment involved in the consummation of their 
alienated presences. Without commitment, their relationship cannot sustain itself when the 
momentarily transcendent high of sexual intimacy brings them back to their crushing existence 
of despair. Binx and Kate‟s sexual meeting is meaningless because it is annulled by the absence 
of the speech-act, “I Do,” and by the absence of God and priest to bind them authoritatively. The 
dissolution between word and world in their act – the unhappiness of the consummation – is, for 
Percy, a sacramental sign to Binx on his search. This negative moment – the failure of an 
inverted marriage between alienated protagonists – foreshadows Percy‟s comedic epilogue. 
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Faithful Community or Autonomous Ethics?: Further Consideration 
 One source of critical contention is over whether the ending to Binx‟s narrative signals 
merely an ethical change or a religious change, and, whether Percy‟s ending remains 
individualistic in its Kierkegaardian devotion. Toward the end of the novel, just when Binx is 
ready to fatalistically “fall prey to desire,”346 he decides, rather haphazardly, that he will make 
Kate his fiancé. Binx first reveals the decision in the midst of simultaneously rejecting the 
opportunity for more esthetic play with Sharon and her friend, Joyce. On Ash Wednesday, we 
find that Binx and Kate, together, have plans to marry, albeit rather flimsy plans. Binx asks Kate 
if she has informed Aunt Emily of their plans:  
  „Did you tell her?‟ I ask. 
  „I told her we are to be married.‟ 
  „Are we?‟ 
  „Yes.‟ 
Their mutual plans for a more solidified identity – consecrated in the speech-act of marriage – 
still lacks commitment as evidenced by the constant need for reassurance. Yet again, Kate asks 
Binx what he plans to do, and he responds with a shrug and says to himself, “There is only one 
thing I can do: listen to people, see how they stick themselves into the world, hand them along a 
ways in their dark journey and be handed along, and for good and selfish reasons.”347 Though 
Binx is committed to the intimacy of listening to people, his solution to the problem of alienation 
seems rather arbitrary. In yet another signal that Binx has resigned himself to ethical 
commitments, he reveals his intention to attend medical school if his Aunt Emily wishes him to. 
Despite Binx‟s newfound resignation to choose commitment, we discover that his eventual 
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marriage to Kate will not be easy. She warns Binx that she is “frightened when [she] is alone and 
[she] is frightened when [she] is with people” and that Binx will “have to be with [her] a great 
deal.”348 Again, though Binx and Kate appear ready to commit to one another, their continued 
unbelief seems unsupported by a larger community and, thus, set up for failure. If two alienated 
individuals become one, they cannot embody the orthodox analogue of the relationship between 
Christ and Church unless they are both supported and constituted by the communal relationship 
between Christ and the Church body. Whether or not any significant change has occurred seems, 
at this point, too impossible to say. 
 Yet, Percy did not choose to end his novel in such open-ended ambiguity. Instead, to 
begin the Epilogue, Binx reveals, “In June Kate and I were married.”349 In the year which has 
passed, Binx has begun graduate school, he and Kate have settled into a home, and Aunt Emily 
has become fond of Binx. In committing himself to Kate and to medical school, Binx has not 
only reconciled himself to his ethically-minded Aunt, but he appears to have given himself a 
meaningful existence. This is perhaps most signified by the fact that Binx‟s alienated, onanistic 
monologues have transitioned to intimate conversations, and, finally, the “happy” speech-act of 
marriage to Kate. Yet, the question remains as to whether Binx has realized his need for faith in 
God to sustain his ethical commitments: is he Kierkegaard‟s ethicist or the knight of faith? Or, in 
step with the central conflict of the novel, has Binx merely conformed to Aunt Emily‟s 
moralizing, or has he, via faith in God, resolved the tension between meaningless individualism 
and empty conformity to society? Martin Luschei concludes that Binx takes the leap and 
becomes “the knight of faith,” which he takes to be evidenced by Binx‟s willingness to marry 
Kate in spite of – and fully aware of – her frightening psychological problems and unlikelihood 
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to change.
350
 Kobre agrees with Luschei, but adds that Binx‟s salvation happens on Percy‟s 
dialogical terms – through the conversations and voices that propel the novel‟s narrative.351 
Kobre adds that Binx‟s commitment to Kate in marriage and decision to attend medical school 
does not signal an aquiescence to Aunt Emily‟s moralizing: “[T]he language in which he 
expresses his decision has no trace of the aristocratic „obligations‟ of which Emily speaks. 
Rather, Binx‟s vision of service, „to hand [others] along a ways in their dark journey and be 
handed along,‟ is one of fellowship and interdependence.”352 In what is perhaps his most 
compelling argument, Kobre argues that Binx‟s search has transitioned from a focus on 
“observable phenomenon” to “the more elusive spiritual realm,” and this also signals a change in 
his relation to the people around him as evidenced in the very last line of the Epilogue where he 
does not refer to the children as his half-brothers and half-sisters, but as his brothers and sisters:  
With a shift of a word, the nascent religious voice that we heard earlier at last 
takes precedence in his microdialogue. For by omitting a simple adjective, Binx 
quietly declares that his relation to these children is no longer so tenuous, so 
provisional. And, by extension, perhaps, he also embraces his other brothers and 
sisters: the sad, fractious family of humanity. Where once he fixed his sight on the 
distance between himself and others, now he sees the web of creation that binds 
them.
353
 
While Luschei‟s proclamation of Binx as Kierkegaard‟s knight of faith and Kobre‟s affirmation 
of this transition of faith through Percy‟s use of sacramental-dialogue is compelling, Sykes and 
Desmond make important qualifications in their mostly similar affirmations. 
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 Sykes and Desmond offer important qualifications for us to consider in their affirmations 
of Percy‟s conversational and marital form of redemption. Sykes – contra Luschei354 – argues 
that Binx “is never able to adopt Lonnie‟s unselfconscious directness, his actions indicate an 
inward amendment.”355 In terms of his newfound faith, Binx‟s conversion remains almost wholly 
inward. That is, Sykes‟s point seems to intimate another one he makes about Percy‟s devotion to 
Kierkegaard in general:  
The chief theological difficulty comes with . . . the quest of the alienated self for 
authenticity. . . . In more directly theological matters, Percy‟s attachment to 
Kierkegaard seems to have inclined him to a notion of grace that is private and 
decisionistic[.] . . . Percy, like Kierkegaard, is hoping to lead the reader to the 
point where he will decide to change the orientation of his life. But an orientation 
dependent upon one‟s private decision is always reversible. . . . From Binx 
Bolling to Tom More, they carom through life with varying degrees of 
distractedness, dislocation, and outright mental pathology. Any decision they 
make seems temporary, which in turn makes their relationships to the church 
tenuous and secondary.
356
 
Percy, in his commitments to Kierkegaard, may have depicted redemptions which are still 
excessively committed to subjectivity. Sykes‟s contention regarding the weakness of the will 
seems telling in relation to Desmond‟s affirming conclusion: “Does Binx‟s anticipated „new life‟ 
signify a kind of conversion? Percy establishes this, semiotically, as a possibility. Certainly 
Binx‟s earlier life of romantic role playing suggests a self-indulgent indifference to the ideal of 
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love, of suffering with others, and of a life lived in charity with another within the human 
community.”357 Perhaps the open-ended possibility is more directly tied to the tenuous nature of 
Binx‟s decisions than to Percy‟s remaining “faithful to the mystery.”358 So while Percy should be 
lauded for the intersubjectivity he attempts to affirm, for instance, in Binx‟s relationship with 
Lonnie, he, according to Sykes, ultimately leaves “the Cartesian ego its autonomy and its 
emptiness. . . . Regardless of the necessity of some other and some community for my self-
consciousness, I can never be bound to any particular person or group except by my choice. To 
say otherwise would be to cancel out the freedom and mystery of the self upon which Percy has 
staked so much.”359 Without larger communities – particularly the church body – Binx and Kate 
ultimately place faith in their own ability to sustain their commitments. Though Binx and Kate 
have learned that marriage is not a negation of freedom and selfhood, it seems they are still 
reticent to allow themselves to become one in the directing revelation of Christ – a mysterious 
intimacy which seems both more distinctly mysterious and intimate from the kind of 
“intersubjectivity” Percy affirms and Binx and Lonnie demonstrate. And this lasting reticence – 
coupled with the weakness of the will‟s private decisions – seems ultimately instigated by their 
missing relationship to the body of Christ as manifested in the church community. 
 Ultimately, it seems that Percy remains too committed to subjectivity; conscious 
awareness of despair and the subsequent detached search for objective meaning seems 
inadequate to the conversion Percy‟s protagonists must make. Or, to return to the epigraph of the 
novel, that Binx is gradually becoming more aware of his despair is itself considered somewhat 
redemptive. And, Wood who has also noted this point, comments that this seemingly salvific 
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conversion to a kind of passionate self-awareness is “always in solitude.”360 Yet, while Sykes 
and Wood highlight the potential Kierkegaardian shortcomings of Percy‟s affirmations of 
community, I would argue in addition to their points that Percy‟s notion of intersubjectivity as a 
kind of sacramental “real presence” is also problematic, and, though similar, significantly 
different from James Davison Hunter‟s notion of “faithful presence” put forth in chapter 3. First, 
as mentioned above, it seems evident that Binx‟s relationship to Lonnie is intended to be both 
uniquely sacramental and conversational in a way that ultimately bears fruit in Binx‟s new life. 
Above, we saw Desmond refer to Lonnie as “a living sign of the reality of the Word in the world, 
linked to the Eucharist, the sacrament of community.”361 Further, we noted a unique exchange 
between Binx and Lonnie at the movies that seemed to exemplify a kind of mystical 
intersubjectivity: “A good night: Lonnie happy (he looks around at me with the liveliest sense of 
the secret between us; the secret is that Sharon is not and never will be onto the little touches we 
see in the movie and, in the seeing, know that the other sees.”362 This type of knowing 
relationship seems to be what Percy affirms in his modest corrective of Kierkegaard. Yet, upon 
further examination, this sacramental form of intersubjectivity seems problematic as a 
mysterious aspect of redemption for two primary reasons.  
 
The Problem of Percy’s Sacramental Intersubjectivity 
That Percy‟s concept of intersubjectivity as sacramental real presence is problematic is 
evident if we consider further the interaction between Binx and Lonnie. Their interaction, while 
uniquely human, is ultimately also universally – objectively, we might say – human. It is indeed 
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what Wood referred to Percy‟s approach to language – a “natural theology.” And this would suit 
Percy, who, as we noted via Sykes in chapter 3, sought to establish a kind of objective proof for 
Christianity and saw language and sacramental theology together as the key to this proof. That is, 
there is a sense in which Percy intends for this intersubjectivity between Binx and Lonnie to be a 
mysterious form God‟s grace – not unlike O‟Connor‟s more grotesque transfigurations of nature 
– which, due to the signs implicit in the natural interactions of their real presences, is ultimately 
most effective in prodding Binx toward redemption and away from alienation. What is 
interesting, however, is that Binx‟s relationship with Lonnie does not involve any direct 
conversation regarding what directly plagues Binx, nor does it involve any sense of forgiveness 
despite its tremendous influence on Binx as an incitement to his reconciliation with God, 
himself, and others. In other words, the description of a natural theology is telling in that it is not 
a specific revelation. Indeed, even the key scene of intersubjectivity – their interaction at the 
movie – features them focused on a movie together rather than in directly revealing encounter 
with one another. Secondly, it seems this intersubjectivity enables Percy to retain the excessively 
Kierkegaardian subjectivity that Sykes and Wood refer to. That is, while Binx and Kate, newly 
married, seem to have also achieved the kind of intersubjectivity Binx and Lonnie have, they 
ultimately remain sovereign and searching – ever shaky in the willfulness of their decisions. 
Wood‟s assertion seems both relevant to the point and pointed in its conclusion: “Although [Binx 
and Kate] have come to themselves, they have not yet been delivered from themselves.”363 
Perhaps the underlying reliance on human reason in Percy‟s sacramental-semiological 
reconciliation between word and world is ultimately what undermines Binx‟s ethical decisions in 
the end of the novel. The marital relationship is intended to be communal in such a way that goes 
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beyond mere intersubjectivity: two becoming one retains two persons, but certainly means more 
than just two spiritual subjects interacting. Further, the relationship which marriage signifies – 
the relationship between Christ and the Church – also involves a two-becoming-one intercourse 
which requires faith that transcends reason, while also imparting more direct forms of grace, 
mercy, and forgiveness than the indirect religiousness that Lonnie sacramentally imparts to Binx. 
Again, the difference in emphasis on the Incarnation between Percy and Hunter is compelling: 
for Percy – and O‟Connor – the emphasis is excessively concerned with God‟s mysterious 
presence in nature and the grace this imparts. However, for Hunter, as we noted in chapter 3, the 
Incarnation‟s emphasis is distinctly about faith in direct, reconciliatory agentic action: “In the 
most momentous event in history, God became incarnate in Christ not only to model shalom (by 
forgiving the sinner, feeding the hungry, healing the sick and infirm, raising the dead, losing the 
outsider, and caring for all in need) but, as St. Paul writes, to be „our shalom.‟”364 Percy‟s real 
presences are, rather ironically, both too reasonable and too indirect. The actions of Christ while 
on earth – and of God in Christ toward men universally – are directly reconciliatory and not 
merely intersubjective, but constitutionally relational. That is, humans, by faith, find their 
identities mysteriously in Christ and not merely in their interactions with Christ. And, further, 
Christ‟s directly relational actions happen through his church community which is his body – or, 
are constituted by his very presence. 
 
Conclusion 
In his undying affirmation both of a Kierkegaardian critique of atheistic autonomy and of 
intersubjectivity based on the uniqueness of human language, Walker Percy provides a 
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compelling and enjoyable narrative that juxtaposes onanistic desire and marriage; alienated 
monologue and intimate conversation; and, in doing so, offers a compelling synthesis of meaning 
between word and world, infused with the intimacy of recognition. Yet, perhaps paradoxically, 
Percy‟s call for a realistic, sacramental-semiology remains too reliant on natural theology to 
produce significant, knowable, and lasting redemption; further, his call for intersubjectivity, 
while important, seems to diminish the faithful, mysterious, and constitutional relationship 
between Christ and church. Ultimately, the Incarnation of God in Christ is not primarily about 
God‟s embodiment in nature, but, more to the point, is about his divine speech-act to man – the 
divine „I Do.‟  
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Part 2, Chapter 6 
The Seducer‟s Self-destructive Family: Rabbit‟s Run into the Arms of a Prostitute and the 
Dissatisfaction with Creatureliness in Updike‟s Novel 
 
Introduction 
 There is little doubt that the dominating motif in John Updike‟s fiction is sexuality. While 
the explicit sexual depictions in Updike‟s fiction are often off-putting for critics and readers, 
what is often misunderstood is that Updike, following Søren Kierkegaard, understood man‟s 
erotic strivings, in part, as his struggle to transcend the limitations of his existence. The other 
often disconcerting element in Updike‟s fiction is his seemingly overly sympathetic tone toward 
the pervasive darkness that his protagonists persist in. As critics have pointed out, Updike‟s 
depictions, particularly in his early novels, often served, however unwittingly, to illuminate the 
Barthian “shadow side” of God‟s creation365 – the dialectical shadow of night, sorrow, finitude, 
and need which is cast by the light of God‟s eternal, creative goodness. Updike‟s 1960 novel, 
Rabbit, Run, is illustrative of two primary themes: the early influences of Updike‟s 
Kierkegaardian and Barthian Protestantism, and the dominant theme of unrestrained sexual 
desire as constitutive of a kind of freedom. Continuing with our theme of the autonomous ego‟s 
onanistic manipulation of others to the detriment of community life – one of the most necessary 
sources of selfhood, we could aptly consider Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom as Kierkegaard‟s esthetic 
Seducer. Rabbit‟s radically autonomous freedom is construed as synonymous with the 
unmitigated pursuit of desire fulfillment; yet, the erotic form of transcendence he pursues 
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produces only vacuous freedom and its attendant evils – nothingness. Rabbit runs from the 
ethical obligations of his family to Ruth, a prostitute, and attempts to refasion his drab 
circumstances with her into an ideal sense of family on his onanistic terms; yet, a family 
constituted by his unrestrained, egoistic desire produces the anti-creative waste and death which 
characterizes Barthian nothingness. 
 
Basketball as Illustration of Theme 
 Rabbit, Run opens with a scene fit for cinema, and the basketball theme it initiates is 
worthy of consideration for our topic, because of the self-other dynamics associated with player 
and team. The scene integrates the basketball motif with an introduction of its protagonist: 
Boys are playing basketball around a telephone pole with a backboard bolted to it. 
Legs, shouts. The scrape and snap of Keds on loose alley pebbles seems to 
catapult their voices high into the moist March air blue above the wires. Rabbit 
Angstrom, coming up the alley in a business suit, stops and watches, though he‟s 
twenty-six and six three. So tall, he seems an unlikely rabbit, but the breadth of 
white face, the pallor of his blue irises, and a nervous flutter under his brief nose 
as he stabs a cigarette into his mouth partially explain the nickname, which was 
given to him when he too was a boy.
366
 
Rabbit is a 26 year old fledgling businessman beset with nervousness and desirous to return to 
his high school glory days. Rabbit joins the boys in their game, but they do not dare utter 
competitive banter at their elder; yet, Rabbit almost resents this: “He doesn‟t want this respect, 
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he wants to tell them there‟s nothing to getting old, it takes nothing.”367 Updike‟s anti-saint 
seems acutely aware that as he gets older, idealistic dreams are not realized; rather, death inches 
closer and life‟s seeming nothingness sets in evermore. Seeking to transcend this growing 
awareness, Rabbit joins the boys, and seems at first to return to the days when he was “famous 
through the country” for his basketball playing, but he is quickly reminded of his deteriorating 
nature: “He feels liberated from long gloom. But his body is weighty and his breath grows short. 
It annoys him, that he gets winded.”368 The “liberation from long gloom” which Rabbit seeks is 
an early signal of his essential predicament: he feels the constraining, finite burden of growing 
old and the equally constraining ethical burden of being a husband and father to a less-than-ideal 
family. Rabbit works a dissatisfying job to support a wife who is a depressive alcoholic. And, 
eight years removed from high school glory, Rabbit is disillusioned, given his status as a prior 
center-of-attention star player for the basketball team. The present circumstances of Rabbit‟s life 
weigh on him like a sexual burden that is building to release. 
 Joyce B. Markle has provided the most compelling and extensive analysis of basketball 
imagery in Rabbit, Run, and noting two of her main points is a helpful segue to considering 
Rabbit‟s free-running autonomous desire. The first essential point which Markle makes is that 
the basketball motif provides sexual imagery in the novel:  
The circular hole of the basket is the goal, above the heads of the players and 
bathed in light. The net surrounds the hole, catching at the ball when it slips 
through. Net or mesh is also used to trap or cage rabbits, so the images of nets in 
the novel become associated with threats to Rabbit‟s freedom or those things 
which are not the goals, which interfere with the goal. Basketball and sex are 
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associated, first through the obvious image of the circle or hole, a female symbol; 
Rabbit describes the basket as „the high perfect hole with its pretty skirt of net.‟ 
The rim becomes a „crotch.‟ The net makes „a lady-like whisper.‟ . . .  
 Basketball and sex are also associated specifically by Rabbit when he 
recalls Mary Ann, the girl he made love to after basketball games.
369
 
Women are goals for Rabbit to score, and, in high school, he did plenty of “scoring” on and off 
the court. Yet, in all of this self-satisfying scoring, there is a distinct connection between 
Rabbit‟s teammates and the women who are his sexual exploits: he is the star of the show, and it 
is more about him than the others. The relationship between Rabbit and his former basketball 
teammates is the second essential point that Markle makes regarding basketball as a motif in the 
novel: 
[A human oriented] society has no provision for star players; it demands only 
„team players.‟ In his basketball days, Rabbit was a star player – „Showboat‟ the 
man in the crowd called him. He was the shooter, the point-maker. He did not 
work well with other players, as former team-mate Harrison explains in the bar 
when he quotes Tothero as saying, „This is in confidence, Ronnie, but I depend on 
you to spark the team. Harry is not a team player.‟ 
 The star player and the team players are necessary to each other; and 
because of his point-making potential the star player is allowed his independence 
and a certain degree of selfishness.
370
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In her discussion of basketball imagery, Markle has provided us with the essential connection we 
want to explore: the unrestrained, egoistic desire for self-transcendence which is often associated 
with sex, and the destructive consequences this unrestrained desire breeds between self and 
other. During high school basketball, Rabbit could afford to get away with the selfishness that 
being the star of the team afforded him; while at times off-putting to his teammates, Rabbit‟s 
self-exaltation did not prevent the achievement of mutual goals. However, the more serious 
ethical implications involved in family life and sexuality expose the socially-problematic nature 
of the independent freedom Rabbit was afforded on the basketball court.  
 
Rabbit’s Run from Ethical Obligations in his Automobile 
 The reasons for Rabbit‟s eventual running are most prevalently related to the difficult 
obligations imposed on him by his family, though his past decisions are certainly implicated in 
his family‟s current difficulties. Rabbit‟s marriage to Janice is the product of a shotgun wedding 
which occurred when “he was twenty-three and she was two years out of high school.”371 His 
glory days from high school faded into history, and the transcendence of Rabbit‟s high school 
stardom was quickly brought back down to earth. Rabbit has a son, Nelson, and another child on 
the way, but Janice‟s pregnancy seems to interfere with Rabbit‟s sexual desire in a way that is 
telling: “She stands up and her pregnancy infuriates him with its look of stubborn lumpiness.”372 
Even his wife‟s growing stomach is perceived as an impingement upon his sexual desire. Rabbit 
returns home from playing basketball with the boys to find his wife tipsy-drunk, with the car at 
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one grandparents‟ and Nelson, their son, at the others‟ – and Janice‟s depressive irresponsibility 
only further ails his already aching dissatisfaction with bourgeois life. When Rabbit needs a way 
out, he opts for that mode of transportation which, as we saw in chapter two, has so enabled 
Americans‟ unmitigated pursuit for personal fulfillment and independence: the automobile. 
 Rabbit‟s initial run from his family is particularly compelling for our purposes, because 
he takes off in his automobile – that accessory to Americans‟ autonomous desire we also saw 
prominently used in O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood and Percy‟s The Moviegoer. It is common 
knowledge that Updike once revealed that Rabbit, Run was intended as a kind of response to 
Jack Kerouac‟s 1957 novel On The Road: “[W]ithout reading it, I resented its apparent 
instruction to cut loose; Rabbit, Run was meant to be a realistic demonstration of what happens 
when a young American family man goes on the road – the people left behind get hurt.”373 Once 
Rabbit has hit the road of freedom, Rabbit, despite his attempts to push away the feelings of guilt 
with thoughts of basketball, cannot do so:  
His mind nervously shifts away from the involuntary vision of Janice‟s meal 
sizzling in the pan, chops probably, the grease-tinted water bubbling 
disconsolately, the unfrozen peas steaming away their vitamins. He tries to think 
of something pleasant. He imagines himself about to shoot a long one-hander; but 
he feels he‟s on a cliff, there is an abyss he will fall into when the ball leaves his 
hands. He tries to repicture his mother and sister feeding his son, but the boy is 
crying in backward vision, his forehead red and his mouth stretched wide and his 
helpless breath hot.
374
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Rabbit‟s sudden visions of the ethical commitments he is leaving behind – despite his attempts to 
evade these visions with self-authenticating thoughts of basketball playing – provide the earliest 
assertion that his radical autonomy pushes him to the “abyss” of nothingness. Updike‟s claim to 
be taking a pointed stance against Keruoacian free-wheeling is perhaps nowhere more telling 
than when Rabbit, having “driven forty miles to get sixteen miles away,”375 stops to ask for 
directions. In a move that reveals Updike‟s love for name-symbolism, Rabbit discovers that if he 
goes straight, he will end up in “Churchtown,” then “New Holland”376 – a small town in 
Pennsylvania which originally meant “New Design.” Rabbit‟s response to a potential trip to 
Church and a New Design is the desire to go somewhere else: 
  „Do you have any maps?‟ 
  „Son, where do you want to go?‟ 
  „Huh? I don‟t know exactly.‟ 
„Where are you headed?‟ The man is patient. . . . For the first time, Harry 
realizes he is a criminal.
377
 
Rabbit‟s self-directing freedom is incoherent; he has no sense of what direction he is running 
when dumping his family for a new life. Updike does not allow his character the luxury of 
uncomplicated escape; instead, he exposes Rabbit‟s concept of freedom for what it really is: 
enslavement to personal desire to the destruction of both self and other. Ronald Primeau gets it 
right when he says that Updike‟s Rabbit, Run uses the automobile to question the American 
Dream:  
Rabbit‟s dreams of freedom are derived from what he has read and heard about 
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the American quest. . . . Rabbit‟s anger and frustration, however, soon overwhelm 
his short-lived hopes for escape. The more he drives, the more surroundings bring 
back the same painful memories and associations. . . . 
 For Rabbit, the road becomes a hostile force and a barrier to his escape. 
He, therefore, becomes obsessed with maps, though he can‟t read them in the dark 
and can‟t remember where he‟s been. Struggling to make out the names of towns 
and rivers, he sees the map as a net of intersecting red and blue lines forming a 
maze in which he is trapped. What had been for Kerouac straight and fast 
stretches inviting power, speed, and energizing continent-crossing was for Rabbit 
only another trap.
378
 
The problematic nature of Rabbit‟s freedom is reinforced when, at another stop, Rabbit is 
slightly reprimanded by a farmer, who, no doubt, represents an earthly ideal which modern man 
has lost. He reminds Rabbit that “[t]he only way to get somewhere, you know, is to figure out 
where you‟re going before you go there,” but Rabbit quickly responds, “I don‟t think so.”379 
Later, in a symbolic fit of anger, Rabbit destroys his map and “blames everything on that farmer 
with glasses and two shirts. Funny how the man sticks in his throat. He can‟t think past him, his 
smugness, his solidity.”380 The farmer‟s solid sense of self – his ethical orientation – bothers 
Rabbit. Later, after Rabbit has returned the car to Janice for her to use, the reverend Jack Eccles 
pointedly criticizes him asking, “Why? Don‟t you need it, to explore your freedom in?” To 
which Rabbit admits, “[I]t didn‟t do me any good.”381 Ironically, Rabbit‟s drive from home leads 
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him right back to Mount Judge, Pennsylvania – where he can still run freely from his family, but 
is forced to witness the consequences of the solipsistic family he attempts to create.
382
  
 
Rabbit as Kierkegaard’s Seducer: The Esthetic Re-creation of Family with a Prostitute 
 Before considering Rabbit‟s re-creation of his situation with Ruth into a sense of family, 
it is helpful to return one final time to our analysis in chapter one of Kierkegaard‟s Either/Or – 
particularly as it relates to the characteristics of the Seducer. Of course, as mentioned above, the 
personified manifestation of the esthetic sphere is characterized by one‟s living according to the 
immediacy of desire. Thus, one particular passage, as it relates to familial obligation and solidity, 
is telling for both “A” and the Seducer which may or may not be “A” himself: 
They do say that marriage partners become one, but this is very obscure and 
mysterious talk. If an individual is many, he has lost his freedom and cannot order 
his riding boots when he wishes, cannot knock about according to whim. If he has 
a wife, it is difficult; if he has a wife and perhaps children, it is formidable; if he 
has a wife and children, it is impossible.
383
 
The fact that personal freedom seems to get smothered by familial obligations is depressing to 
“A” to the extent that he, much like Rabbit, wishes to avoid them. However, his lack of 
commitments seems also to undergird his depression: “[T]he only thing I see is emptiness, the 
only thing I live on is emptiness, the only thing I move in is emptiness.”384 However, what is 
unique to the Seducer is the qualification of reflectiveness. Unlike the more immediate esthete, 
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the Seducer is more concerned with “the subtlety, the cunning, whereby he knows how to steal 
into a girl‟s heart, the dominion he knows how to gain over it, the enthralling, deliberate, 
progressive seduction. How many he has seduced is of no importance here; what occupies us is 
the artistry, the meticulousness, the profound cunning with which he seduces.”385 Much like the 
more immediate esthete, the Seducer perceives a potential commitment to a woman as a 
constraint on his freedom, and seeks to invert the relationship so that the woman is objectified as 
a means to the end of his personal pleasure. However, while the more immediate esthete enjoys 
the pleasure itself, the more reflective Seducer enjoys his own enjoyment. He enjoys the 
excitement of artistically recreating his immediate circumstances to his own liking. He, the artist, 
attempts to fashion circumstances into a situation – a work of art – to be enjoyed. That the 
Seducer‟s extreme form of freedom aimed to manipulate circumstances resembles that of an 
asocial god is most telling when he says, “I have always tried to develop the beautiful Greek 
αὐτάρκεια (self-sufficiency), and especially to make a pastor superfluous.”386 The implications 
for any relationship with a woman are, ultimately, disastrous, for the relationship becomes 
onanistic in the sense that the woman becomes an object of manipulation – a means to the end of 
his pleasure. The onanistic imagery is perhaps most apparent when the Seducer proclaims, “My 
relationship to her is like a dance that is supposed to be danced by two people but is danced by 
only one. That is, I am the other dancer, but invisible.”387 Rabbit‟s eventual relationship with 
Ruth, a prostitute, seems not unlike much of these descriptions. He manipulates Ruth to fulfill his 
sexual desires, and attempts to recreate the situation‟s circumstances so as to seem familial; that 
is, Rabbit attempts to create a family in his own solipsistic image.  
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 Rabbit seems to have some of the same tendencies as Kierkegaard‟s Seducer. That his 
family is an impingement on his freedom is made explicitly transparent: “For in the vast blank of 
his freedom there remain a few imperfections: his wife, their apartment, their child – clots of 
concern.”388 Thus, when he returns to town from his short-lived time on the road, Rabbit bunks 
up with his former high school basketball coach and soon finds himself on a bit of a double date 
with the coach and two women – one of whom is the prostitute Ruth Leonard. While there is 
some subtle flirting between Rabbit and Ruth, the weight of his decisions are always at the 
forefront of his mind. At one point, Ruth questions him, “What‟s this about you being married?” 
Rabbit responds, “„Well, I was. Still am.‟ He regrets that they have started talking about it. A big 
bubble, the enormity of it, crowds his heart. . . . This makes it worse, picturing Janice.”389 
Reminders of the family he has left behind constantly clutter Rabbit‟s mind so as to sharply 
juxtapose his real family alongside the family he is about to create with Ruth. Yet, despite his 
accompanying guilt, Rabbit‟s greater concern – certainly one that the Seducer avoids at all costs 
– is to avoid boredom. And, thus, when Rabbit discovers that Ruth desires to hear nothing of 
Janice, “[t]he bubble rolls off his chest. If it doesn‟t worry anybody else why should it worry 
him?”390 With Janice momentarily off of his conscience, Rabbit and Ruth enter her apartment for 
their first unholy union. 
 After Rabbit has sufficiently sweet-talked Ruth in a hardened way for most of the 
evening – and though he will recreate their circumstances to seem more positively familial – his 
rapacious drives first come to the fore as soon as they enter her apartment:  
Once inside, as she reaches for the light switch, he knocks her arm down, pulls 
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her around, and kisses her. It‟s insanity, he wants to crush her, a little gauge inside 
his ribs doubles and redoubles his need for pressure, just pure pressure, there is no 
love in it, love that glances and glides along the skin, he is unconscious of their 
skins, it is her heart he wants to grind into his own, to comfort her completely. By 
nature in such an embrace she fights back. The small moist cushion of slack 
willingness with which her lips had greeted his dries up and turns hard, and when 
she can get her head back and her hand free she fits her palm against his jaw and 
pushes as if she wanted to throw his skull back into the hall. Her fingers curl and a 
long nail scrapes the tender skin below one eye.
391
 
They both settle down a bit after the initial encounter, but Rabbit remains manipulative during 
their sexual encounter. He demands that it fit certain criteria that seem to complement the 
situation he is trying to create; for instance, Rabbit desires to undress her, and he refuses to let 
her use any form of birth control. Ruth‟s response to Rabbit‟s manipulation of the situation is 
revealing: “Say, do you think we‟re married or something the way you boss me around?” 
Rabbit‟s initial response confirms the pseudo-familial situation he is creating: “Yes; let‟s be.” 
And, shortly thereafter, Rabbit says, “Don‟t be in such a hurry[.] . . . You‟re supposed to enjoy 
this. This is our wedding night.”392 The irony of Rabbit‟s seduction is completely transparent: he 
is recreating the situation of a night of pleasure with a prostitute that he just met as one of the 
most intimate, committed, and conventional occasions of all: the wedding night. He sees her in 
her silver slip and thinks to himself that “[w]omen look like brides in their slips.”393 Just when 
Rabbit seems lost in his creative vision, his guilt clutches him yet again when Ruth tells him to 
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pull the shade due to the “depressing view”: “He goes to the window and bends to see what she 
means. There is only the church across the way, gray, grave, and mute. . . . He lowers the shade 
on it guiltily.”394 Yet, with the blinds closed to the church and rings removed from their fingers 
to further symbolize the inverted family Rabbit is creating, he finally “makes love to her as he 
would to his wife.”395  
 
Nothingness and the Attendant Guilt Bred By Rabbit’s Family 
Yet, at the conclusion of their “wedding night,” it is not joy which is felt, but that 
gnawing guilt which Updike will not allow his anti-saint to elude: “Ruth takes her legs from 
around him and spills him off her body like a pile of sand. He looks in her face and seems to read 
in its shadows an expression of forgiveness, as if she knows that at the moment of release, the 
root of love, he betrayed her by feeling despair. Nature leads you up like a mother and as soon as 
she gets her little contribution leaves you with nothing.”396 The despair and nothingness Rabbit 
feels after sex with Ruth is complemented once more by the imagery of the looming church in 
the background: “The more awake he gets the more depressed he is. From deep in the pillow he 
stares at the horizontal strip of stained-glass church window that shows beneath the window 
shade.”397 Rabbit dozes off to sleep, and in the morning, they have sex again. Ruth gets dressed 
and Rabbit describes his watching her get dressed as their becoming “domesticated.”398 As if to 
fulfill the thought, Rabbit offers to go to the grocery store to buy food for her to fix for them. 
When Rabbit asks what he ought to purchase, Ruth responds, “What do you like?” When Rabbit 
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leaves, he feels pleased by her submissive response in deference to his desires: “What do you 
like? He has her. He knows he has her.”399 Rabbit becomes exceedingly pleased with his new 
situation as Ruth submits to his manipulation. His thoughts of guilt seem to transfer to thoughts 
of comparison between Janice and Ruth, but quickly return again:  
When Ruth serves lunch he sees she is a better cook than Janice; she has boiled 
the hot dogs somehow without splitting them. With Janice, they always arrived at 
the table torn and twisted and tortured-looking. He and Ruth eat at a small 
porcelain table in the kitchen. As he touches his fork to his plate he remembers 
the cold feel in his dream of Janice‟s face dropping into his hands, and the 
memory spoils his first bite, makes it itself a kind of horror. Nevertheless he says 
„Terrific‟ and gamely goes ahead and eats and does regain his appetite.400 
With the conclusion of his first night and morning with his newly created family comprised of 
his demanding desire, a willing prostitute, and the absence of children, Rabbit has begun a 
destructive affair, and the consequences of his seductive re-creation for his actual family are set 
in motion. 
 The destruction of his scandalous “wedding night” with Ruth meets Rabbit almost 
immediately. He returns to his apartment to retrieve some clothes and is immediately struck by 
his own desertion: 
Though the apartment is empty, it is yet so full of Janice he begins to tremble; the 
sight of that easy chair turned to face the television attacks his knees. Nelson‟s 
broken toys on the floor derange his head; all the things inside his skull, the gray 
matter, the bones of his ears, the apparatus of his eyes, seem clutter clogging the 
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tube of his self; his sinuses choke, with a sneeze or tears he doesn‟t know. The 
living room smells of desertion.
401
 
Rabbit‟s esthetic, experiential “self” cannot escape his natural reaction to the scene of desertion. 
Gerry Brenner helpfully points out that Rabbit‟s sexual escapades and their subsequent 
consequences are Updike‟s way of criticizing an animalistic “return to nature.”402 Yet, I would 
also argue that, in a way, Rabbit‟s inescapable guilt-filled responses to his actions signal the fact 
that his esthetic approach to existence is unnatural to normative selfhood. His “self” was not 
created to abandon his family for a prostitute, then return to the deserted scene without feeling 
the attendant incongruities of his essential need for commitment. That Updike, unlike Kerouac, 
forces his protagonists to play witness to the consequences of their actions is essentially tied to 
his refusal to allow their unmitigated “freedom” (possibility) to go unchecked by the other side 
of the Kierkegaardian synthesis: necessity, or constraints that are imposed on us by the givenness 
of our nature. As we saw in chapter one, Kierkegaard, via the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, says in 
The Sickness unto Death that man is “a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal 
and the eternal, of freedom, and necessity, in short a synthesis.” And this synthesis, which 
becomes self-conscious, “must either have established itself or have been established by 
another.”403 Updike, who affirmed man as a creature made in God‟s image, would certainly have 
no problem referring to Rabbit‟s sexual deviances as destructively self-effacing, for destruction 
ultimately results in what Updike‟s other spiritual mentor, Karl Barth, isolates as that which is 
essentially evil: nothingness. However, before considering Rabbit‟s nothingness, we must first 
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consider his relationship with Reverend Jack Eccles, and how Eccles differs from the essential 
Barthian figure of the novel – Reverend Fritz Kruppenbach. 
 
Updike’s Two Pastoral Voices: Liberalism and the Barthian Critique 
 Interestingly, it is Updike‟s novel, among the three we have been considering, which 
invites its protagonist to interact with the church in a specific way; following his abandonment of 
family, Rabbit is accompanied and consulted by Reverend Jack Eccles. Yet, given the amount of 
time Eccles spends with Rabbit, Brenner‟s comment that Rabbit is “[d]eprived of the relief of 
shared responsibility provided by prescriptive values” and “compelled to evaluate his 
entanglements alone,”404 seems a telling indictment of Eccles. And it is – Brenner goes on to 
more explicitly assert,  
Jack Eccles, the Episcopal minister, demonstrates the extreme example of 
ineffectual authority. . . . Eccles‟ failure as authority is . . . partly caused by [the] 
attempt to treat Rabbit as an individual needing special consideration. By 
piecemealing his authority in advice to individuals, he loses his larger 
authoritativeness and becomes an amateur psychologist, a „meddler‟ according to 
his wife, to Rabbit[.] . . . His concern with Rabbit as an individual proceeds from 
his permissiveness, which Rabbit resents soon after he meets Eccles: „He is 
getting slightly annoyed at the way the minister isn‟t bawling him out or 
something; he doesn‟t seem to know his job.‟405 
Early in the novel, Eccles is set in contrast with the more conservative, authoritative, and 
Lutheran minister, Kruppenbach. Referring to Eccles anonymously, Miss Arndt says, “It‟s not 
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Reverend Kruppenbach,” and the response is telling: “No, of course not Kruppenbach; Rabbit 
knows who it is, though he doesn‟t know his name. The Episcopalian. The Springers were 
Episcopalians, more of the old phony‟s social climbing, they were originally Reformeds.”406 
Hence, Kruppenbach, acting as a kind of authority whom Rabbit never encounters in the novel, is 
juxtaposed with Eccles‟ more liberal, humanistic ministry. Indeed, upon his first encounter with 
Rabbit, Eccles sounds like a psychologist when he responds to Rabbit‟s desire to hear how Janice 
is doing by saying, “She seems much saner today.”407 Yet, not only is Eccles contrasted with 
Kruppenback, but he is ultimately depicted as comparable with Rabbit. Eccles says, “Now if I 
were to leave my wife . . . I‟d get into a car and drive a thousand miles.” His comment, which 
“almost seems like advice,” reaches Rabbit favorably when he, “delighted by how much they 
have in common,” reacts, “That‟s what I did!”408 And the equation between Rabbit and Eccles is 
brought full circle when Rabbit discovers that Eccles‟ family is not in order, either: his wife, 
Lucy, generally despises Eccles for the absence of love in their marriage, and flaunts Freudian 
clichés which seemingly provide a solace for her own troubled existence. Eccles is not unlike 
Rabbit in that he has made the modern conversion from nature constituted by God as 
authoritative to personal whim or experience, in short, from God to self; the only difference is 
that Eccles deceives himself and others with his ethical cloak, but his garb is ineffectual in 
leading Rabbit to redemption, for it lacks an authoritative reference point. 
What is of note regarding Eccles‟ interactions with Rabbit is that he never appeals to 
Rabbit‟s breaking God‟s authority – only to how he ought to feel sorry for Janice. Yet, without 
this compelling external authority, Rabbit remains irresponsibly self-reverential: “Well I‟m not 
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going back to that little soppy dope no matter how sorry you feel for her. I don‟t know what she 
feels. I haven‟t known for years. All I know is what‟s inside me. That‟s all I have.”409 Later, 
referring to Eccles‟ desire for him to be transparent in conversation, Rabbit exclaims that “[t]he 
more he tells, the more he loses. He‟s safe inside his own skin, he doesn‟t want to come out. This 
guy‟s whole game is to get him out into the open where he can be manipulated.”410 These 
passages reinforce the fact that Rabbit‟s esthetic desires are his ultimate authority, and this is the 
basis for his god-like, onanistic manipulation of Ruth, and even Janice; further, it reinforces 
Rabbit‟s feeling that the responsibilities attendant to intimacy are only constricting of his desires. 
While Updike, like Walker Percy in his treatment of Jack “Binx” Bolling, is quick to be 
sympathetic to Rabbit‟s basic desire for transcendence, he also recognizes that Rabbit‟s ruthless, 
impeding desire leaves him lost in the cosmos. One day, feeling “bothered by God,” Rabbit begs 
Ruth to hold him when he is troubled by the nagging thought of why he isn‟t “home.”411 Much 
like O‟Connor and Percy, Updike clearly establishes the fact that the absence of metaphysical 
coherence and authority leaves us not only disconnected from the cosmos, but also, by 
implication, from one another. Though Eccles may be lost to the point of recognizing what both 
Rabbit and he are missing, he is at least capable of recognizing what ails Rabbit: “We‟re trying 
to serve God, not be God. . . . The truth is . . . you‟re monstrously selfish. You‟re a coward. You 
don‟t care about right or wrong; you worship nothing except your own worst instincts.”412 Yet, 
Eccles‟ ultimately psychological analyses render his influence on Rabbit qua “pastor” what the 
Seducer described as “superfluous.” However, Kruppenbach, in contrast to Eccles, would not be 
rendered unnecessary, for he realizes that Christ is the one thing necessary. 
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To understand both Updike‟s sympathy toward his unwieldy protagonist and his 
illumination of the destructive self, one must consider the dialectical theology which he 
apprehended from Barth. George Hunt has confirmed that Updike intended for Kruppenbach to 
be a Barthian figure; the Lutheran minister is “the touchstone of the novel as I intended it. His 
life . . . is meant to be Barth in action.”413 Eccles meets with Kruppenbach and after explaining to 
Kruppenbach all that has happened between Rabbit and Janice thus far, Eccles is chided by the 
Lutheran minister: 
Do you think this is your job, to meddle in these people‟s lives? I know what they 
teach you at seminary now: this psychology and that. But I don‟t agree with it. 
You think now your job is to be an unpaid doctor, to run around and plug up the 
holes and make everything smooth. I don‟t think that. I don‟t think that‟s your 
job. . . . I‟ve listened to your story but I wasn‟t listening to what it said about the 
people, I was listening to what it said about you. What I heard was this: the story 
of a minister of God selling his message for a few scraps of gossip and a few 
games of golf. What do you think now it looks like to God, one childish husband 
leaving one childish wife? Do you ever think any more what God sees? Or have 
you grown beyond that? . . . It seems to you our role is to be cops, cops without 
handcuffs, without guns, without anything but our human good nature.
414
 
Kruppenbach‟s initial chastisement of Eccles reveals his appeal to authority – both explicitly in 
his reverence for God and implicitly in his authoritative tone. Yet, the distinctly Barthian nature 
of the minister comes to the fore when Kruppenbach admonishes Eccles to quit with his psycho-
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analytical meddling and get on his knees in prayer: “There is your role: to make yourself an 
example of faith. . . . Yes, you suffer, but you must love your pain, since it is Christ’s pain. When 
on Sunday morning then, we must walk up not worn out with misery but full of Christ, hot with 
Christ, on fire: burn them with the force of our belief. . . . There is nothing but Christ for us. All 
the rest, all this decency and busyness, is nothing. It is Devil‟s work.”415 Here, we see the 
dialectical contrast between the goodness in Christ and the evil in Nothing. Further, suffering can 
come from God and not necessarily be evil. Yet, where Updike‟s particular ambiguity comes in 
is in his Barthian view of Christ‟s death on the cross. Hunt comments that Kruppenbach, like 
Barth, emphasizes a picture of Christ that is “rooted in a positive vision of the world. Just as man 
is elected in the Man Jesus, so too the reprobation that man deserves falls on Jesus. This, for 
Kruppenbach-Barth, is the meaning of the Cross in that Christ has borne condemnation for us all; 
on the Cross Christ encountered the powers of Nothingness and overcame them.”416 Of course, 
Christ may have ultimately overcome the powers of nothingness, but unredeemed humans 
remain powerful agents of nothingness in the world, and in the worlds Updike creates, Christ‟s 
overcoming of nothingness seems to have minimal redemptive effect on his characters. The 
problem for Rabbit, whom Ralph Wood has referred to as Updike‟s “ambiguous pilgrim,”417 is 
that no matter how far he desires to run from dull, animalistic conformity, his passionate, esthetic 
creations ironically produce evil and death.  
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Barthian Nothingness and the Waste Rabbit’s Onanistic Behavior Produces 
 Though Rabbit is searching for something – some transcendence to propel his life into a 
meaningfulness which is uncorrupted by evil and dour everydayness – his search produces only 
nothingness. His attempts to elude the void ironically push him and the people whom he 
encounters further into nothingness. As Wood puts it, Rabbit “thrives amidst the metaphysical 
void.”418 This incessant indulgence in nothingness has intriguing implications for our 
consideration of Rabbit‟s egocentric family with Ruth. That Ruth has “married” herself to 
precisely this agent of nothingness is made apparent when she refers to Rabbit‟s uniqueness 
among her clientele: “But this one. What a nut. . . . [W]hen they‟re good together she feels like 
next to nothing with him and that must be it, that must be what she was looking for. To feel like 
next to nothing with a man.”419 The subtle play on words seems implicitly to make the point: 
with Rabbit, Ruth is conjoined to nothing. Later, in a more familiar passage, Ruth recognizes 
who she has committed herself to: “I see you very clear all of a sudden. You‟re Mr. Death 
himself. You‟re not just nothing, you‟re worse than nothing. . . . You just wander around with 
the kiss of death.”420 Additionally, when referring to Barth‟s description of evil as the powers of 
nothingness, Hunt explains Rabbit‟s plight: “Just as the opposite of goodness is Nothingness, so 
too the opposite of a good man is a Nothing-man. The Nothing-man is one who is fascinated 
with Nothingness or who confuses creation with Nothingness or who mimics and thus distorts 
goodness: Rabbit Angstrom.”421 Hence, continuing with our consideration of Rabbit as being 
Kierkegaard‟s Seducer, his esthetic recreations are ironically deathly-cultivations of nothingness. 
Indeed, Rabbit the Seducer‟s recreation of his relationship with Ruth as a kind of family has 
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proven indirectly infertile. Rabbit‟s irresponsibility to his drunken, depressed wife, Janice, 
produces the chilling death of their newborn child. Janice, who is all the more depressed and 
drunken by Rabbit‟s absence, accidently drowns their baby in the bathtub. The deathly 
description that follows involving Janice and the baby is, as critics have noted, filled with 
nothingness: 
She lifts the living thing into air and hugs it against her sopping chest. Water 
pours off them into the bathroom tiles. The little weightless body flops against her 
neck and a quick look of relief at the baby‟s face gives a fantastic clotted 
impression. A contorted memory of how they give artificial respiration pumps 
Janice‟s cold wet arms in frantic rhythmic hugs; under her clenched lids great 
scarlet prayers arise, wordless, monotonous, and she seems to be clasping the 
knees of a vast third person whose name, Father, Father, beats against her head 
like physical blows. Though her wild heart bathes the universe in red, no spark 
kindles in the space between her arms; for all of her pouring prayers she doesn‟t 
feel the faintest tremor of an answer in the darkness against her. Her sense of the 
third person with them widens enormously, and she knows, knows, while knocks 
sound at the door, that the worst thing that has ever happened to any woman in the 
world has happened to her.
422
 
It seems clear that Rabbit‟s abandonment of his family for Ruth is, in part, responsible for 
begetting the death of Rabbit‟s and Janice‟s infant; yet, the preceding description is notably 
devoid of Rabbit‟s responsibility in what has happened. Rather, as Wood has noted, the scene is 
not just filled with death and nothingness, but with a kind of nothingness that accusingly 
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wonders at the absence of God.
423
 The idea of God‟s absence as the cause of Nothingness in the 
world is the primary source of ambiguity in Updike‟s novels. Naming God‟s absence as the 
cause of life‟s nothingness gives Updike‟s characters positive license to search for God in any 
and every way – no matter the ethical problems left in the dust of the search.  
 
Updike’s Excessive Regard for Subjectivity 
Updike, in a way not unlike Percy, gives too much credence to the subjective searcher 
who looks fleetingly for transcendence and chides the dull conformity attendant to bourgeois life. 
The lines between Something and nothingness – between Godliness and sin – seem too 
ambiguous in Rabbit, Run. The final reinforcement of this ambiguity seems most striking and 
confounding to our clear sense of the Good when, after Rabbit‟s and Ruth‟s family have 
indirectly produced the death of Rabbit and Janice‟s child, we come to discover that Ruth is 
pregnant. It is as if Updike is discontent to leave Mr. Death with the rotten fruit of his 
nothingness; although Rabbit‟s run has been destructive, it has produced something in the form 
of a baby. In fact, in the final scene, the ambiguity seems to become rather clearly the most 
deathly of self-contradictions. Rabbit begs Ruth not to have an abortion, but when she presses 
him as to why he cares, he can only respond, “I don‟t know. I don‟t know any of these answers. 
All I know is what feels right. You feel right to me. Sometimes Janice used to. Sometimes 
nothing does.” Then, when Ruth presses Rabbit to make a marital commitment to her if he wants 
her to keep the child, Rabbit, yet again, feels his freedom constrained: “The way she is fighting 
for control of herself repels him; he doesn‟t like people who manage things. He likes things to 
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happen of themselves.”424 Rewarded with the fruit of a child, Rabbit is cast as a bit of a hero for 
pursuing transcendence of his boring existence; yet, he has not undergone any change which will 
prohibit his destructive running. Indeed, in the end, Rabbit keeps running. I would argue that 
Updike‟s contentment with this problem may result from an implicit misunderstanding of the 
delineation in Barth‟s theology between the “shadow side” of creation and the Nothingness, or 
evil, by which this shadow side is capable of being invaded. To make the distinction – one which 
Hunt does not make explicit – we must turn to Barth in Volume III, book 3 of his Church 
Dogmatics: 
What we have called the „shadow side‟ of creation is constituted by the „not‟ 
which in this twofold respect, as its distinction from God and its individual 
distinctiveness, pertains to creaturely nature. On this shadow side the creature is 
contiguous to nothingness, for this „not‟ is at once the expression and frontier of 
the positive will, election and activity of God. When the creature crosses the 
frontier from the one side, and it is invaded from the other, nothingness achieves 
actuality in the creaturely world. But in itself and as such this frontier is not 
nothingness, nor has the shadow side of creation any connexion with it. Therefore 
all conceptions and doctrines which view nothingness as an essential and 
necessary determination of being and existence and therefore of the creature, or as 
an essential determination of the original and creative being of God Himself, are 
untenable from the Christian standpoint.
425
 
The shadow side of God‟s creation essentially constitutes man‟s distinctiveness from God as a 
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creature; hence, the shadow side, though different from the essence of God the Creator by its 
very susceptibility to evil, is not, therefore, a nothingness or an inherent evil. However, because 
man is creaturely, or, distinct from God, he necessarily has the ability to be in conflict with God 
even if he was not created to be so. Hence, man, if he is a creature, retains the possibility of self-
destruction – of nothingness – but this nothingness is not inherently part of who God created him 
to be. Updike seems to want to befuddle precisely these lines of distinction. He seems too 
sympathetic to man‟s desire to obstruct the necessity which is part of the Kierkegaardian 
synthesis, and, thus, too willing to degrade ethical commitments as dour obligations which are 
more complicit with man‟s self-inflicted nothingness than with the goodness of God‟s original 
creative intentions. Further, when these lines are blurred, man‟s self-destruction – as in the case 
of Janice‟s drowning her child – is more easily misconstrued as a nothingness which was caused 
by God‟s separation, when, rather, the gulf has been self-inflicted. 
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, while Updike avoids dissatisfactory attempts at redemption, he also implies 
in the novel in the ways mentioned above that no such redemption is possible in this life – that, 
in opposition to nothingness, mere “being” (as opposed to fullness of being) is the highest 
affirmation of humanity and God. One wonders if Updike, in all of his affection for ambiguity, 
could conceive of a protagonist that lived the ethical life with a passionate, transcending faith. 
The birth of a child via Ruth seems less an attempt at showing God‟s ability to produce goodness 
out of men‟s evil-biddings, and more like an obsession with a supposed ambiguity between 
man‟s God-givenness as a creature and his self-destructive tendency to use his agency qua 
creature to create distance from God. Communal modes of transcendence and redemption that 
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are generative – positive, creative – are obviated in Updike‟s novel not just because 
Kruppenbach never encounters Rabbit, but also because the shadow side of God‟s creation – 
man‟s distinctiveness as a creature – is ambiguously equated with man‟s self-imposed 
nothingness. For Updike, it seems, ethical commitments and finitude are not goods to be 
passionately and faithfully embraced, but dour nothings to be transcended. And due to life‟s 
stultifying ambiguities, it seems all that is left for Rabbit is to run around looking for Something, 
bypassing this life by playing a kind of god with others. He remains looking for modes of self-
transcendence which only perpetuate nothingness within communities along the way – all the 
while ignorant that the refusal to accept that which makes him a creature before God is precisely 
the self-destructiveness which prohibits both fulfillment and reconciliation between self and 
other, however imperfect in this life. 
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Conclusion 
 Following Loncar and Kosch in their reading of Søren Kierkegaard, I have sought to 
emphasize that modern man‟s despair – his sense of an alienated, dissatisfactory existence – is 
tied to a widespread, culturally-codified misunderstanding of the nature of freedom. One could 
argue that this misunderstanding began forcefully with Kantian autonomy and its transposition of 
the telos of authority from the exterior source of revelation to the interior source of man‟s 
reasoning faculties. Due primarily to man‟s apparent lack of disciplined, self-derived ethical 
motivation, Kant‟s notion of freedom as rational/moral agency has degenerated into more 
ruthlessly individualistic forms of self-reliance, self-dependence, and self-sufficiency whereby 
one is free to pursue his desires along self-created boundaries with little consideration of his 
fellows. That our increasingly liberal notions of freedom have ironically been degenerative in 
such an inhumane way must give us pause to reconsider the nature of free human agency and the 
contours of a satisfying existence.  
Part of the aim of this thesis has been to affirm Kierkegaard as a bit of a modern prophet 
in his keen perception of what it means to exist as a human being. He understood that part of 
what it means to be human is to be fundamentally constituted by a kind of givenness. Yet, while 
Kierkegaard argued convincingly for the individual‟s reliance on a revelation from God, and his 
need for a relationship with that transcendent God, he ultimately does not seem to have affirmed 
the implications of his own thought regarding man‟s fundamental need for community life on 
earth – nor the inherent goodness of this intimate fellowship. The fact that each person is a 
synthesis of possibility and necessity qua givenness is compelling for our understanding of 
freedom in two particularly related ways: (1) our supreme reliance on other persons in order to 
have an identity and (2) the necessity for that exteriorly-derived identity to make narrative sense 
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of our lives – or, to render our lives meaningful from beginning to end. In these ways, 
Kierkegaard‟s thought seems to anticipate recent work regarding human agency among thinkers 
whom I have loosely termed “communitarian.”  
Thus, in Part One, I have sought to suggest that Kierkegaard‟s thought – and the 
intellectual milieu which necessitated it – is also compelling for our consideration of American 
forms of individualistic alienation and despair, particularly considering Kierkegaard‟s popularity 
on the American academic scene during the twentieth century. Further, the distinctly American 
cultural artifact which both concretizes the abstracted dialectic of freedom and alienation in 
chapter one, and, thus, also clues us in to its thematic presence in the novels under consideration, 
is the automobile. While this technology, which boomed during the twentieth century, enabled 
the individual to enjoy new freedoms particularly attendant to the American Dream, it also often 
enabled individuals the excessive and destructive independent freedom to avoid or take 
advantage of others. And, in the conclusion of Part One in chapter three, I sought to make the 
transition from twentieth-century American culture to the importance of the novels discussed in 
this thesis by considering the individual‟s situation within the elements of narrative – a narrative 
that must be particular, coherent, and communal. This understanding of the importance of 
narrative and language for the development and fulfillment of selfhood hopefully fosters a 
revived appreciation of the place of literature – particularly novels – to offer a compelling form 
of science, or knowledge. The novels we have discussed do just that: they offer a diagnosis of 
human existence which modern man must consider more fruitfully as an informative access to 
truth.  
Through the particular and authoritative lens of the Christian narrative, Flannery 
O‟Connor, Walker Percy, and John Updike wrote novels which, in unique ways, offered 
Olson 182 
 
Kierkegaardian critiques of excessive freedom by depicting protagonists who experience the 
necessarily debilitating consequences of a personal freedom which is devoid of ethical 
responsibility. The relationship between literature and religion on the basis of narrative is a 
compelling one. In his article “How Religion Resists Secularity,” Graham Ward comments,  
It is no surprise . . . that literature and religion are profoundly associated, at a 
formal level, through their narrative orientation. Each determinate form of 
religion tells a story about the world; each adherent to that religion inserts him- or 
herself within that story; and each of the practices of piety whereby that insertion 
takes place is a subplot of the grand narrative schema that gives meaning to the 
various communities of the faithful. Literature too is indissociable from story-
telling. Even the most modernist (or postmoderninst) fracturing of narrative 
structure . . . depends upon the expectations of story-telling. . . . So, although the 
fragmentation, narrative rupture and syntactic breaks practiced by certain modern 
authors do not presuppose a whole, and sometimes even critique the idea there be 
a final answer or resolution, they nevertheless play with the absence of that whole 
and the texts would have no coherence at all without anticipated conceptions of 
wholeness.
426
 
Hence, the very nature of narrative complements O‟Connor‟s, Percy‟s, and Updike‟s Christian 
and novelistic concern with holistic identity. In addition to the Kierkegaardian critique of 
autonomous notions of freedom, the use of the automobile as an American cultural artifact of 
excessive freedom, and the implicit affirmation of communitarian wholeness implicit in narrative 
structure, O‟Connor‟s Wise Blood, Percy‟s The Moviegoer, and Updike‟s Rabbit, Run focus on 
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the breakdown of particular relationships: in Wise Blood, Hazel Motes starts an atheistic church 
of one that is patently against God‟s existence; in The Moviegoer, Jack “Binx” Bolling pursues 
personal sexual fulfillment with secretaries he has little desire to know, or commit to, in a 
significantly intimate way; lastly, in Rabbit, Run, Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom attempts to create a 
sense of family with a prostitute after abandoning his own family. The implicit problem is that 
these protagonists‟ excessive freedom, which is based on the unwieldy authority of personal 
desire, destroys their relationships and creates destructive ones which actually enslave them to 
nothingness, because manipulative, self-serving relationships ultimately diminish any coherent 
sense of identity. Further, I have sought to show that the dialectic of freedom and alienation is so 
fundamentally relevant to, and constitutive of, the modern condition, that some of the most 
prominent themes in each novel – violence in O‟Connor‟s, conversation in Percy‟s, and 
basketball in Updike‟s – are directly connected to the overarching theme of autonomous freedom 
and alienation. 
 Yet, despite these compelling critiques of the problems attendant to autonomous notions 
of freedom, the three authors‟ novels are also Kierkegaardian, whether wittingly or not, in the 
sense that they lack redemptive depictions that do not just reconcile man to God, but reconcile 
man with his fellows. In this way, each novel – O‟Connor‟s and Percy‟s in particular, as they 
especially intended to depict redemptive resolutions – is a bit dissatisfactory, for they each lack 
the communal resolution that the problem of existential alienation calls for: reconciled 
community life. That is, each novel ultimately fails to offer a compelling depiction of a character 
living freely and transcendently – in the fullness of being – precisely because of, and not in spite 
of, intimate ethical commitments between self and significant others. And, ultimately, this seems 
inimical to the historically generative, eternal hope of the Christian narrative, which creates the 
Olson 184 
 
realization of a scenario in this life in which communal relationships offer the compelling 
vocabularies and actions – grace, forgiveness, mercy, gift, sacrifice, etc. – that provide both a 
fulfilling identity and the essential signals of a more permanent form of transcendence. In short, 
rather than demanding an individual freedom which promotes personal sovereignty and the 
manipulation of others for the stimulation of self, our freedom must be qualified by the 
authoritative boundaries which will promote the intimate benefit of both self and other. Instead 
of seeking an incoherent, onanistic freedom, we must situate our freedom within a story which 
promotes a fruitful, unifying, and generative intercourse – and call into question those among us 
whose “freedom” or “rights” would severely undermine it. 
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